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Abstract 
In 1996, larger German corporations such as DaimlerChrysler, Deutsche Bank and 
Deutsche Telekorn started to introduce US-style executive pay. In 1998, the German 
government decided to end the prohibition of US-style stock option schemes by amending 
the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to allow German corporations to issue 
straightforward stock option schemes freely, by either issuing new shares or repurchasing 
outstanding equity to meet obligations. Most large German corporations started to adopt 
some form of US-style executive pay and introduce stock option schemes. Financial 
commentators and economists espousing faith in the 'efficiency-enhancing' aspects of 
competition and globalisation have cited the adoption of Anglo-American performance- 
based management compensation as exemplary evidence of the alleged convergence of 
German corporate governance. Institutional theorists however counter-argue that despite 
the adoption of executive share option schemes, Germany's corporate governance 
systems have remained unchanged: relational governance persists to a great extent in 
Germany and important strategic decisions are still being decided collectively, With 
employees' welfare being served through the fifty per cent representation on the 
supervisory board of large firms. 
Executive share options imply a philosophy of individualism, are essentially inegalitarian, 
and arguably allow executives to control their own reward packages by manipulating 
performance conditions, exercise prices and -the timing of announcements. Thus, the 
implicit aim of US-sye stock option schemes, maximising shareholder value, when 
analysed closely appears to be incompatible with the concept of the German firm as a 
social institution and its sense of Gemeinschaft created to enhance community welfare. 
Convergence on Anglo-American pay practices is not necessarily equivalent to a full- 
blown adaptation of a market driven corporate governance regime. Nonetheless, apparent 
convergence on US-style pay practices may represent some form of real convergence. It 
seems important, therefore to examine closely executive share option schemes recently 
implemented by large German corporations to determine whether they truly resemble US- 
style equity based management compensation. 
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Chapter 1: Laying the Foundation 
1.1 In troduction 
The focus of this thesis is on a particular component of the executive reward packages 
recently introduced in large companies in Germany: sock options. In general terms, stock 
options are contracts, which give the executives the right to buy stocks at a specified 
exercise price after a specified term. Executive rewards are just one component of 
corporate governance, which can be defined as the means which important managerial 
decisions are controlled by the firm's non-managerial stakeholders (Buck and Tull 2000). 
The international 'varieties-of-capitalism' literature in political science (e. g. Hall and 
Gingerich 2001) broadly divides world governance systems into two types: market based 
corporate governance (e. g. in the USA and UK) and relational governance (e. g. in 
Germany). This thesis attempts to compare German executive stock options With 
executive stock options in the US and UK, investigating whether or not they induce a 
process of convergence, mainly assumed to mean the gradual spread of US-style 
governance. Alternatively, such 'convergence' could conceivably be on some hybrid 
market/relational pattern. 
This chapter introduces and lays the foundations for the thesis, providing a brief outline of 
the main research question, proposition, and methodology. It is structured as follows: 
Section 1.2 provides the research background, outlining the broad field of the study, which 
leads to the research question being asked. Section 1.3 states the research proposition 
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that will be developed into a number of research propositions in a later chapter. Section 
1.4 describes the research methodology. Section 1.5 briefly outlines the structure of the 
thesis. 
1.2 The Research Background 
Corporate governance structures in large German firms traditionally differ from those in 
the USA and the UK. In the USA and UK, the structure is ostensibly focused on ensuring 
that strategic decisions made by executives are aligned with the interests of shareholders, 
which is to maximise shareholder value. This is mainly achieved by uninvolved 
shareholders buying and selling their shares on a market, invoking the possibility of 
underperforming companies being taken over. However, doubts have been expressed 
about the efficiency of the takeover mechanism and the tendency for large firms to 
takeover profitable ones (Schneider L6nne 1992, O'Sullivan 1999). Therefore, other forms 
of governance have been relied upon, e. g. single-tier boards of directors are supposed to 
be exposed to shareholder influence, through again, doubts have been expressed, and 
many shareholders 'free-ride' without exercising their voices (Noteboom 1999). The ability 
of contractual arrangements in the form of executive rewards to align shareholders' 
interest with those of executives hence presents itself as crucial governance option. 
In Germany, the control of large corporations is traditionally considered too important a 
function to be left only to the discretion of public shareholders (Monks and Minow 1995). 
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The German firm is widely regarded as a social institution and its sense of 'Gemeinschaff 
created to enhance community welfare (Charkham 1994). The main aim of the German 
corporation is thus not to solely maximise shareholder value but to strike a balance 
between the various stakeholders of the corporations and achieve sustainable, stable, 
continuous growth. German share markets are quite illiquid and banks and insurance 
companies are dominant stakeholders in a complex system of cross-shareholding, using 
their voice to influence the strategic decisions and performances of German companies. A 
system of industrial co-determination as enshrined in the Co-determination Act of 197 also 
results in employees being powerful stakeholders, where elected workers' representatives 
on a second-tier supervisory board have more far reaching information, consultation and 
veto rights on certain issues than those in the USA and UK where there is only one board 
of directors representing the shareholders' interests. Decisions made by senior German 
executives are thus not based upon maximisation of shareholder value but on the 
collective interests of the stakeholders. 
Lately, however, the traditional German system of corporate governance has been 
commented to be converging on the US and UK type by financial commentators in the 
business press (e. g. Los Angeles Times. New York Times, Financial Times, Economist). 
New combinations of political and social forces are said to have introduced new forms of 
corporate governance oriented towards maximising shareholder value. Germany's finance 
minister, Hans Eichel has been quoted in the press as saying '... German as a closed 
system ... that is over... ' and '... German firms have to be competitive or lose out... ' (Roth 
2000). Similarly, a number of chief executives of large German corporations such as 
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Deutsche Bank AG and Veba AG have been quoted in the Wall Street Journal in separate 
occasions as saying that current trends have signalled the demise of Deutschland AG 
(Cheffins 2001, Roth 2000) and that German firms are now seeking to increase 
shareholder wealth. The head of securities sales and trading at Deutsche Bank quotes, 
'... if you want equity capital, the biggest suppliers are English and American pension 
funds. If you want this equity, you have to adjust to their way of thinking. You have to 
swallow your pride and present yourself differently... ' (Financial Times 14 July 1993). 
Some evidence relating to greater reliance on the stock market and a declining role for 
banks as important stakeholders lends credence to this view. For example, an increasing 
number of large German firms, which have already listed, are reported to be turning away 
from debt financing (and thus bank influence) and seeking out broader markets for their 
shares (Cheffins 2001, Melloan 2000). Germany's previously prosperous Miffelstand 
enterprises (mostly family owned, medium sized firms that account for over half of the 
country's industrial turnover) are expected to increasingly issue shares given their need 
for capital to fund expansion against the background of tax considerations and difficulties 
with succession (Cheffins 2001, Major 2000, Raghavan and Steinmetz 2000, Fenby 2000, 
Andrews 2000, Economist 1995). Previously, only a small number of German companies 
were quoted on the stock exchange and new equity issues were rarely used for financing 
purposes. The introduction of the Neuer Mark changed this, although the outlook for the 
Neuer Markt appears bleak these days due to scandals involving certain Neuer Markt 
firms and a low level of market capitalisation. Taken into account the Neuer Markt and 
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larger DAX quotations, total German stock market capitalisation had risen to 40 per cent 
of GDP by 1997, from 23 per cent in 1990 (Megginson 2000). 
German corporations are also expected to become more shareholder-oriented because 
banks and insurance companies started to adopt business strategies during the late 
1990s that focused on investment banking and specialist financial services rather than on 
the monitoring of the German industrial sector (Beyer 2002). The big banks have been 
quietly reducing their shareholdings for some time; the number of companies in which 
banks held at least ten per cent of the shares (directly or indirectly) fell from 129 in 197 to 
86 in 1986 and the number on which they controlled a blocking minority of more than 25 
per cent fell from 86 to 45 (Deeg 1991). 
Banks and insurance companies have also simultaneously begun to relax the system of 
cross-holdings and interlocking directorates. Between 1992 and 1999, the share of bank 
representatives as chairmen of supervisory board fell from 44 to 23 per cent in forty large 
companies in Germany (Jackson and 1-16pner 2001). They now have slightly less control 
over proxy votes (Deeg 2001). The chief financial officer of Deutsche Bank declared 
publicly that his bank had not filled all the supervisory board positions offered by 
companies for some years. Deutsche Bank would in future provide even fewer directors 
and recommended that the practice of foreign pension fund managers who met with 
company management boards on a one to one basis are used instead (Argen et al. 
2002). 
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Banks that are keen to rely on capital markets to raise cash know that their industrial and 
commercial holdings are unpopular with investors (Cheffins 2001) because the rate of 
return on investments is diminishing (Becker 2001, Deeg 2001), more could be achieved 
by focusing on underwriting, and the lucrative market for company buying and selling. A 
tax reform package abolishing the taxation on profits on the sale of share blocks passed 
by the German federal parliament in 2000, taking effect in 2002 encouraged banks to 
liquidate their investments in German firms. Prior to the tax reform, companies had to pay 
50 per cent on capital gains obtained from selling equity stakes in other companies and 
they were greatly discouraged from unwinding shares that they held on to for so many 
years. 
There is also the argument that Germany's business environment is moving towards the 
Anglo-American capitalist model due to the real threats posed by hostile takeovers 
following one successful hostile bid in 2000 (Cheffins 2001, JOrgen et al. 2002). Then, 
Vodafone Airtouch p1c, a UK Mobile Telephone Company successfully acquired control of 
Mannesmann AG, a telecommunications giant, despite the latter's initial management 
objections. Compared to previous hostile takeover attempts in Germany, the banks 
affiliated to Mannesmann AG hesitated to side with the management of the target firm and 
labour, wider public opinion and politicians did not oppose the takeover. Hostile takeovers, 
involving a bidder making an offer to the shareholders of the target company to buy their 
equity with a view to installing new managers is an essential element of the Anglo- 
American approach to corporate governance. 
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Additionally, German corporations' policies towards employees have been observed to be 
changing. With rising labour costs becoming'a serious competitive issue, German 
corporations, previously so concerned about providing secure employment for their 
workforce, have responded by shifting operations to other countries thereby restructuring 
themselves on ways that cause job losses (Cheffins 20G1). Additionally, with 
manufacturing operations being relocated overseas, union power (Streeck 2001, Wehling 
2000) and work councils (Lane 1999) in German companies are expected to weaken. For 
example, there has been a growing trend particularly in the auto industry to place the 
complete production of a given model, including the high value parts in a foreign location 
(Muller 1996, Pries 1997). Foreign direct investment (FDI) strategies, although still 
primarily oriented to market expansion, show a shift towards emphasis in lower production 
costs (Lane 1999). 
To be sure, managerial allitudes to rationalisation and dismissal are hardening and 
managers who are adept at this have been well rewarded (Bloch 1998). For example, 
Daimler Benz upon incurring losses of almost 6 million Marks in 1995 closed down Fokker 
AEG concerns and announced the redundancy of 56,000 workers. As a consequence of 
this, the value of Daimler Benz shares increased by 26 per cent and the leader, Jargen 
Schremp was herald by publications such as The Wall Street Journal and Business Week 
as a revolutionary success and ground breaking organisational developer. In 1985, the 
German giants of Hoechst, Bayer, and BASF also reported record profits while at the 
same time announcing massive retrenchments (Bloch 1998). The managing director of 
Hoechst, JOrgen Dormann was even reported in Die Zeit (22 July 1886) as saying that 
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Hoescht was hardly German anymore, stressing that it considered the USA to be its major 
market and Kuwaiti shareholders having a greater shareholding than the Germans. In this 
respect, Article 14 of the German constitution stating that ownership should serve the 
common interest is now an unaffordable luxury (Bloch 1998). 
In addition, a new and important kind of institutional investor seems to be emerging in 
Germany. Faced with demographic changes and increasing life expectancies, the 
German Bundestag passed legislation in 2001 to introduce supplementary, private, tax- 
supported old age provisions, which aimed to overcome the crisis of the German pension 
system (O'Sullivan 1999). Where the government supports the supplementary pensions 
with fixed amounts, it is expected that financial asset formation in institutional forms of 
savings (investment funds, insurance, pension funds) will be strongly stimulated 
(Deutsche Bank Research 2001). By 1999, there were 34 investment funds offering 
private pensions in Germany and 25 of these were owned and run by German financial 
institutions (Argen et al. 2002). Clearly, the position of pension funds as institutional 
investors is becoming stronger. Such funds would be mostly interested in the DAX 30 
firms and guided by shareholder value principles. US pension funds with investments in 
Germany are also increasingly engaged in buying shares and putting pressure on 
company management to act on behalf of shareholder interests (The Conference Board 
2000). 
The combination of these developments indicates that large German corporations are 
faced with a changing corporate governance system, capable of further emphasising 
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shareholder value. Banks and insurance companies are seen to be taking active steps 
towards disengaging from cross-shareholding and interlocking directorates. Trade union 
powers are reduced with manufacturing being relocated overseas. German corporations 
which seek to tap equity markets abroad and locally have the onus to demonstrate that 
their shareholders matter, since international investors will not want to buy their shares 
unless they are given priority. In this light, the introduction of US-style stock options in 
large German corporations may now be regarded as one manifestation of new 
shareholder maximisation oriented activities. 
While performance-linked executive pay in the form of stock options is relatively new in 
Germany, they are very popular in the USA and UK where investors typically urge 
companies to link managerial remuneration with share price performance (Heard 1995, 
Marino 1999, Black 2000, Kelly and Parker 1999, Flynn and Naik 2000, Waples 2000). 
Managers are argued to be more attentive to shareholders' interests if pay levels fluctuate 
in accordance with the returns being delivered to those owning equity (Cheffins 1999, 
Yablon and Hill 2000, Allen and Gale 2000). Stock options stakes arguably encourage 
managers to think like owners (Donkin 1999). Shareholders in the USA and UK have 
accepted dramatic increases in executive pay as long as good results for investors are 
being delivered (Heard 1995, Oldfield 2000, Gribben 1999). German companies thus 
stand to lose out in the competition for international capital or find their own domestic cost 
of capital increasing without implementing US-style performance linked pay. At the same 
time, German companies not implementing such remuneration would arguably also find it 
extremely difficult to attract and retain managerial staff due to the competitive global 
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market. In the case of SAP AG, Europe's largest software company and one of 
Germany's largest corporations, it was forced in 1999 to give in to the pressures of 
implementing US-style option plans, which it opposed after losing most of its US 
management team to competitors. 
In 1996, large German corporations such as DaimlerChryler, Deutsche Telekom, Hoechst, 
and SGL Carbon started to introduce US-style executive pay, by granting compensation in 
the form of bonds, which could be converted into shares (convertible bonds), or had 
warrants attached which granted the rights to acquire shares upon its exercise (warrant 
bonds) and stock appreciation rights (SARs). In 1998, the German government decided to 
end the prohibition of US-style stock option schemes and amended the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG) to allow German corporations to freely issue straightforward stock 
option schemes, by either issuing new shares or repurchasing outstanding equity to meet 
obligations. Following the passing of the AktG, most large German corporations started to 
adopt some form of US-style executive pay and introduce stock option schemes. 
At the same time, it is obvious that convergence on Anglo-Amedcan pay practices is not 
necessarily equivalent to a full-blown adaptation of a market driven corporate governance 
regime. Many discrepancies between the governance of German and Anglo-American 
firms remain. Relational governance persists to a great extent in Germany and important 
strategic decisions are still being decided collectively, with employees' welfare being 
served through the fifty per cent representation on the supervisory board of large firms. 
10 
Chapter I Laying the Foundation 
What is less obvious is whether apparent convergence on US and UK pay practices 
induces real convergence. 
Theorists espousing faith in the efficiency-enhancing aspects of competition such as 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2002) seem to think so, citing this as exemplary evidence of 
the superiority of Anglo-American style governance and the alleged convergence of 
German corporate governance. On the other hand, Germany's corporate governance 
systems have in essence remained unchanged (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995, D6rre 
1996, Lane, 1999). The system of co-determination, which is regarded as the core of 
stakeholder corporate governance arguably still remains largely unaffected. Furthermore, 
the implicit aim of US-style stock option schemes, maximising shareholder value, when 
scrutinised closely, remains incompatible with the concept of the German firm as a social 
institution and its sense of Gemeinschaft created to enhance community welfare. 
Executive share options imply a philosophy of individualism, are essentially inegalitarian, 
and arguably allow executives to control their own reward packages by manipulating 
performance conditions, exercise prices and the timing of announcements. 
While institutional theory, emphasising institutional inertia (e. g. North 1990) provides 
enough reasons to cast serious doubts on the idea that a German corporate governance 
system based on a stakeholder model and the influence of banks and employees on 
corporations is converging on Anglo-American style governance, there exists little 
research examining whether the adoption of US-style executive stock option schemes by 
larger German corporations does not induce convergence. It seems important, therefore 
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to investigate at a deeper level the innovation of German executive share option schemes 
and to develop research propositions that recognise the reality of institutional stability and 
institutional change and not just their surface appearance. This thesis thus proposes to 
examine closely the recently adopted German executive share option schemes and 
compare their structures to US/UK style executive stock options. 
1.3 The Research Proposition 
The main resear6h question is therefore: Does executive pay in the form of stock option 
schemes, for executives in German corporations really induce US-style corporate 
governance? 
The thesis proposes that while US-style incentives in the form of stock option schemes 
are apparently being adopted by German companies, their structure or effectiveness may 
not be identical to those in the USA or UK. It argues that a closer examination of German 
executive stock option schemes and a comparison of their structures to US-type schemes 
may reveal a diluted incentive instrument. Attempts to balance shareholders' interests 
with the interests of employees and other stakeholders may result in the German 
schemes reflecting modified, but continuing, relational governance. 
In fact, where executive stock option schemes superficially resemble US-style scheme 
they may not serve to provide incentives for individual managers but merely exist to 
12 
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appease international investors, since executive stock option schemes announcements 
have in general a positive influence on share price (Westphal and Zajac 1998). Where this 
is true, international investors attracted to invest in German companies implementing 
executive share option schemes may consequently find themselves investing in 
companies which might not only fail to align senior managers' interests to shareholders in 
terms of maximising shareholder value, but are also burdened with additional agency 
costs where shareholder value is redistributed in favour of managers (Eglau 1997, 
Bernhardt 1999). 
Extending this assumption and based on the analysis of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, it is 
assumed that institutional theory with emphasis on culture, embeddedness, isomorphism, 
and inertia is appropriate for analysing German corporate governance. Thus, a general 
proposition is suggested: German executive share option schemes in their detail may be 
expected to be more Germanic than American in the sense of being more egalitarian and 
mode demanding of executives in a number of important dimensions such as: awarding 
lower rewards in total, attaching quantitatively and qualitatively more performance 
conditions, and establishing longer qualification periods. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
Continued interest with executive pay issues has resulted in a number of studies 
comparing the level and structures of executive pay internationally. While the number of 
13 
Chapter I Laying the Foundation 
international comparisons has grown, the quantity of research is still relatively low, given 
the level of interest in the area of executive pay (Murphy, 2000). This has been attributed 
in some part to the difficulties of obtaining and assembling the requisite data. For 
example, in the case of cross-country comparisons involving Germany, the USA, and the 
UK, data limitations arise because executive pay measurements vary according to 
national legal and accounting systems and micro-data relating to individual German 
companies have largely been unavailable (Conyon and Scwalbach 2000a). 
Information disclosure relating to stock options in Germany has however improved 
recently. The trend for German companies to list on the New York Stock Exchange has 
resulted in a source of previously undisclosed information in the form of proxy statements 
filed with the American Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). German companies 
choosing to list themselves on the American market by issuing Level 11 and Level III 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) are 
required to file proxy statements disclosing compensation including stock options awarded 
to their top five corporate executives. Additionally, where German companies have 
chosen to adopt US generally accounting principles (GAAP), their annual reports also 
contain more information on executive pay compared to those found using German HGB 
accounts. Notwithstanding this, the number of German firms listing themselves on the 
American stock market using US GAAP is few. Any international study involving German 
executive pay including stock option schemes still incur the problem of obtaining a large 
enough sample. 
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For this reason, this thesis rather than choosing a research design which will offer 
statistically representative samples and rigorous tests of hypotheses, proposes instead an 
alternative research approach consisting of case-studies, which will illustrate the 
developed propositions, and present findings that can lead to modifications/improvements 
to research propositions. Because case-studies use their own sampling logic, the question 
as to whether the sample is big enough to be statistically representative of a total 
population is not a major concern (Yin 1981). The consideration of using this approach is 
also important given that case-studies incorporate a method which purports to study real 
world conditions (Yin 1981), involving actual awards of stock options by corporations 
embedded in the German national institution and culture. 
This thesis adopts the analytical strategy of pattern-matching. Pattern-matching involves 
comparing an empirically based pattern with a predicted one or with several alternative 
predictions (Trochim 1989, Yin 1994). If patterns are found to be the same, it can be 
tentatively concluded that German executive reward does induce US-style governance. 
That is, there is tentative indication that German relational governance is being subjected 
to a process of convergence taking the form of hybrid markettrelational pattern. This 
finding would help develop theory and be useful for future research. For example, when 
sample size increase, significant tests may be performed on the differences between 
sample means and the refined research propositions can be more rigorously tested for 
rejection or support. 
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1.5 The Plan of the Thesis 
Follo\Mng this broad introduction, the chapters in this thesis are organised and presented 
in the following way. Every chapter, apart from this chapter and the concluding chapter, 
begins \Mth an introduction that outlines the main areas of consideration, and a chapter 
summary that highlights concluding remarks and sets out the setting for the following 
chapter. 
Chapter 2 aims to provide a better understanding of corporate governance and executive 
reward structures for the purpose of informing the chapters that follow. The first part of the 
chapter considers the definitions of corporate governance and provides an analysis of 
comparative corporate governance systems, involving the German and US/LIK model. 
The second part of the chapter discusses the typical structure of executive compensation, 
focusing on stock options from a corporate governance perspective. It reviews agency 
theory and the optimal contracting approach in relation to the link existing between stock 
options and share price appreciation or pay and performance and considers managerial 
power theory as an alternative framework. The remainder of the chapter assesses the 
relative importance of stock option plans within executive compensation packages 
awarded in the USA, UK, and Germany. 
The main objective of Chapter 3 is to review the main debates surrounding corporate 
governance and convergence. This will provide a better understanding of the theoretical 
context for analysing possible governance convergence in Germany, particularly the 
reward packages of senior executives and the generation of research propositions about 
them. The chapter thus reviews ideas supporting corporate governance convergence, 
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which argues for the case of globalisation and efficiency as well as alternative literature, 
which maintains that path dependencies, contingencies, political influence, culture, and 
institution will ensure that governance systems will not converge. Where important legal 
and economic changes are observed to be taking place in Germany, the chapter reviews 
the evidence in the literature to find out whether there is a compelling case of 
convergence. Consequently, it considers the recent developments in neominstitutional 
theory which seeks to understand change by progressing beyond the ideas of inertia and 
concentrating on induced changes, and considers the speed of adjustment. 
Chapter 4 develops a set of research propositions relating to the convergence of German 
executive pay, or replacement of relational influences by the influence of more open 
capital and labour markets. The chapter first summarises the findings of the literature 
review conducted in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and restates the research question, which 
was first introduced in Chapter 1. Then, it presents a theoretical framework leading to the 
generation of research propositions. 
The aim of Chapter 5 is to propose a research methodology or design which will best 
address the research propositions generated in Chapter 4, through a process of pattern- 
matching applied to multiple case-studies as a means of analysing the convergence of 
German executive pay. The chapter starts by explaining the philosophical approach of the 
research, and the reasons for choosing case-studies as a research methodology. It also 
presents a description of the research design of the thesis, focusing on the selection of 
sample and data collection. 
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Chapter 6 initialises the pattern-matching process by constructing the theory-pattern. 
Performing the pattern-matching procedure requires the completion of three distinct 
stages of constructing a theory-pattern, constructing a case-study pattern and matching 
both sets of patterns, and analysing whether the events in the case-study patterns 
correspond with the events in the theory-pattern. Where each of these steps is quite 
extensive, Chapter 6 solely focuses on the first stage of constructing a theory-pattern 
leaving the remaining stages to be dealt with by Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
Building on the previous chapters, Chapter 7 constructs the case-study patterns by 
collecting information relating to the selected companies described in Chapter 5. It 
constructs a database that records the details of individual German, US and UK schemes, 
and makes comparisons between both German and US schemes, and German and UK 
schemes. 
Chapter 8 performs the third and final step of pattern-matching. It examines whether the 
variables contained in the theory-pattern have the same values as those in the case-study 
pattern. Where the values of the variables in the theory and case-study patterns are found 
to be the same, it can be tentatively concluded that German executive rewards are 
converging, i. e. there is a tentative indication that German relational governance is being 
subjected to a process of convergence on some hybrid market/relational pattern. 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by synthesising the major findings of the research, 
discussing their significance to academic debate and any implications it might have for 
18 
Chapter I Laying the Foundation 
policy, and for remuneration practices in firms. Finally, the chapter considers the 
limitations for the research and highlights suggestions for future work. 
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ZI In troduction 
Chapter 1 explained that the main aim of this thesis is to compare stock options recently 
introduced in large companies in Germany with executive stock options in the USA and 
UK; investigating whether they induce a process of gradual spread of US-style corporate 
governance. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background for the understanding 
of corporate govemance and executive rewards, to inform the chapters that follow. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 defines and explains corporate 
governance. Section 2.3 provides some background on corporate governance systems, 
contrasting the traditional German model with the US and UK version. Section 2.4 
constructs the typical structure of executive pay in both models. Section 2.5 analyses 
stock options from a corporate governance perspective, considering the link between 
stock options and share price appreciation. Section 2.6 examines managerial power 
theory in relation to stock options. Section 2.7 reviews executive pay structures, in 
particular executive stock option schemes in the USA, UK, and Germany. Section 2.8 
concludes the chapter. 
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Z2 Corporate Governance Defined 
Since executive pay comprises one element of corporate governance that rewards and 
penalises managers, it is perhaps best to start by defining corporate governance. Different 
writers vary widely in how they define corporate governance. In its narrowest sense, the 
term describes, 'the means by which important decisions made by senior managers are 
controlled by the firm's shareholders' (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) or'ways of ensuring that 
corporate actions, assets, and agents are directed at achieving the corporate objectives 
established by the corporations' shareholders' (Sternberg, 1998). At its most expansive, 
the term is stretched to include the entire network of relations involving the corporate 
sector and their consequences for society in general, 'the means by which important 
decisions are controlled by the frin's stakeholders' (Buck and Tull, 2000). 
An absence of consensus on the definition of corporate governance is symptomatic of the 
debate on the concept of the firm in the economy. For example, in countries sucti as the 
USA and UK, the firm is viewed as a capital market institution with a primary duty to its 
shareholders (Monks and Minow 1995). Under this form of capitalism, the firm is 
conceived to be about maximising returns for those who invest in it, i. e. an instrument for 
the creation of shareholder wealth. Shareholders being residual claimants thus exert 
substantial influence on managerial decisions while other parties such as employees, 
suppliers, customers, banks, and the government are usually dealt with on a bilateral 
market basis. The influence of shareholders is also strongly institutionalised with laws in 
the USA and UK strongly promoting the securities market by protecting equal access to 
information and protecting minority shareholders (Weimer and Pape 1995). 
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Alternatively, Germany's capitalist system predominantly features a stakeholder rather 
than a shareholder economy where maximising profits for shareholders has not been 
overriding priority (Hopt 1994). The German corporation is considered to be embedded in 
society, and since it profits from society, it has obligations towards it (Schneider-L6nne 
1992). This commitment is rooted in Article 14(2) of the German constitution, which 
requires that property be used to serve the 'public weal' (Charkharn 1995). In fact, the 
German language does not even have an expression for 'shareholder value'; the English 
phrase is used, emphasising its foreign origin and alien nature (Sternberg, 1998; Wahstyl 
1996). The German firm is thus seen in terms of serving a Wider social interest and as an 
institution with a continuing purpose and social obligation to employees and local 
community (Charkham 1994). The interests of others having long-term relationships with 
the firm and stakes in its long-term success are explicitly recognised. The main motive of 
shareholding is hence to strengthen long-term relationships and business 
interdependencies and the firm is often a part of cross-holding networks with long-term 
relationships Wth suppliers, employees, customers and the community. 
Recognising that different countries uphold different definitions of the objective of the firm 
and therefore have different definitions of corporate governance, this thesis defines 
corporate governance in the USA and UK as the 'means by which important decisions 
made by senior managers are controlled by the firm's shareholders'(Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Conversely, when referring to corporate governance in Germany, the term 
construes corporate governance as the 'means by which important decisions are 
controlled by the firm's stakeholders' (Buck and Tull, 2000). Alternatively, corporate 
22 
Chapter 2: Definitions and Background 
governance could also be more broadly defined more generally as 'the means used in 
corporation to establish order between parties whose interests may be in conflict' 
(Williamson, 1996). 
Z3 Corporate Governance Systems 
Corporate governance systems refer to the country-specific framework of legal, 
institutional, and cultural factors that shape the patterns of influence that stakeholders 
(including shareholders) exert on managerial decision-making (Weimer and Pape 1999). 
Corporate governance systems can be differentiated according to governance essential 
characteristics. While the inventory of the governance characteristics is not exhaustive, it 
includes characteristics such as: the prevailing concept of the firm, the board system, the 
salient stakeholders' ability to exert influence on managerial decision-making, the 
importance of stock markets in the national economy, an external market for corporate 
control, the ownership structure, and the extent to which executive compensation is 
dependent on corporate performance. (Scott 1985, De Jong 1989, Moerland 1995, 
Weimer 1995 and Weimer and Pape 1999). 
Alternatively, corporate governance systems can also be categorised as having either a 
'market-oriented' or a 'network-oriented' system of corporate governance (Weimer and 
Pape 1999, Moerland 1995). A 'market-oriented' system is characterised by an active 
market for corporate control which acts as a mechanism for independent shareholders to 
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influence managerial decision-making. By contrast, a 'network-oriented' system is 
characterised by a relationship-oriented structure where stakeholders are able to 
influence managers directly, based on the strength of their long-term inter-corporate 
relationships. 
Similarly, corporate governance systems can also be differentiated from the theoretical 
perspective of 'voice' versus 'exit (Hirschman 1984). Similar to a market-oriented system, 
$exit', is associated with arms-length and spot contracting between autonomous rival 
firms. Agents, dissatisfied with performance, exit to the best alternative. Outside directors 
sifting next to executive directors on boards act more as experts than as instruments 
capable of influencing management (Moerland 1996). Dissatisfied owners sell their 
shares, and activities are coordinated either by price in the market or by hierarchy within 
firms. Ownership of firms is thus subject to public trade on the stock market. Conversely, 
'voice', comparable to a network-oriented system is linked to partly rival and partly 
cooperative relations between firms connected in networks with more or less durable 
relations (Nooteboom 1999). Agents voice themselves when they are dissatisfied and try 
to overcome their dissatisfaction through ongoing interaction. Ownership is in part 
shielded from public trade through private ownership, cross-ownership between firms, 
ownership by banks, shares with restricted tradability, and protection against takeovers. 
Firm owners thus try to influence managerial action through non-executive directors. 
Nooteboom (1999) proposes that the difference between the exit and voice systems is not 
restricted to the external organisation of ownership and relation between firms, but also 
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applies to internal organisation of relations between management and labour, and 
between central management and management of divisions. Le. it is embedded in the 
country's institutional environment and arrangements (North and Thomas 1973). Whereas 
firms in the exit system are oriented towards more fragmented and short-term relations 
within the firm, with short-term labour contracts and autonomous sub-divisions, firms in 
the voice system are geared towards ongoing relations with the firm as well as between 
the firm, and its environment. There is more orientation towards teams, longer-term 
employment, and the sharing of competencies between divisions. 
Observing the legal, institutional, and cultural characteristics of the rich, industrialised 
countries, researchers like Scott (1985). De Jong (1989), Moerland (1995), Weimer 
(1995) and Weimer and Pape (1999) find that the corporate governance systems in the 
USA and UK posses similar legal, institutional and cultural factors. For example, they 
share the same prevailing concept of the firm, the board system, the ability of salient 
stakeholders to exert influence on managerial decision-making, the importance of stock 
markets in the national economy, an external market for corporate control, the ownership 
structure, and the extent to which executive compensation is dependent on corporate 
performance. On the other hand, the German corporate governance system is 
characterised by the system of co-determination, the ties that corporations have with 
financial institutions, the dual shareholdings, and the nature of the interlocking 
directorates that is produced. The market for corporate control, which is prevalent in the 
Anglo-American system, is also not thought to act as a significant disciplining influence in 
Germany. Instead, stakeholders are able to influence managers more directly, based on 
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the strength of their long-term inter-corporate relationships. This is elaborated in more 
depth in the next sub-section. 
2.3.1 The Anglo-American Corporate Governance System 
In the USA and UK, the firm is viewed as an instrument for the creation of shareholder 
wealth hence the influence of shareholders is strongly institution alised. In the USA, this 
protection is embodied in, among others, the Securities Exchange Act (1934), the 
Securities Investor Protection Act (1970), the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (1984), and 
the Private Securities Litigation Act (1995). In the UK, comparable legislations or codes of 
conduct comprise the Company Securities Act (1985 revised in 1989), the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers and the Financial Services Act (1986). 
Executive and supervisory responsibilities of the board are also condensed in a one-tier 
board in the USA and UK. There are however executive and non-executive board 
members, appointed and dismissed by the general assembly of shareholders. Non- 
executive board members sit on the board, advising the inside directors or managers on 
major policy decisions while bearing the interests of shareholders in mind (Bleicher and 
Paul 1986). The effectiveness of an appointment of non-executive directors to act as 
effective monitors have been doubted by many (see Monks and Minow 1995, Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992, Mangel and Singh 1993 and Forbes and Watson 1993) with Jensen (1993) 
even querying the effectiveness of the board system as a control mechanism. 
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Stock markets also play an important role in the Anglo-American countries compared to 
other groups of countries. The active external market for corporate control (often referred 
to as the takeover market) has been frequently assumed to be the central, indirect 
discipline on Anglo-American managers. Given the deep and liquid markets in the USA 
and UK, the share price at any point in time is regarded as an unbiased estimate of the 
value of the equity of the firm under incumbent managers and the impact of any strategy 
they have introduced, providing a signal of management success. In the prototypical case 
of market of corporate control (Manne 1965), poor management performance in a widely 
held company will lead to specialist shareholders (who have no other role in the firm) 
repeatedly selling the stock, bringing down the stock price below the takeover deterring 
level. A potential acquirer believing that it can improve the performance of the firm either 
by removing the management, generating economies of scale or altering operations will 
make either a friendly bid or a hostile bid to acquire the equity of the firm or takeover the 
firm. 
The most familiar takeover techniques are tender offers, proxy fights and leveraged buy- 
outs and these may result in merger. Notwithstanding these different techniques, a 
takeover's real ability to influence corporate conduct depends largely on the tendency and 
effectiveness of the new owners to replace board of directors and senior management 
(Sternberg, 1998). On the other hand, the mere threat of a takeover may serve to improve 
corporate governance. Managers and boards may be motivated to try harder to achieve 
shareholders' objectives upon realising that poor performance can cost them their jobs. 
Even the most ardent advocates of US/UK style capitalism must concede, however, that 
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the market for corporate control is deeply flawed. Large (unprofitable) firms tend to 
takeover smaller (unprofitable) ones, and it has not been proven that returns to 
shareholders in acquiring firms have improved after takeover (O'Sullivan, 1999). The 
practices of corporate raiders of taking over a company and stripping its assets to make a 46 
quick profit or the resultant high-yield instruments such as junk bonds are also 
unappealing (Schneider-L6nne 1992). Thus, instead of providing ongoing discipline, the 
market for corporate control is often more considered as a control of last resort (Jensen, 
1986). 
The difficulties associated with internal and market mechanisms put new pressure on 
other forms of governance in the USA and UK. One such form of governance is 
contractual arrangements like executive compensation contract. Holderness et al., (1999) 
propose a 'substitution hypothesis', whereby executive rewards, especially shares 
compensates f6t governance instruments which are weak and incapable of preventing 
executives from prioritising decisions relating to their job security or salary levels. 
2.3.2 The German Corporate Governance System 
The German corporation is not, as in Anglo-American countries, seen as a device to 
create shareholder value. Rather, it is considered as an autonomous economic entity 
constituting a coalition of various participants, such as shareholders, corporate 
management, employees, supplier of goods and services, suppliers of debt and 
customers, striving for the continuity of the firm as a whole (Moorland 1995). In Germany 
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thus, the interests of stakeholders in particular employees is formalised by the system of 
co-determination, which formalises this balance of interests, and both the shareholders 
and the employees are represented on the supervisory board. The system arose in the 
late nineteenth century from an attempt to overcome the contradiction between the reality 
of industrialisation and liberal ideas about the self-determination and the rights of 
individuals (Pistor 1998). Its legal origins date from 1891 when an amendment to the law 
on entrepreneurial activities (Gewerbeordnung) provided that workers' councils could be 
established on a voluntarily basis. The Weimar Constitution formally recognised co- 
determination but the principle was suppressed by the Nazis. It steadily re-emerged after 
the Second World War with the most important legislation governing it being the Co- 
determination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of 1976. 
This Co-determination Act of 1976 requires that public and private limited companies with 
more than 2,000 employees must have a supervisory board (Aufishsr5te) and a 
management executive committee (Vorstand). While the management board consists of 
executives of the company and is responsible for managing it, the supervisory board, 
which may not include executives, is responsible for appointing and supervising the 
management board. In one respect, the management board in Germany functions 
similarly to the unitary board in the Anglo-American system where it undertakes day-to- 
day management decisions. 
On the other hand, it is somewhat more constrained, having to report to the supervisory 
board on issues three or four times a year on matters pertaining to the performance, 
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policy, and strategy of the corporation. The supervisory board is nominated by the 
Vorstand and is half elected by the employees (Schneider-Unne 1992, Prowse 1995). 
Two thirds of the employee representatives are members of the company's staff, while 
one third are external, trade union representatives (Schneider-Unne 1992). 
Representatives elected by shareholders are typically representatives of firms with close 
functional relations with the company, including suppliers, customers and bankers 
(Sternberg, 1998). Where the German law requires the supervisory board to include a 
stipulated number of employee representatives, corporations are prevented from pursuing 
decisions that lack employee support (Sternberg, 1998). For employees, the survival of 
the company, the protection of work places as well as their wage and non-wage benefits 
is naturally of primary interests (Hansmann 1996). 
The market for corporate control, which is prevalent in the Anglo-American system, is not 
thought to act as a significant disciplining influence in Germany, although recent work is 
challenging that belief (Jenkinson and Ljunvist 2001). Germany's corporate governance 
can be described as being more relationship-oriented where stakeholders (banks, large 
corporate shareholders, creditors, and employees) are able to more directly influence 
managers, based on the strength of their long-term inter-corporate relationships. 
Operating within a Gemeinschaft (community or consensual style), stakeholders typically 
participate in the more important decisions by expressing themselves through 
representatives on the company's supervisory board instead of relying on the share prices 
or market mechanism to discipline errant managers. Indeed, while attention is paid to the 
share price as it determines future prospects of capital, it is relatively rare that the board 
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of managing directors is held responsible for the development of share prices (Schneider- 
Unne 1992). 
The ownership structure in Germany partly explains the absence of an active market of 
corporate control. The more concentrated the holding of the companies, the more 
mechanisms shareholders can use their board representatives to effectively influence 
managerial decision making in a direct manner, and the less acute the need for (or threat 
of) the takeover as an option of last resort to correct managerial decision making. The 
OECD (1997) estimates that the largest five shareholders in Germany hold on average 41 
per cent of the outstanding shares compared to in the USA and UK, where the frequency 
of majority ownership yielded about 10 per cent in comparable samples. 
Shareholder identity in Germany also helps to explain the absence of a serious market for 
corporate control. Non-financial corporations own 38.8 per cent of the shares of listed 
firms, and mutual cross-shareholdings between firms are permitted and commonplace. 
German corporations can take cross-shareholdings subject to a limitation of 25 per cent of 
the voting rights associated with those shareholdings, but irrespective of their size 
(Cheffins, 1990; 2000). By contrast, share ownership is widely dispersed in the USA and 
UK. Most large firms have publicly traded shares and do not have core shareholders that 
own a sufficiently large block of equity to exercise any sort of dominant influences. 
Furthermore, one third of corporate ownership in the Anglo-American model must result in 
a bid on all other shares (Pape and Weimer 1999). 
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Two other traditional features of the German corporate governance system differ 
significantly from the Anglo-American model. The first is the ties that German companies 
have with financial institutions, which are predominantly German banks. The second issue 
is the dual shareholdings and the nature of the interlocking directorate that is produced. 
Large German financial institutions are salient influential stakeholders. Apart from their 
role as suppliers of debts, they exercise influence through equity ownership owing around 
16 per cent of outstanding German equity compared to the nominal accounts held by 
banks in the US or UK (Prowse 1995, Peck and Ruigrok 2000). In contrast to the USA, 
where the Glass-Steagall act (1933) and the Bank Holding Company Act (1956) forbid 
commercial banks to participate in the shareholders' capital of non-financial corporations 
on their own account, there are almost no restrictions for the German financial institutions 
to hold large blocks of shares of non-financial firm (Weimer and Pape 1999). Additionally, 
most directors sitting on supervisory boards come from other firms or particularly banks 
that have major stake in the firm. The supervisory board is not only used to exercise 
supervision over companies but also as a tool for business cooperation in the fields of 
production and finance (Jackson, 2001). A survey by Zieglar (1997) on 78 large German 
firms in 1927 provides an insight into the extent of entanglement of the German republic in 
earlier days: within the iron and steel industry, 28 per cent of the supervisory board 
members belonged to banks, and an additional 36 per cent represented industrial 
interests. 
German banks also play a further role in corporate governance arena via proxy rights. 
Through a legal device called Depotstimmrecht, banks have the right to assemble the 
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voting rights conferred in them by keeping custody of bearer shares of individual 
shareholders who have surrendered their proxies. In 1992, banks cast on average more 
than 84 per cent of all votes present at the meeting of the 24 largest stock corporations 
with widely dispersed ownership (Baum, 1995). This influence rests on equity holdings, 
the votes cast by their subsidiary investment funds and above all their role as proxies for 
their clients who have deposited their shares with them. 
Z4 Executive Compensation Structures 
In the context of corporate governance, executive compensation is only one of the many 
factors considered to affect corporate governance which include: (i) importance of large 
stockholders, (ii) legal protection of shareholders, (iii) extent to which relevant laws are 
enforced, (iv) treatment of stakeholders such as labour, (v) reliance of debt finance, (vi) 
structure of the board of directors, and (vii) frequency of takeovers. While executive pay 
as a governance element may not be needed if other governance forms act efficiently, 
doubts have been raised about the performance of both German relational governance 
and US/UK based governance. Hence, the development of performance-dependent 
executive compensation, commonly in the form of share option plans, which arguably 
align the interest of managers and shareholders as well as multi-year bonus plans. 
Executive compensation generally consists of a base salary, annual bonus, prerequisites, 
and long-term incentive plans such as stock options, with the value of stock options 
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dominating other sources of wealth for executives. In addition to this, executives also 
participate in broad based employee benefit plans and receive special benefits including 
life insurance and executive retirement plans. The definition of executive here relates to 
that of a main board director with a full-time contract of employment. When considering 
executive pay from a corporate governance perspective, it is the stock option that is 
viewed as the most important corporate governance instrument, where stock options 
represent attempts to realign the interests of executives and shareholders (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992, Reitman 1993). Nevertheless, as the base salary and annual bonus are 
important components of the executive pay and are awarded alongside stock options in 
the executive compensation package, they will be discussed briefly here. 
Base salaries are key components of executive compensation globally. They represent a 
fixed element, are usually determined independently of performance, based on industry 
salary surveys, and supplemented by detailed analyses of selected industry or market 
peers (Murphy 1999). Where these surveys typically adjust for company size, measured 
by company revenues, Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) suggest that the use of the 
surveys both formalise and reinforce the observed relation between compensation and 
company size, though size reflects past performance. Arguably, where salaries are 
relatively unresponsive to current company performance, they create conflict between 
executives and shareholders e. g. by imposing new risks on managers and thus 
encouraging relative risk aversion compared with the risk neutrality of shareholders Wth 
perfectly diversified portfolios (Bruce and Buck 1997). Lewellen et al. (1987) also observe 
that when remuneration is predominantly independent of corporate performance, 
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managers tend to be more risk averse, appraise decisions in shorter time frames, and 
produce diminishing risk. 
Annual bonus plans relate to bonuses which are paid to executives upon achieving their 
performance targets. Sourcing data from the Tower Perrin Annual Incentive Plan Design 
Survey, Murphy (1999) shows that almost all companies base their bonuses on some 
measure of accounting profits such as revenue, net-income, pre-tax income, operating 
profit, or economic value added. Where such financial performance measures are not 
used, individual performance relating to pre-established objectives as well as subjective 
assessments is utilised. Thus, although annual bonus plans do provide incentives for 
executives to increase company profits to a certain extent, they can also induce 
executives to make decisions which might conflict with shareholders' objectives, as they 
pursue their own targets rather than shareholder returns directly. 
In contrast to base salaries and bonus plans, long-term incentive plans in the form of 
stock options are more complex. In general terms, stock options are contracts which give 
the executive the right to buy stocks at a specified exercise price (usually the middle 
market price on the day of option award) after a specified term. They typically vest over 
time, are non-tradable, and are forfeited if the executives leave the firm before vesting. 
The value of the stock option varies according to the share price performance of the firm. 
For example, where the market price increases above the exercise price during the period 
in which the option is eligible for exercise, the value of the stock option will increase. 
Conversely, should the share price remain below the exercise price ('under water') 
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throughout the eligible exercise period, they will become worthless. The realised value 
received by executives from exercising options thus is the difference between current 
market price and exercise price, less transaction costs. Where long term incentive plans 
come in the form of 'conditional shares', they refer to conditional executive stock options 
with zero exercise prices (or gifts of shares) subject to conditions. 
Unlike base salaries and annual bonus plans which offers no strong incentives for 
executives to act in the interest of owners, and take risks, stock option grants increase 
managerial risk-taking by rewarding share appreciation in full and imposing only limited 
penalties for falling share price. For example, sustained growth in the market price of a 
share over a number of years will provide considerable returns to the executives holding 
the options. On the contrary, should the share price remain below the exercise price 
('under water') throughout the eligible exercise period, the executive enjoys no gain. The 
executive however experiences a sense of loss, if the options offered a notional gain that 
was lost when prices fell. Problems with options arise because share price movements 
may be caused by factors not relating to the company's, let alone the executive's 
performance. From the relatively undiversified executive's viewpoint, therefore, options 
carry risks that reduce their value. From a corporate governance perspective, it is this 
direct link between stock options and share appreciation that cause stock options to be 
regarded as a vital component of the executive pay. This is considered in more depth in 
the next section. 
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Z5 Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance 
The link between executive compensation contracts and corporate governance 
fundamentally lies in the acceptance of agency theory. Agency theory is concerned with 
the relationship between the principals (shareholders) and agents (executives) and the 
determination of the optimal contract which would align the interests of shareholders with 
those of the executives. Agency problem arises with the recognition that executives can 
potentially pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders (Kaplan 1982, 
Grossman and Hart 1982, Rosen 1992). Two alternative explanations exist for this: that it 
is caused by Modern Corporation's separation of ownership and control and that it occurs 
because of information asymmetry resulting from delegated authority. They are both 
discussed briefly here. 
The first view, which allributes agency problem to the separation of ownership and 
control, goes back to the proposition by Berle and Means (1932). That is, when control is 
distinct from ownership and the dispersion of shareholders is far too great to enforce the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth, those in control may deploy assets in ways that 
benefit themselves rather than owners. Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalise these costs 
by demonstrating that when the owner-manager sells equity in the firms to outsiders and 
both parties are utility maximisers, the owner's interest will diverge from that of the new 
principals. 
On the other hand, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and some others attribute agency 
problems to information asymmetry associated with delegated authority rather than of a 
divorce of ownership and control per se. When executives' actions are cheaply 
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observable, a risk-neutral shareholder could fully insure a risk-averse executive by paying 
a fixed salary resulting in optimal effort, and eliminate shirking by monitoring (Rosen 
1992). The classical agency problem however arises because shareholders cannot 
cheaply monitor many executives' decisions that are essentially entrepreneurial, involving 
judgments'and attitudes to risk that amount to'hidden actions' (Murphy, 1999). 
Collective research (for example by Mirrlees 1974,1976, Holmstrom 1978, Grossman and 
Hart 1983) suggests that moral hazard problems can be overcome via the workings of the 
optimal-contracting model. The model basically suggests that compensation plans can be 
designed to align the interests of risk-averse self-interested executives with those of risk- 
neutral shareholders, and maximising shareholder's objective. The design of the optimal 
contact has to take into account the imposed constraints of the executives' optimising 
behaviour which consist of participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint. 
That is the executive pay-off must be at least as great as those presented by outside 
opportunities; and given the incentive schedule, the executive should choose the best 
self-interested course of action. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) suggest that optimal 
contracting model also take into account the factors which have been identified as 
affecting the sensitivity of pay for performance contract. For instance, a one to one 
relation exists between executive actions and rewards when output is known with 
certainty and observed by shareholders, or if the executive is risk neutral, and he willingly 
assumes the risks embodied within the firm's assets. Optimal contract thus depends on 
reducing the risk aversion of the executives, increasing the certainty of firm value, and the 
function describing the cost of effort to the executive (Murphy 1999). 
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Relating this concept to stock options, stock options are considered optimal contracts 
because they involve trading-off both executives' risks and incentives, by virtue of there 
being a direct and mechanical link between executive rewards and share price 
appreciation. Conversely, the link between pay and performance via executive cash 
compensation and shareholder returns demonstrates only an implicit link between one- 
component pay and shareholder returns. However, tying executive pay to shareholder 
wealth directly is not without risks. For instance, increasing the sensitivity of executive pay 
to firm's performance will result in more risk being imposed on the executives where 
performance measures might also be affected by factors beyond the control of the 
executives, share price movements being noisy (Murphy 1999). The fundamental insight 
being that optimal compensation contract works in a way that mimics the statistical 
inference problem with the payout depending on the likelihood that the desired actions 
were in fact taken. Nevertheless, Holmstrom (1979), using the 'informativeness' principle, 
suggests that payouts should be based on stock-based measures not because 
shareholders desire higher stock prices but rather because realisations of stock based 
measures provide useful information in determining which actions the executives took. 
Empirical studies however, have so far only provided weak support for the pay- 
performance link (Tosi et al. 2000). For example, a negative relationship has been 
established between the share option wealth of CEOs and the measures of firm risk 
(Wiseman et al. 2001). Options deep-in-the-money lose their risk inducing potential and 
converge on shares from the incentive property perspective (Tosi et al. 2000) and where 
the executive is heavily undiversified, options granted at-the-money may have a negative 
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effect on risk-taking (Hall and Murphy 2002). Empirical evidence has also yet to prove 
whether stock option contracts actually motivate executives. Such studies are difficult to 
conduct where stock returns have shareholder expectations embedded in them (Abowd 
and Kaplan 1999, Westphal and Zajac 1998), allowing the announcement effect to occur 
prior to the executive responding or ahead of the announcement of the plan. Additionally, 
while an innovation in the structure of incentives which is followed by improved 
performance might suggest a causal link, they might also reflect the exploitation of a 
scheme by executives in anticipation of improved performance (Bruce and Buck 1997, 
Tehranian and Waegelein 1985). Event analyses (see Brickley et al. 1985, Warner 1985) 
which chart performance around the point of scheme inception are additionally frustrated 
by the announcement of the an intention to launch a scheme some time in advance where 
the event is not uniquely identifiable as relating to a specific point of time. 
Given all of these factors thus, there remain the possibility and danger that the optimal 
contracting approach is not relevant to executive pay, if shareholders are ineffective in 
monitoring executive decisions. This possibility introduces a role for theories based on the 
executive's power to extract more than optimal pay or rents, from shareholders, subject to 
an outrage constraint (Bebchuk et al. 2002). Indeed, Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue that 
managerial power theory and the desire to camouflage rents perhaps explain significant 
characteristics of the stock option plans that have been problematic from the optimal 
contracting perspective. The next section examines managerial power theory in relation to 
stock options in more detail. 
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Z6 Executive Compensation and Managerial Power Theory 
Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue that executive compensation can be explained by managerial 
opportunism and power over the board of directors. Like the optimal contracting approach, 
the managerial power approach recognises the principal-agent framework. Unlike the 
optimal contracting approach however, the managerial power approach argues that 
executive compensation are not optimal contracts but instead contain characteristics 
which allow executives to extract pay (rent) from their compensation. Underlying the 
hypotheses are the two beliefs: firstly, executives prefer more rather than less 
compensation and secondly, executives possess considerable power over the level and 
structure of their pay. While the optimal contract approach state that most pay decisions 
are made by independent boards in legitimate arm's length transactions, the managerial 
power approach recognises that executives can influence the independent board of 
directors in their awards. Executives exercise power over independent directors because 
they control the nomination process, maintain social relations with board members, and 
expect board support. Moreover, although executive compensation is set against the 
background of market-forces measures which offer corporate governance control, these 
forces are hardly strong enough to compel optimal contracting outcomes. 
The managerial power model does not suggest however, that there exist no constraints 
which will prevent executives from extracting rent. Indeed, the model explicitly recognises 
that an important factor affecting executives' ability to increase their compensation is 
affected by how the compensation arrangements are perceived by outsiders or the 
amount of 'outrage' expressed in response to the proposed compensation. That is, where 
outrage is sufficiently Videspread and intense, it Vill limit the extent of rent extracted by 
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the executives. 'Outrage costs' imposes constraints through various ways, via its effect on 
the board in the form of increasing social and reputation costs to directors, or by affecting 
one of the market measures highlighted in the corporate governance literature. For 
example, institutional investors might view such compensation as a signal that executives 
are insensitive to shareholder interests and be less willing to support the executives in a 
takeover bid. An important point to note here is that excessive compensation will not by 
itself impose significant outrage costs. Instead, outrage costs largely depend on the 
visibility of the rent extraction or extent to which the rent extraction can be observed. 
Subsequently, opportunistic executives will prefer compensation packages which are 
camouflaged as optimal contracting, and will use their power to influence design. Indeed, 
the extensive use of compensation consultants and uniform compensation are regarded 
as means of justifying and legitimising excess pay, and minimising outrage. Hence also, 
the existence of sub-optimal incentives or option plans which does not even partly filter 
out 'noises' or stock price gains due to industry or general market trends such as the use 
of options without market-index, uniform exercise prices, re-priced options, freedom to 
unwind incentives and reload options. The managerial power approach hence does not 
question the desirability of using options to compensate executives, but rather highlights 
possible reasons why the designs and magnitudes of stock option schemes do not 
represent optimal contracting. The implication being of course, that a badly designed 
option scheme significantly reduces shareholder value as opposed to maximising it. 
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It is this possibility of unrestrained opportunism by executives in the design of their own 
reward packages, perhaps with the approval of 'friendly' non-executives and remuneration 
consultants that has cause so much concern in Germany and to some extent the UK, over 
the use of stock option schemes. This has led to a resistance to generous option schemes 
from supervisory boards and government regulators (in Germany) and from self- 
regulatory bodies in the UK such as the London Stock Exchange, the accountancy 
profession and association of institutional investors such as the British Insurance 
Association and the National Association of Pension Funds. It is this intriguing theoretical 
conflict between agency theory and power-based theories that add spice to research into 
US-style pay innovations like executive stock options in Germany. That is, the possibility 
that the mere establishment of an option scheme by large German corporations is not, by 
itself, sufficient to align the interests of principals and agents nor also induce convergence 
of German corporate governance. 
Z7 Executive Compensation Structures in USA, UK and Germany 
The executive share option as an element of executive remuneration owes its popularity 
over the last two decades to a number of factors. Fundamentally, it may be seen as one 
of several instruments of compensation which seek to address the conflict of interest 
embedded in the relationship between corporate owners and decision makers, principals 
and agents, by affecting a closer congruence of interests between the two groups. More 
pragmatically, the early uptake of executive stock option schemes in the USA and UK was 
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often associated with their tax efficiency relative to other means of rewards, through tax 
advantages in the USA and UK have been substantially weakened in recent years. 
In the USA, executive stock options have been growing in importance since the 1980s. A 
study performed by Lambert et al. (1989) found that by 1986,193 of the Fortune 200 
companies had introduced executive stock option programmes. Studies of chief executive 
officer's (CEO) compensation in US Standard and Poor 500 Industrials (S&P 500) 
companies by Murphy (2002) have shown that, over the 1990s, the percentage of stock 
options of total chief executive officer's swelled from 27 per cent to 51 per cent. Another 
study of CEO pay components of Standard and Poor 500 companies (S&P 500) by 
Murphy (1999a) also revealed that as of the early 1990s, stock options had replaced base 
salaries as the single largest component of compensation in all US industry sectors with 
the exception of utilities sector. Conyon and Murphy (2000) examining CEO pay for 
almost 1,700 US publicly quoted companies too found a strong bias in favour of stock 
options. As of 1997, average salary only consisted of 29 per cent of overall CEO pay, 
compared to 63 per cent of variable pay. Of this variable pay, stock options were found to 
be the most important element, constituting 42 per cent. 
In the UK, executive stock option schemes were sufficiently novel to be described as the 
'newest executive game' in 1987 (Conyon and Murphy 2000). McKnight and Tomkins 
(1999) found that during the 1990s however, stock options became immensely popular 
with average remuneration in the form of share options increasing over 145 per cent, 
i representing nearly 41 per cent of the overall pay package in 1995 compared to just less 
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than 26 per cent in 1993. Recent evidence from Towers Perrin (2002) has shown this 
figure increasing to 57 per cent in the year 2000. 
The development of the executive stock option schemes in the UK, while lagging behind 
the experience in the USA by at least a decade, was also, in many important respects, 
similar to the US original (Bruce and Buck 1999). As in the USA, the strong growth of the 
development of executive stock option schemes was motivated by a similar blend of tax 
efficiency incentives and a more fundamental desire to realign potential conflicts of 
interest within the corporation. Also, it probably also reflected the desire of larger UK 
corporations not to be disadvantaged in international executive labour markets, where 
American firms had been the pioneers in developing such schemes (Murphy 199b). As 
stock option schemes became established among the larger British firms, so it seems 
likely that their continued uptake was sustained by fellowship behaviour. 
Conspicuous differences in the development of executive pay in the USA and UK only 
occurred from 1995, following public outrage over the perception that top managers of 
privatised utilities were receiving excessive pay increases (Bruce and Buck 199%. 
Consequently, the Greenbury Commission responded by urging UK companies to replace 
stock options with share options and/or Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) with 'more 
challenging performance criteria'. LTIPS - are essentially conditionally executive stock 
options with zero exercise prices subject to conditions. Post-1995 executive rewards in 
the UK have consequently emphasised LTIPs as a package component with LTIPs 
offering gifts of shares or cash conditional on the firm's performance relative to some 
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capital market average, to a sectoral average to some peer group of companies, or to 
some or all of these. In addition, international performance comparisons may be involved. 
Unlike in the USA or UK, CEOs in Germany received no compensation in the form of 
stock options prior to 1998. The granting of executive stock option schemes by 
corporations was impossible until the German Stock Company Law (Aktiengesetz) was 
changed. Nonetheless, there existed pefformance related pay since 1986, which 
ultimately achieved similar end as the option schemes in the USA and UK, in the form of 
'option bonds', 'warrant bonds', 'stock appreciation rights' (SARs) or'phantom stocks' and 
'convertible bonds' (Bernhardt 1999). Despite the existence of these instruments, German 
executive compensation packages prior to 1996, only contained a small variable portion 
(Bernhardt 1999) and were typically based on operative result and absolute figures such 
as annual profit, dividends, turnover and cash flow, or in direct relation to the company's 
performance like return on equity, return on investment, and return on assets (Becker 
1990). 
Indeed, studies conducted on German executive pay structure confirm that prior to 1996, 
performance related pay in general was 'largely a foreign concept' (Cheffins 2001). 
Studies of German and UK executive pay from 1960 to 1995 conducted by Conyon and 
Schwalbach (2000a) noted that the main difference in the structure of executive pay n 
Germany and UK was that German executives were not awarded stock options. 
Furthermore, after stripping long-term compensation out from the UK calculations, CEOs 
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in Germany and UK were found to have earned similar pay when firms chosen were of 
comparable size or related to comparable industry, sharing similar types of influences. 
There exist a number of anecdotal reasons why performance related pay was missing in 
the German executive compensation package. Cheffins (2001) identifies three common 
ones. Firstly, prior to 1998, German companies wanting to issue stock options to their 
executives would have to submit a resolution to the shareholders and obtain a three 
quarter majority vote. Secondly, a German company did not have the incentive to do so 
where gains from options were not deductible for tax purposes, unlike in the USA (but 
similar to the UK). Thirdly, employees on supervisory boards able to directly influence the 
structure of pay acted as strong brake on options, opposing to any incentive plans which 
results in executive becoming more disposed towards shareholders. Indeed, Conyon and 
Schwalbach (2000a, 2000b) concluding that the main difference between German and UK 
executive pay rested in the structure of pay attributed the absence of German executive 
stock options to the latter reason, highlighting the fact that different corporate governance 
mechanisms existed in the UK and Germany. Clearly, executive compensation 
innovations designed to minimise the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
executives are not vital instruments to large German firms, traditionally associated with 
long-term, 'relational' investors and a 'Gemeinschaff of stakeholders with voice-based 
corporate governance. 
As previously stated in Chapter 1, the situation in Germany has however changed. In 
1996, larger German corporations such as DaimlerChrysler, Deutsche Bank and 
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Deutsche Telekorn started introducing compensation in the form of US-style executive 
pay, by granting compensation in the form of convertible bonds, warrant bonds and SARs. 
In 1998, the German government also decided to formally end the prohibition of US-style 
stock option schemes and amended the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to freely 
allow German corporations to issue outright stock options. German tax laws were also 
changed to remove the disincentives for shares sales by long-term relational investors like 
banks, making shares of large firms more liquid, and a necessary condition for stock 
options as effective incentives. Since 1998 Aktiengesetz, most large German corporations 
have started introducing US-style stock option schemes, raising the question as to 
whether German corporate governance is converging. 
Z8 Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to provide a background to corporate governance and 
executive rewards for the analysis of executive rewards as a specific governance element 
in future chapters. Consequently, this chapter started with discussing the alternative 
definitions of corporate governance. The thesis adopts two alternative definitions of 
corporate governance which are system-specific. In the Anglo-American model, corporate 
governance refers to the means by which important decisions made my managers are 
controlled by firm's shareholders. In Germany, corporate governance is construed as the 
means by which important decisions are controlled by firm's non-managerial stakeholders. 
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The chapter then contrasted German and Anglo-American models of corporate 
governance, outlining corporate governance mechanisms used in both models in the 
process. Several significant corporate governance characteristics in Germany were 
identified. They include the establishment of the two-tiered board system enshrined in the 
Co-determination Act of 1976; the ties that German companies have with financial 
institutions and; the dual shareholdings and the nature of the interlocking directorates that 
are produced. In the USA and UK, although some direct monitoring is exercised by the 
shareholders through annual meetings, proxies and accounting reports and the best- 
known characteristic of the corporate governance system is the market for corporate 
control or the takeover market. 
The chapter proceeded by discussing the typical structure of executive compensation. 
Generally, executive compensation consists of a base salary, annual bonus, prerequisites 
and long-term incentive plans including stock options. From a corporate governance 
viewpoint, it is the direct link between stock options and share price appreciation that 
causes stock options to be regarded as a vital component of the executive pay structure. 
That is by linking pay to performance, conflict or interest between shareholders and 
executives are addressed and are supposed to be minimised. Nevertheless, empirical 
studies have so far only provided weak support for this logic. Empirical evidence has also 
yet to prove whether stock option contracts usually motivate executives. 
There remain the possibility and danger thus, that the managerial power theory is more 
relevant to executives instead of the optimal contracting approach - The managerial power 
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approach argues that executive compensation contain characteristics which allow 
executives to extract excess pay (rent) from their compensation. Hence, a badly designed 
option scheme significantly reduced shareholder value as opposed to maximising it. This 
intriguing theoretical conflict between agency theory and power-based theories gives rise 
to the possibility that the mere establishment of an option scheme by larger German 
corporation is not, of itself, sufficient to align the interests of principals and agents. 
The chapter also assessed the relative importance of stock option plans within executive 
compensation packages awarded in the USA, UK and Germany. Results of surveys 
undertaken of executive pay structures in these countries revealed that while stock 
options are vital components of executive pay packages in the USA and UK, they 
remained non-existent in Germany up until the mid 1990s. Large German corporations 
started introducing compensation in the form of US-style executive pay in 1996 and it was 
only in 1998 when German government abolished the prohibition of US-style stock option 
schemes by amending the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) that most large German 
corporations started introducing US-style stock option schemes. This raises the question 
as to whether the introduction of executive stock options in German corporation signifies 
the convergence of German corporate governance into US-style governance. 
Seeking to answer this research question, this thesis continues with Chapter 3 reviewing 
the main debates in the literature regarding corporate governance and convergence in 
order to provide a better understanding of the theoretical context for analysing 
governance and possible convergence. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided a background for understanding corporate governance and observed 
that corporate governance patterns in the Anglo-American and German models have 
continued to differ. Within the corporate governance convergence literature, there are two 
standard positions on this. Established literature in neoclassical economics argues that 
although governance pattern currently differ, increased globalisation in product, labour 
and capital markets Ml force at least large-scale firms that trade internationally to adopt a 
common set of governance characteristics. There exist strong opposition to the idea of 
corporate governance systems converging particularly from the legal theorists, who 
counter argue that competition arising from globalisation cannot influence governance 
reforms. The reason for this being that governance structures, rather than simply being 
forms of 'technology', are infused vAth prevailing politics and culture, and shaped by 
institutions and history. 
This chapter reviews both perspectives but focuses on the literature of non-convergence 
theories because it contains different strands of theories which are complementary, such 
as path dependency, institutions, political influence, isomorphism and culture in 
influencing the evolution of corporate governance and resisting competitive forces arising 
from globalisation. On the other hand, the convergence argument in the established 
economics literature focuses on the sole argument that increased globalisation in product, 
labour, and capital markets forcing large-scale firms that trade internationally to adopt a 
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common set of governance characteristics. In other words, the adoption of efficient 
governance is essential to product market survival (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This will 
provide a better understanding of the theoretical context for analysing convergence in 
Germany, particularly in the form of reward packages of senior executives. These 
perspectives will then be used to generate research propositions about them in Chapter 4 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews convergence and counter- 
convergence arguments within the current literature. Section 3.3 reviews the evidence for 
convergence or counter-convergence. Section 3.4 considers an alternative proposal for 
convergence, distinguishing between 'formal convergence' from 'functional convergence'. 
Section 3.5 provides a neo-institutional perspective on convergence. Section 3.6 
considers the speed for adjustment. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Convergence and Counter-convergence Arguments 
The theory that corporate governance patterns are converging or will converge on either 
the Anglo-American model or some hybrid between the shareholder and stakeholder 
models is well established within the field of economics. Where most of these traditional 
theories stress the role of globalisation, it seems necessary to define globalisation before 
reviewing the arguments for convergence. Essentially, globalisation entails a lifting of 
barriers to the mobility of capital, products, and labour, leading to the intensification of 
competition for these factors across borders by firms and countries (Guill6n 2000). 
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3.2.1 Convergence Theory 
Efficiency Theory 
Undoubtedly, one of the most commonly cited arguments for convergence is the much 
cited 'efficiency theory' propounded by economists such as Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1991), Demsetz (1983), and Hansmann and Kraakman (2002). According to this theory, 
the shareholder-centred model is considered the most efficient, and competition from 
globalisation in one country will drive countries and firms to adopt this 'best practice' form 
of corporate governance structure. This is because corporations that adopt a shareholder- 
oriented governance approach will enjoy access to capital at a lower cost, providing them 
with a competitive advantage over these non-adopting firms (Hansmann and Kraakman 
2002). Firms following a shareholder value model will have competitive advantage in 
product markets because their governance structure allows them to adapt more rapidly to 
a changing environment (Khanna and Palepu 2001). Unencumbered by other stakeholder 
interests, such corporation may have superior capabilities in reorganising their 
management structures, aggressively entering new product markets, or more rapidly 
abandoning inefficient investments (Hansmaan and Kraakman 2002). Hence, firms and 
countries that continue to employ an inefficient system of corporate governance will be 
punished by global markets through falling profits and shareholder value and/or by an 
inability to raise new capital (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991, Demsetz 1983, Useem 1996, 
Rubach and Sebora 1998, Coffee 1999, Hansmann and Kraakman 2002). As a result, 
firms, factories, and businesses might suffer, or might migrate away from that country 
(Easterbrook and Fischel 1991, Demsetz 1983, Hansmann and Kraakman 2002). 
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The premise here is that corporate governance differs little from other forms of 
technology, similar to manufacturing techniques, an inventory management system, or an 
engineering economy of scale. Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) write, 'the corporation and 
its securities are products in financial markets to as great an extent as the sewing 
machines or other things the firms makes. Just as the founders of a firm have incentives 
to make the kinds of sewing machines people want to buy, they have incentives to create 
the kind of firm, governance structure, and securities the customers in capital markets 
wanf. Advanced economies are thus predicted to display similar patterns of governance 
especially when the adoptions of efficient corporate governance systems are facilitated by 
easy flow of information about corporate technologies, cross-border investors and 
multinationals bringing with them familiarity with foreign practices (Orange and Renault 
1998, Tagliabue 1998, Webb 1997) and national reports regularly featuring practices seen 
elsewhere and identify them as beneficial (Bebchuk and Roe 1998, Hansmaan and 
Kraakman 2002, Vitols 2001). 
The question however arises as to why the arguments considers shareholder-centred 
model to be efficient and other forms of governance patterns inefficient. The answer is not 
generally stated in the literature. A persuasive rational however does comes from positive 
agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen and Meckling 1976) which reasons as 
follows: once agency costs are controlled through a governance mechanism, the 
dispersion of ownership is best, for it allows an efficient risk allocation. However, while this 
theory says that the spreading of property rights is a good thing, it does not really state 
that shareholder value is good in itself, which is what an argument for convergence to 
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Anglo-American model would need to encompass (Reb6rioux 2002). The case for 
shareholder value starts by noting that as residual claimants, stockholders bear the risk in 
the corporation. Consequently, the corporation should run in their interest and formal 
control rights should be in their hand. 
However, this line of reasoning works just as well for the stakeholder approach, as noted 
by Blair (1995). Indeed past literature debating the merits of governance systems, prior to 
the busting of the Japanese 'bubble economy', had predicted the stakeholder system as 
representing the future, where it supported lean manufacturing (Aoki and Patrick 1994), 
casting serious doubts on the superiority of the American model (Gerlach 1992, Kester 
1996). Thus Bishop (1994) writing in the Economist magazine, admits that '... predicting 
trends in corporate governance is a tricky business. Five years ago the long-termism of 
the Japanese and Germans seemed the best course; and the turmoil caused by the 
hostile bids in American and Britain seemed the opposite. Now things look different'. 
Charkham (1995) also offers a detailed analysis of cross-national differences but leaves it 
up to the reader to decide which the'best'model is. 
Some political economists have also predicted that convergence will occur. For example, 
where international financial markets can move large sums of money out of countries, 
governance systems can be coerced to prioritise measures which will preserve the value 
of capital (Andrews 1994, Epstein 1996, Cerny 1996). In addition, countries accepting 
financial assistance from international organisations like the International Money Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank have had to commit to fundamental reform of their corporate 
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governance system in the direction of the American model (See IMF 1999, Bratton and 
Cahery 1999). 
3.2.2 Counter-Convergence Theory 
Path Dependency 
The view that corporate systems are likely to converge on a universally 'best-practice' is 
rejected by theorists such as Bebchuk and Roe (1998,2000) who invoked the concept of 
path dependence based on traditional institutional theory. According to theory of path 
dependency, initial conditions, whether established by historical accident or political 
compromise, direct an economy down a particular path of development from which there 
is no easy return. Consequently, even though there might be powerful forces pressing 
towards the adoption of an 'efficienf system, the outcome might still appear inefficient. For 
example, governance emerging from the Glass-Steagall Act, which effectively divorced 
commercial and investment banking have resulted in a proliferation of local financial 
intermediaries which are too small and legally constrained to effectively monitor the US 
industry (Roe 1994). The Glass-Steagall Act was initially established by the US political 
tradition which was sceptical of concentrated financial power and concerned with making 
law which limited the activities of banks and specified tight, anti-trust constraints on 
collaborative arrangements between firms in the same industry. 
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Clearly, the most important implication of path dependency on corporate governance and 
convergence is that once events have been set in motion and historical forces have 
produced significant national variations in the structure and design of corporate 
governance systems, there may be no answer to the question of what incremental 
changes are most efficient (Coffee 1999). North (1990) writes that although complex 
systems of laws and regulations evolve in a path-dependent way and are resistant to 
change, radical change may still be possible during times of 'conquest or revolution'. 
Studies by Buck and Tull (2000) however show that during the 'conquest' of US military 
occupation (1945 - 1952), German governance remained resistant to convergence. 
Although the occupying forces were in a very strong position to reform corporate 
governance in Germany in their own image, governance reforms actually implemented 
owed a heavy debt to German history and culture, and many Allied proposals were either 
ignored or dropped as a result of the Cold War and market forces. 
Institutions 
The view that corporate systems are likely to converge due to efficiency considerations is 
also refuted by who believe in the institutional theory. Institutional theory originally evolved 
from the discipline of sociology, which states that different corporate governance systems 
enable firms and countries to excel at different kinds of activities in the global economy, 
and different governance mechanisms can perform equally well in different contingent 
environments. It is thus futile to attempt to identify the best practice or model in the 
abstract (Guill6n 1994, Whitley 1992,1999). Countries and their firms are institutionally 
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equipped to follow different competitive strategies in the global economy, and corporate 
governance is an institutional instrument facilitating specific competitive strategies 
(Bebchuk and Roe 1998, Buhner et al. 1998, Kester 1996, Kim and Hoskisson 1996, 
Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1996). 
For example, many German, French, Japanese and American firms have managed to 
retain their competitive edge by following different strategies, which are closely intertwined 
with their corporate governance systems. Germany's educational and industrial 
institutions of dual apprenticeship system, management union cooperation, dual board 
corporate governance system, and traditions of hands on engineering have enabled 
companies to excel in high quality, engineering-intensive industries such as advanced 
machine tools, luxury automobiles, and specialty chemicals. The participation of labour in 
the supervisory boards of German corporation has also been a key mechanism 
compelling firms to look for smart ways of employing the skills of their expensive but 
sophisticated and productive workers (Hollingworth et al. 1994, Streeck 1991,1995, 
Soskice, 1998). Also, Korea successfully exported mass-produced automobiles, 
consumer electronics, chemical and steel (until 2000, at least) though its indigenous 
pattern of social organisation and corporate governance underpinning the rise of large, 
capital-intensive and diversified conglomerates known as chaebol (Guill6n 2000). 
It follows therefore that systems which are deemed to be efficient in one context may not 
be considered to be efficient in another, especially 'if reforms are implemented on a 
piecemeal basis. A particular practice can only be efficient in any given context if is 
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compatible with another practice that is prevailing in that context. Indeed, the adoption of 
allegedly 'efficient' governance might even produce inconsistent evolutionary adaptations 
in differing economic environments (Gordon 1998). For example: an Anglo-American style 
of corporate governance adopted in a heavily leveraged German firm would not work well 
if corporate control was assigned to a board of directors only responsible to the 
shareholders. Perverse incentives would arise for the equity shareholders to pursue 
inefficient strategies that would transfer wealth from the creditors towards holders of 
equity. Clearly, optimal monitoring in these circumstances is contingent on the capital 
structure that the firms have in that particular economic environment. 
Political Influence 
Another counter-convergence theory is the opinion that corporate governance models and 
practices are influenced by political interests. Closely related to path-dependence theory, 
it argues that political forces of each stakeholder group have the power to shape and 
perhaps derail any radical change imposed (La Porta et al. 1999). Hence, it does not 
matter whether a more efficient regime of corporate governance could be demonstrated to 
exist; inertial political forces would still be sufficiently powerful to preserve the less 
efficient status quo (Millhaupt 1998, Gordon 1998). Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) define this 
as 'political embeddedness', where institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for 
power that involves economic actions and non-market institutions. For instance, systems 
in which banks are successful players in corporate governance are unlikely to evolve 
towards the market-based system if only because banking interests will be opposed 
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(O'Sullivan 1999). Millhaupt (1998) thus writes that regardless of whether a more efficient 
regime of corporate governance could be demonstrated to exist, inertial political forces 
would still be sufficiently powerful to preserve the status quo. 
The study on the diffusion of corporate governance and organisational forms in general is 
full of detailed analysis of how domestic political contingencies affect outcomes. 
Commonly, domestic politics were found to mediate the relationship between external 
pressures and outcomes and scholars such as Macey and Miller (1995), O'Sullivan (1999) 
found no theoretical reasons why the impact of globalisation on corporate governance 
should be any different. Djelic (1998) provides compelling historical evidence that under 
pressure from Marshall Planners and advisors, German politicians, industrialists and 
labour leaders resisted the direct implementation of American corporate governance and 
industrial organisational blueprints during the 1950s. Domestic actors were found to be 
able to shape and mould American models to their own goals and priorities. Outcomes 
also depended on the resulting interactions and collaborative ties between executives, 
shareholders, financial institutions, suppliers and employees supported by the different set 
of banking, labour, tax, and competition laws and regulations. 
Gordon (1998) additionally finds that even if a particular governance structure is found to 
be efficient, it is not necessarily in the interest of all groups in society to modify existing 
law or structure or to permit such reforms. Coffee (2000) for instance views shareholders 
as the classic example of an 'inchoate group', a group defined by Olson (1982) as 'a 
group that although large in number is not well organised and hence might have less 
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ability to influence political decisions than smaller but better organised groups such as 
labour, or corporate managers. Referring to the failed hostile takeover of Thyssen by 
Krupp in 1997 in Germany, Coffee (2000) further observes that political interest resulted 
from protests by Thyssen's union towards Krupp and its investment advisor Deutsche 
Bank lead to the German government brokering a long-term consolidation, which reduced 
the number of threatened job losses. 
Now-institutional Theory 
New-Institutional theorists argue that 'isomorphism' (DiMaggio and Powel 1983) is more 
influential in determining the formal structures in an organisation, often more profoundly 
than market pressures. This is because new and existing organisations faced with the 
same set of institutional environment will tend to adopt the same organisational forms or 
'templates for organising' (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) because failure to adopt these 
forms will be seen as irrational and negligent (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983, Scott 1987,1998). Nationally established organisations thus usually conform 
and adopt the expected appropriate organisational structures to gain legitimacy and 
increase their probability of survival. There are three distinct pressures though which 
institutional isomorphism occurs: coercive pressures arising from legal mandates or 
influence from the environment which is being dependent upon, mimetic pressures to 
copy successful forms in times of high uncertainty and normative pressures arising from 
similar attitudes and approaches of professional groups and associations brought into the 
organisations through hiring practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
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Culture 
Although national culture is difficult to define with any precision (Licht 2001), it is strong 
though controversial theme in the determination of political, legal and economic 
institutions, influencing the assimilation of institutional innovations within corporate 
governance systems. Where cultural influence cannot explicitly explain variations (Lane 
1989, Whiteley 1992), an institutional perspective considers culture as being embedded in 
observable social, political and economic institutions such as education, training, 
workplace representation and social relations (Peng 2000, Crang 1997, McDowell 1994). 
National institutions may thus embody, promote and defend national culture (Roe 1993, 
1997, Bebchuk and Roe 1998) and top officers in large companies everywhere are 
embedded in social structures that link actors, influence and legislation (Davis and 
Thompson 1994). 
The dimensions of national culture continue to be used in international business research 
in relation to associations between culture and the entrepreneurship (Begley and Tan 
2001), wages and employee voice (Van der Wert 2001, Thomas and Au 2003), entry 
mode choice (Brouthers 2002) and the performance of joint ventures as entry modes 
(Pothyckuchi et aL 2002). National culture has also been frequently drawn upon to help 
explain why institutions continue to differ considerably within countries (Gross and 
Wingerup 1999, Conyon and Murphy 2000). Cheffins (2003) analyses culture as a 
variable that may affect the globalisation of executive pay and observes that the 
meritocratic and 'winner take all' environment in the USA is more hospitable for lucrative, 
performance oriented managerial pay than the milieu elsewhere. Banking and tax laws in 
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the USA discourage relational investments by banks in industrial firms, and encourage 
them in Germany and Japan (Roe 1997). Anti-takeover devices have been gradually 
eroded by shareholder activism in the USA (Davis and Thompson 1994), while dual-board 
governance is allowed to obstruct takeovers in Germany. In this case, national culture and 
institutions become inextricably intertwined in their impact on corporate governance 
system. Patterns of pay maybe influence by a culture embracing high collectivism, that will 
itself influence tax regulations and other important institutional arrangements that in turn 
impinge upon the design of executive pay packages. 
Table 3.1: Dimensions of National Culture (Hofstede, 1997) 
USAWK Germany Japan 
Collectivism Low (9/11) Moderate (33) Moderate (54) 
Uncertainty Low (46/35) Moderate (65) High (92) 
Avoidance 
Power Distance 
Tolerance Low (40/35) Low (35) Moderate (54) 
Table 3.1 reports the three main national cultural attributes that may influence governance 
institutions for the four countries under consideration (Hofstede 1997). A low-high 
spectrum runs generally from left to right in Table 3.1, with the familiar low collectivism, 
low uncertainty avoidance, low power distance tolerance of the USA and UK contrasting 
with national culture in Russia, Germany and Japan. Low US/UK levels of power-distance 
tolerance, collectivism and uncertainty avoidance have implications for particular elements 
of corporate governance systems. For example, the open disclosure of company 
information to outsiders and minority shareholder protection is demanded by highly 
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individualistic shareholders with low power distance tolerance in relation to executives, 
and low uncertainty avoidance makes shareholders and executives willing to accept the 
risks involved in open disclosure. With legal, fiscal, social, political and economic 
institutions embedded in the distinctive national cultures of the USA and UK, the 
resistance of prevailing governance structures to proposed reforms that purport to 
advance collectivism, hierarchical control by executives, or insurance against risks for 
stakeholders can be understood. Hence, in these circumstances, interest groups from all 
sides tend to defend the status quo (Davis and Thompson 1994). 
Thus, UK governance has been resistant to the attempts made by the European Union 
(EU) to impose works councils on large UK firms to advance employee participation and 
collectivism. By way of contrast, in the case of Germany, higher levels of collectivism and 
uncertainty avoidance manifest themselves in voice-based governance institutions that 
are said to comprise a community, or Gemeinschaft of stakeholders (Schenider-L6nne 
1992). With moderate levels of collectivism, trust is an important feature of German firms, 
where incumbent employees and managers form coalitions and each party forgoes 
individual opportunities for short-term gain in favour of longer-term collective gains (Pistor 
1998). As a result, banks and employees, fearing the uncertainty of takeover and 
liquidation, are strongly represented on upper-tier, supervisory boards, and encourage the 
accumulation of labour and financial reserves by firms (Macey and Miller 1997). The 
efforts by the EU to construct a takeover code that would force German firms to permit 
takeovers according to the democratic wishes of individual shareholders have 
consequently been blocked. 
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3.3 The Evidence 
Within the literature, there exists no study so far which has been able to provide evidence 
that there is an unambiguous direct link between corporate governance and economic 
performance, thereby supporting the argument for convergence, in particular the 
efficiency theory. Instead, results of studies have brought up the possibility that corporate 
governance does not alone determine performance and that different corporate 
governance systems enable firms and countries to excel at different kinds of activities at 
different stages of the trade cycle. Quantitative studies undertaken by Thomsen and 
Pedersen (1996) show that differences in corporate governance across advances 
industrial economies are not significantly associated with differences in financial or sales 
performance at the company level, after controlling for industry and firm size. They also 
imply that a shareholder-orientation may be best suited to downturns in economic activity. 
Similarly, La Porta et al. (1999) also find no evidence to indicate that differences in 
corporate governance systems consistently affect GDP growth over the long run. 
The literature has documented great cross-national differences in terms of such essential 
aspects of corporate governance as the importance of large stockholders, the legal 
protection of shareholders, the extent to which relevant laws are enforced, the treatment 
of stakeholders such as labour, the reliance of debt finance, the structure of the board of 
directors, the way in which executives are compensated, and the frequency of takeovers. 
Concentrated ownership is still the rule rather than the exception throughout the world, 
and so is family control of even the largest corporations in most countries (Becht & Roll 
1999, La Porta et al. 1998,1999, Loredo and Suarez 1998, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 
Thomsen and Pedersen 1996). The extant literature has not however produced 
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longitudinal evidence documenting changes in corporate governance practices for a 
number of countries large enough to confirm whether there is convergence to the 'efficient 
Anglo-American' system in the world. 
Observing the lack of evidence in the literature, Guill6n (1999,2000) thus compare the 
rich and emerging countries in terms of: (i) foreign direct investment by firms under the 
influence of various governance systems in their home countries; (ii) the influence of 
institutional investors; (iii) the proportion of listed corporate equity held by different types 
of shareholders; (iv) the adoption of long-term incentives in CEO remuneration; (v) the 
occurrence of hostile takeovers; and (vi) the balance between debt and equity financing 
struck by non-financial firms. His findings indicate that: (i) the impact of foreign 
investment originating from countries With an Anglo-American market based corporate 
governance system is waning; (ii) institutional investors such as insurance companies, 
pension funds and investment companies have a very unequal presence across countries 
where it is highest in the UK and US and barely growing in Germany; (iii) patterns of 
stockholding have been remarkably resilient with the German tradition differing sharply 
from the Anglo-American one; (iv) only the Anglo-American countries were found using 
executive pay as a corporate governance mechanism and awarding long-term incentives 
in CEO remunerations; (v) the occurrence of hostile takeovers was not found to be 
worldwide phenomenon, but one largely confined to the US and the UK, both in terms of 
targets and acquirers and; (Vi) the debt-equity ratios of non-financial firms remain very 
different across countries studied with Germany only showing few signs of convergence 
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over the last two decades. Guill6n (1999) thus concludes that corporate governance 
systems are unlikely to converge across countries. 
A surprising result of the Guill6n (1999) study is the finding that Germany is insensitive to 
the global trend towards adopting long-term incentives in CEO remunerations when in fact 
larger German corporations had since 1996 started adopting long-term incentive forms 
similar to US-style stock option schemes for its senior executives. Indeed, the introduction 
of executive stock option schemes in Germany had attracted considerable academic 
attention for portraying alleged corporate governance convergence. Assessing the 
importance of such equity-based pay in Germany, Peck and Ruigrok (2002) performed 
company surveys and found that although equity-based pay is far from universal in 
Germany (35 per cent of sampled companies had no stock based schemes), it is an 
increasingly important phenomenon of the German pay scheme. Le. stock option plans 
are the most prevalent form of equity-based pay in Germany existing in 55 per cent of the 
companies surveyed. The survey also discovered that most of the companies were aware 
of the importance of paying for performance with 78 per cent of companies using financial 
criteria in their bonus plans. Where the study by Guill6n (1999) also failed to comment on 
the significance of the hostile takeover succeeding in Germany, it is assumed that this is 
because the study was not concerned with specific country analysis. 
Coffee (2001) considers that recent evidence demonstrating law reforms in transition 
economies, weakening structure of concentrated ownership in Germany, France and 
Japan, the growth of European stock markets and the emergence of the market for 
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corporate control outside Anglo-American countries indicate that corporate governance is 
converging globally (Coffee 2001). A study by Pistor (2000) tracking the development of 
shareholder and creditor rights for twenty-four transition economies from 1990 through 
1994 showed that despite substantial differences in the initial conditions across countries, 
there is a strong tendency towards convergence of formal legal rules as the result of 
extensive legal reforms. The law reform was primarily responsive to economic change (as 
opposed to leading it) and the tendency was towards the Anglo-American model With 
investor protection strengthened (Pistor 2000). Brancato (2000) sourcing data compiled 
by the Conference Board also shows that there is a measurable decline in the stakes held 
by banks and non-financial corporations in the twenty-five largest corporations in 
Germany, France and Japan, traditionally held by allies of the founding families and 
managements. The comparison conducted by Brancato (2000) has a study period of only 
one year; nevertheless, the data still demonstrates that shares unwound would have 
moved into the hands of public investors (Coffee 2001). Indeed, Tagliabue (2000) shows 
that 35 percent of outstanding shares of the forty largest companies on the Paris Bourse 
are now held by US and UK institutional investors and US institutional investors have 
increased their investments in foreign equity with the largest twenty-five US pension fund 
holders of international equity holding $110.. 8 billion in foreign equities in 1996, $181.1 
billion in 1998, and $265.6 billion in 1999 raising the question that a 'substitution effect' 
may be taking place. 
A study by Van der Elst (2000) shows that the number of firms listing on European stock 
markets such as France, Germany and Spain have risen sharply from 1990 to 1999. 
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Other statistics by Van der Elst (2000) also reveal that stock market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP has increased in several European countries to the point that it now 
equals or exceed the same ratios in the USA or the UK. These percentages are subject to 
greater fluctuations in countries with small populations or modest GDPs (such as 
Netherlands and Switzerland) and much of the market capitalisation in these countries 
remains in the hands of controlling owners. However, these results are deemed important 
because it reveals the suddenness of the transition (Coffee 2001). As the European 
market integrated in the mid-1990s, stock market values soared, both in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of GDP. The study also shows that while IPOs were once practices 
associated with the US and the UK markets, they have become common across Europe. 
In 1999, Germany saw 380 IPOs and France 581, compared to the past decade where 
Germany saw 168 IPOs and France, 75. Where systems of concentrated ownership are 
thought to lack the institutions necessary to bring new companies directly into the equity 
market and new firms are believed to be dependent on bank and debt financing, the 
significance of these figures bears emphasis (Coffee, 2000). 
Stokes (2000) found that from 1986 to 1999,86 per cent of all takeovers involved at least 
one American party, but in 1999, this percentage fell to only 40 per cent. At the same 
time, the percentage of corporate takeovers involving at least one European party rose 
from 15 per cent to 43 per cent. Looking at the market value of these transactions, 
takeovers involving a European party grew from 11 per cent of the world total in 1985 to 
47 per cent in 1999 (Black 2000). The driving force for this transition is the integration of 
European currencies into Euro noting that European corporate bond market had tripled in 
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size in 1999 thereby ending the dependence of European acquirers on bank financing 
(Coffee 2001). Furthermore, this trend is expected to continue with the adoption of the 
13th Company Law Directive by the European Union which requires EU member states to 
legislate to bar anti-takeover defensive measures after a takeover has been announced 
(Coffee 2001). Where the compliance of this directive is uneven, the legitimacy of the 
takeover as a mechanism of corporate governance has been accepted. Indeed, as been 
stated before, the successful case of the hostile takeover by Mannesmann by Vodafone 
Airtouch pIc indicates that corporate actors are reviewing their previous strategies towards 
the market for corporate control (Cheffins 2001, JOrgen et al. 2002, Coffee 2001, Bayer 
and Hassel 2002). Compared to previous hostile takeover attempts in Germany, the 
Hausbanks or banks affiliated to the commercial undertakings hesitated to side with 
Mannesmann. Labour, politicians, and wider public opinion also did not engage in taking 
sides against the takeover. Additionally, recent debates of the expert commission on 
German' takeover regulation chaired by Chancellor Schroeder showed a high degree of 
acceptance of the emerging practice of hostile takeovers (Bayer and Hassel 2002), even 
though the German government later chose to adopt a dissenting view on the European 
takeover directive as being too friendly towards the bidder. 
Interestingly, while Coffee (2001) makes a point about legal reform taking place within the 
transition economies, no point was made as to equally important legal reforms taking 
place in Germany. Deeg and Lutz (2000) note that from the mid-1990s onwards, 
important legal changes were made in Germany with the aim to liberalise financial 
markets by providing a more transparent framework for the operation of stock trading. 
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Three laws were notably passed and reformed specifically for the promotion of the 
German financial market (Kapitalmarkforderungsgesetze) between 1990-1998, 
establishing a supervisory agency for stock trading at the federal level and setting up of 
rules of conduct for the parficipants. Bayer and Hassel (2002) write that in 1998, two 
corporate laws were changed to improve the position of minority shareholders. For 
example, the law facilitating the raising of capital (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz) 
enabled German companies to issue financial statements based on international 
accounting standards (IASS or US GAAP) rather than on German accounting standards 
(HGB). Previously, companies could issue these statements using IASS or US GAAP in 
addition to German accounting statements. For companies that aimed at being listed on 
foreign stock exchanges and, in particular, the NYSE, this was a major improvement. 
Where international accounting practices are considered to be more transparent than 
German accounting standards, it can be said that applying international accounting 
standard improves the ability of shareholders to judge the performance of firms (Bayer 
and Hassel 2002). The German government also passed the 1998 Control and 
Transparency Act (KonTraG). The KonTraG was a comprehensive piece of legislation that 
aimed at increasing the transparency of companies in the interest of investors and at 
improving the control function of supervisory boards (Bayer and Hassel 2002). The law 
was also reformed to increase investors' rights when the law prescribing the principle of 
'one share one vote' was passed thereby banning shares with multiple votes 
(Mehrfachhstimmrecho and limited votes (Hochstsimmrechte). Moreover, it restricted the 
use of proxy voting by banks in those cases where the bank itself holds more than 5 per 
cent of the firm's stock and all investors are required to disclose holdings above a margin 
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of 5 per cent. For listed companies, the law also prescribed that the accounting 
statements report for segments. 
Another example of an important legal change occurring in Germany is the decision by 
the government to end the prohibition of the US-style stock option schemes and the 
amendment of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) in 1998 to freely allow German 
corporations to issue straightforward stock option schemes by either issuing new shares 
or repurchasing outstanding equity to meet obligations. It was following the pasting of the 
AktG that most large German corporations started to adopt some form of US-style 
executive pay and introduce stock option schemes (Cheffins 2001). German tax laws 
were also changed in 2002 to remove the disincentives for share sales by long-term, 
relational investors like banks, so the shares of large firms are becoming generally more 
liquid, a necessary condition for executive stock option schemes as effective incentives. 
Where the evidence shows that legal reforms are taking place and hostile takeovers and 
executive stock option schemes are being introduced in Germany, it does appear as if 
German corporate governance is converging on Anglo-American patterns. Nevertheless, 
there exists no research so far, which have actually studied these actual processes 
(Branson 2001, Khanna et al. 2002). Consequently, this review considers the alternative 
proposal of convergence occurring via 'functional convergence' and the recent 
developments in institutional theory in the form of neo-institutional theory. 
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3.4 Formal Convergence Vs Functional Convergence 
Coffee (1999) develops an alternative proposal for convergence by distinguishing 'formal 
convergence' (convergence to common legal rules and practices) from 'functional 
convergence'. He argues that even when formal convergence is blocked by political, legal, 
or institutional barriers, convergence can still emerge through 'functional convergence' in 
a process of migration and substitution. For example, a corporation coming from a home 
country with weak securities markets may decide to cross-list on a stronger, foreign 
securities market in the USA or the UK to raise capital, increase share capital or make 
acquisitions. There, companies will find it impossible to avoid adopting corporate 
governance practices consistent with maximising shareholder value as institutional 
investors and pension funds will put pressure for a credible commitment that they will not 
be exploited (Coffee 1999). 
Companies that do not meet these requirements are predicted to decline in terms of 
global competitiveness (Bishop 1994, Charkharn 1995, lbbotson and Brinson 1993, 
Loredo and Suarez 1998, OECD 1998, Useem 1996). Indeed, it is a well known fact that 
most of these investors are insurance and pension funds and are interested only in return 
on investment (Bloch 1998) and thus would prefer companies to maximise shareholder 
value, observe shareholder rights, be transparent in their reporting of corporate activities 
and results (Useem 1994) and provide standardised information (Ibbotson and Brinson 
1993, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
For example, by listing on a US exchange a foreign company accepts the obligation under 
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to disclose holders of more than 5 
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per cent of its outstanding stock, a significantly more stringent trigger than the 10 per cent 
threshold required by the EU Transparency Directive. The company also accepts the rules 
under Section 14(d) governing the procedural and substantive aspects of tender offers, 
those under Section 13(e) governing going private transactions and those under Section 
13(b) governing the making of questionable payments. Although the SEC has allowed 
some exemptive relief for foreign issuers when the detail of a particular requirement is 
inconsistent with the law of a foreign company's home jurisdiction, the scope of 
governance rules adopted by the act of listing and the resulting application of the 
Securities Exchange Act is significant. 
Hence, where the evidence show that legal reforms are taking place and hostile takeovers 
and executive stock option schemes are being introduced in Germany, it does appear as 
if German corporate governance is'functionally converging'on Anglo-American patterns. 
3.5 Neo-institutional Theory 
Change has always posed a problem for institutional theorists, most of whom discussed 
institutions as a source of stability and order (Scott 2001). Traditional institutional theory 
originally evolved from the discipline of sociology where firms exercised power but were 
perceived as seeking legitimacy, i. e. reconciling organisational efficiency goals with social 
functions (Selznick 1957,1996). New institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Aldrich 1999) also emphasised cognitive filters, affiliations, 
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myths and routines rather than legitimacy. In parallel Wth these sociological 
developments, disciplines of political economy (North 1990) and economies (see 
Williamson 2000) in developing their institutional branches also continued to emphasise 
on the embededdness of institutions in national cultures and environments (Granovetter 
1985), resistance to institutional change, path dependence and strategic inertia in firms. 
Unlike these theories, neo-institutional theory seeks to understand change by moving 
beyond the ideas of inertia and persistence and focusing on the interplay of contextual 
forces and intra organisational dynamics (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Hence, instead 
of concentrating on templates that originate in the institutional context, and around which 
networks of organisation converge, neo-institutional focuses on tracking the effects of 
changes occurring in power dependencies brought about by crucial market and/or 
institutional pressures. The premise is that shifts in power dependencies, whether brought 
about by market and/or institutional pressures will enable radical organisation change. 
The main drivers causing such shifts in power dependencies are related to resource 
dependency (Pfeffer and Salanchik 1978) and have been identified by Oliver (1992) to 
include: functional pressures arising from perceived performance shortcomings, political 
pressures arising from shifts in the interest and underlying power distributions that have 
underpinned existing institutions and social pressures, arising from fragmented interest 
groups with discordant views. 
Organisations that are centrally located within an institutional context may however be 
less likely to incur change (Greenwood and Hinings 1996) and there is equally a need for 
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power structures to articulate clearly the alternative templates for organisational change. 
Alternatively, corporate governance changes can easily be blocked through concentrated 
power structures which continuously reaffirm the importance, efficiency and effectiveness 
of the current system (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). From their political science 
perspective, Hall and Gingerich (2001) emphasise the interdependence of governance 
institutions and the way that different institutions mutually reinforce each other, resisting 
change. 
While institutions can influence organisational arrangements (Jepperson 1991, Jepperson 
and Meyer 1991), key actors in organisations are the ones articulating and implementing 
strategies (Fligstein 1991). Top officers in government and in large industrial firms play a 
crucial role here, embedded in social structures that link actors and influence legislators 
(Davis and Thompson 1994). For example, senior executives may be able to drive 
governance changes following experiences with international executive labour markets, 
and some firms may need to develop global product strategies to compete on world 
markets for goods and services (Davis and Thompson 1994). Executive influence on' 
institutions may be strongest when strategies are capital4ntensive, i. e. when external 
financial capital is the resource upon which firms are most dependent, and where local 
supplies are inadequate. These circumstances for systematic institutional change 
processes are consistent with the limited convergence experienced in South Korea 
(Millhaupt 1998) and Taiwan (Seo and Creed 2002). 
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3.6 The Speed of Adjustment 
Yet, convergence might still not occur, as radically or as rapidly suggested. Predicting that 
German public listed companies will most likely be interested in adopting only certain 
elements from the Anglo-American system and slowly, Peck and Ruigrok (2000) surveyed 
the perception of German companies on corporate governance arrangements. They find 
that there exists a wide variety of options on the desirability of reforms of the German 
system towards more overtly pro-market German market principles, making it unlikely that 
there will be a rapid convergence of the German corporate governance. This belief that 
any changes will be gradual instead of radical is also supported by Berndt (1998). 
Seeking to critically investigate the proposition that German companies converge upon 
becoming dependent on external financial capital, Berndt (1998) discovers that as 
conglomerates become more dependent on the perceptions and expectations of 
international financial capital as they expand their scale of activities. However, the 
eventual outcome is not a radical change but a dialectical process with the forces of 
dynamic change and institutional practice present at the same time and governance 
dilemmas being solved by decision makers. 
Exploring the effect of globalisation on the German corporate governance system, Lane 
(1999) finds that the underlying structures of ownership and control have continued to 
support long-termism, and entry into foreign stock markets has moderated, but not 
undermined it. Where there is greater emphasis on the stock market and shareholder 
value, the German financial system has adapted them in a way which defines new 
structures and processes compatible with the German business system. Similarly, studies 
relating to human resource management and the intern ation alisation of German 
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companies by Ferner and Varul (2000) find that practices disseminated from vanguard 
subsidiaries of German multinational corporations acquire a different meaning when 
located within different business context. For example, evidence from Germany show that 
resource management practices are subject to the scrutiny of labour unions where the 
workforce is still covered by collective bargaining agreements. The presence of the co- 
determination system ensures that employers maintain positive relations with the works 
council, who are not only legally entitled to consultation and important information but are 
also able to restrict the degree of managerial autonomy. Given that councils seek to 
preserve the strong traditions of social welfare, management may actually possess 
insufficient freedom to develop human resource management practices independently 
according to the strategic interests of the firm. 
It is therefore argued by some scholars that one may thus be witnessing a gradual 
process of convergence in the German manner rather than radical weakening of the 
German corporate governance model. Lane (2003) envisages that existing German 
institutions will mediate the impact of the changes and doubts that convergence will result 
in a creation of a German model identical in all of its features to the Anglo-American 
model. Nevertheless, the transformation of the underlying system logic is expected to 
initiate fundamental and far-reaching changes in all institutional sub-systems. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to provide a review of the arguments surrounding 
corporate governance and convergence within current literature. The chapter started by 
reviewing ideas which supported corporate governance convergence. Basically, 
economists espousing this theory argue that corporate governance is similar to 
technology, and that the globalisation or competition of the product, labour and capital 
market will result in different countries adopting 'efficient corporate governance practices 
consistent with free capital markets, maximising shareholder value. On the other hand, 
there are many scholars who oppose the idea of convergence. Certain legal theorists for 
example view corporate governance as being more than simply a technology, but instead 
constrained by prevailing culture and institution. Other scholars agree highlighting the 
importance of path dependency, political influence, emphasising on the stability of 
organisational arrangements. 
Counter-convergence arguments provide credible reasons to question the idea of 
corporate governance systems converging. Nevertheless, in reality, certain important 
legal and economic transitions are evidently occurring in many countries, including 
Germany. Indeed, it seem clear that corporate governance convergence is occurring at a 
certain level in Germany, possibly prompted by legal reforms and the adoption of 
executive stock options or even through a market for corporate control and a more real 
threat of hostile takeover. 
Where there is a possibility of convergence, it seems imporl: ant to consider the alternative 
proposal of 'functional convergence' which is suggested to occur when formal 
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convergence is blocked by political, legal, or institutional barriers; through a process of 
migration and substitution which happens when a firm cross-lists its shares in another. 
stock market. Recent developments in neo-institutional theory purport to understand 
change by progressing beyond the ideas of inertia and persistence, and focusing on 
induced rather than coercively imposed changes. Utilising the resource-dependence- 
model, which links market changes, power dependencies and radical change, the 
framework provided by neo-institutional theory suggests that radical change may occur if 
market or institutional change shifts the existing power dependencies, and the dominant 
coalition recognises the weakness of the existing template and is aware of the 
alternatives. Even where convergence can be detected, its progress may be extremely 
slow. 
In the case of Germany, senior executives might thus be able to drive governance 
changes, e. g. US-style executive stock options, after participating in international 
executive labour markets, and/or needing to attract international financial capital in order 
to push through global product strategies required by increasing global competition. In 
such circumstances, US investors as suppliers of the dominant resource upon which large 
German films are depended on might thus be in the position to introduce executive pay 
innovations or strategic key decisions in relation to Germany's corporate governance. 
However, even then, convergence on the Anglo-American model might still not be as 
rapid or radical as suggested. The belief that any changes will be gradual is supported by 
the literature on human resource management, which finds that changes may either 
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acquire a different meaning when located within different business contexts, or analysis 
describing changes which occurred as a dialectical process. While it is not envisaged that 
convergence will result in the creation of a German model, identical in all of its features to 
the Anglo-American model, any changes of the underlying system logic is nevertheless 
expected to initiate fundamental and far-reaching changes in all institutional sub-systems. 
With all this speculation over convergence, an analysis of the final structure of executive 
stock options in Germany may grant a way in which the convergence debate can be 
resolved. Executive stock option schemes in Germany may be identical to those in the 
USA or UK in a process of convergence, or a closer examination and a comparison of 
their structure to US type systems may reveal a diluted incentive instrument where 
attempts to balance shareholders' interests with the interests of employees and other 
stakeholders may result in the German schemes reflecting modified, but continuing 
relational governance i. e. counter-convergence. It seems important therefore to 
investigate at a deeper level the innovation of German executive share option schemes. 
Accordingly, Chapter 4 moves the thesis forward, by developing research propositions 
that recognise the reality of institutional stability and change, and not just their 
appearance. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 reviewed the arguments surrounding corporate governance convergence in the 
current literature, with the aim of obtaining a better understanding of the theoretical 
context for analysing governance and possible convergence in Germany. The purpose of 
this chapter is to develop a set of propositions relating to the convergence of German 
executive pay that recognise the reality of institutional stability and institutional change 
and not just their appearance. 
This chapter is structured into three main sections. Section 4.2 briefly recaps the research 
background and restates the research question. Section 4.3 generates the research 
propositions. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 The Research Question Restated 
Chapter 2 highlighted that from a corporate governance perspective, executive stock 
options are considered to be a vital corporate governance instrument in the market-based 
system of USA and UK. Where internal and market governance instruments have been 
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recognised as not being totally effective in preventing executives from prioritising 
decisions relating to their job security or salary levels (O'Sullivan 1999, Monks and Minow 
1995, Milgrom and Roberts 1992), the link between stock options (pay) and share price 
appreciation (performance) enables stock options to realign the interest of risk-averse 
executives with those of risk-neutral shareholders by trading off executives' risks and 
incentives (Murphy 1999). 
In Germany, executive pay innovations in the form of stock option plans play a far less 
significant role. Because German corporate governance is more concerned with achieving 
sustainable, stable and continuous growth benefiting stakeholders, there has been no 
need for governance instruments in the form of stock options. In 1996 however stock 
option plans appeared in Germany. Large German corporations such as DaimlerChrysler, 
Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Telekom, Hoechst and SGL Carbon started introducing US- 
style stock option schemes in the form of convertible bonds, warrant bonds, and SARs. In 
1998, the government's decision to amend the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to 
allow corporations to issue US-style stock option schemes resulted in most large German 
corporations adopting US-style stock option schemes. 
Chapter 3 explained that economists espousing faith in the 'efficiency-enhancing' aspects 
of competition and globalisation (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991, Demsetz 1983, 
Hansmann and Kraakman 2002) have cited this as exemplary evidence of alleged 
convergence of German corporate governance. Counter-convergence theorists on the 
other hand refute this allegation, arguing that corporate governance systems are tightly 
83 
Chapter 4: Development ofResearch Propositions 
coupled with path-dependent regulatory traditions (Bebchuk and Roe 1998,2000, Roe 
1994). Corporate governance do not exist in isolation of other institutional features which 
influence strategies and global pressures on corporate governance practices are 
mediated by domestic politics in way which renders convergence unlikely (Millhaupt 1998, 
Gordon 1998). New-institutional theorists attribute this to 'isomorphism', where the 
stability of the system is maintained by national institutions embodying, promoting and 
defending national culture (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977). National 
institutions may also embody, promote and defend national culture (Roe 1993,1997, 
Bebchuk and Roe 1998) and top executives in large companies are embedded in social 
structures that link actors and influence legislations (Davis and Thompson 1994). 
The prevalence of the stakeholder model and the influence of banks on corporations in 
Germany indicate support for counter-convergence theories, arguing against the 
prediction of the German governance system converging. Recent evidence in the form of 
larger German corporations adopting US-style executive stock option schemes and an 
occurrence of a successful hostile takeover however indicate that convergence may be 
occurring at some level. German companies cross-listing themselves on the foreign 
securities market in the USA or the UK may find it impossible to avoid adopting corporate 
governance practices consistent with maximising shareholder value. Large German firms 
may also need to show that they are capable of pursuing global strategies. 
There exists no research so far which have actually studied these actual processes 
(Branson 2001, Khanna et al. 2002). This thesis attempts to study one of the processes: 
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the adoption of executive stock option schemes by German firms by considering the 
alternative proposal of 'functional convergence'. Essentially, the theory purports that 
functional convergence can still emerge in a process of migration and substitution even 
when formal convergence is blocked by political, legal, or institutional barriers. Hence, a 
German corporation cross listing on a foreign securities market in the USA or the UK may 
find it impossible to avoid adopting corporate governance practices which are consistent 
with maximising shareholder value. Large German firms may also need to show that they 
are capable of pursuing global strategies. 
Recent developments in neo-institutional theory seek to understand change by 
progressing beyond the ideas of inertia and persistence, and focusing on induced rather 
than coercively imposed change. Where the resource-dependent-model posits a link 
among market changes, power dependencies, and radical change, neo-institutional theory 
recognises that radical change is possible if the dominant coalition also recognises the 
weakness of the existing templates and is aware of the alternatives. 
In the case of Germany, senior executives might thus be able to drive governance change 
after participating in international executive labour markets, and/or needing to attract 
international financial capital in order to push through global product strategies required 
by increasing global competition. In these circumstances, US investors, as suppliers of 
the dominant resource upon which large German firms are dependent, might thus be able 
to introduce executive pay innovations or strategic key decisions in relation to German 
corporate governance. 
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However, there remain fundamental contradictions between relational governance and 
US-style stock option schemes, which aim to maximise shareholder value. A large 
number of German firms are controlled by government entities at the federal and state 
level and government owners tend to pursue political, rather than value maximising, 
objectives (Shepherd 1989). Roe (2000) suggests that government entities tend to 
impede implementation of governance practices aimed at aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders. The literature on human resource management also 
suggests that changes may acquire a different meaning when located within different 
business contexts. 
More succinctly, the main conclusions that can be drawn from the review are as follows: 
(i) Changes are taking place in Germany. Important legal reforms have proceeded, a 
hostile takeover has occurred and larger German corporations had since 1996 started 
adopting executive stock option schemes. 
(ii) There are many competing theories attempting to explain these changes. One of the 
most commonly cited arguments is that the changes indicate that globalisation is driving 
Germany to adopt the best practice form of the corporate governance structure. On the 
other hand, counter-convergence theorists emphasise that important features of the 
traditional German corporate governance system have persisted; observing that German 
corporate governance is constrained by institutions and culture. 
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(iii) There is an alternative proposal of 'functional convergence', which is suggested to 
emerge in a process of migration and substitution when formal convergence is blocked by 
political, legal, or institutional barriers. For example, a corporation deciding to cross-list on 
foreign securities markets in the USA or the UK may find it impossible to avoid adopting 
corporate governance practices consistent with maximising shareholder value. 
(iv) There remain fundamental contradictions between relational governance and US-style 
executive stock option schemes. The implicit aim of US-style executive stock option 
schemes of maximising shareholder value is incompatible with the concept of the German 
firm as a social institution and its sense of Gemeinschaft created to enhance community 
welfare. 
(v) The concept of neo4nstitutional theory suggests that radical change may occur if 
marketfinstitutional change shifts the existing power dependencies and the dominant 
coalition recognises the weakness of the existing template and is aware of the 
alternatives. 
(vi) Even then, there is still doubt as to whether convergence will result in the creation of a 
German model identical in all of its features to the Anglo-American model. One may be 
witnessing a gradual process of convergence in the German manner rather than the 
radical weakening of the German corporate governance model. 
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Chapter 3 showed that empirical research examining corporate governance convergence 
has so far only examined indicators of corporate governance converging, for example the 
occurrence of hostile takeovers, legal reforms and the adoption of executive stock option 
schemes by larger companies. Where such research corresponds with the zerolone 
adoption/rejection model, there appears to be a clear void in empirical research that 
examines the characteristics of the hostile takeover or executive stock option schemes 
adopted (Branson 2001, Khanna et al. 2002). 
Studies concerning German executive stock option schemes are hampered by a lack of 
disclosure in terms of German executive pay while hostile takeovers in Germany have 
only recently been successful. With improving information disclosure on German 
executive pay improving, it seems important to analyse and compare German executive 
stock option schemes to US/UK executive stock option schemes. A closer examination of 
German executive stock options may reveal that they only superficially resemble US-style 
schemes, where attempts to balance shareholder interests with the interests of 
employees and other stakeholders may result in German schemes reflecting modified but 
continuing relational governance. This thesis thus proposes to examine closely German 
executive share opfion schemes and compare their structures to US and UK-type 
executive stock options, asking the research question: Does executive pay in the form of 
stock option schemes for executives in Germany really induce US-style governance? 
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4.3 Development of Research Propositions 
In developing the research propositions, it is assumed for a moment that institutional 
theories with emphasis on path-dependence, embeddedness, political influence, 
isomorphism and culture are appropriate for German corporate governance. This 
approach is justified by two rationales. Firstly, where corporate governance in Germany 
has been defined as 'the means by which important decisions are controlled by the firm's 
stakeholders, both governance systems and elements (e. g. executive pay) can be seen to 
constitute institutions, i. e. regulative normative and cognitive influences on firms (Scott 
2001). Secondly, important institutional features of the traditional German corporate 
governance system have persisted (Lane 2003, Lane 1999, Pauly and Reich 1997, Dorre 
1996, Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995). 
For example, German firms have not been rushing to list their shares on the stock 
exchange and the German stock market, in comparative perspective, remains 
undercapitalised. Family ownership of large companies persists and not all large German 
companies are subjected to stock market pressures given that German companies 
become listed much later in their life cycle and at a much higher threshold (Mayer and 
Whittington 1999). Individual shareholding, although increased, remains low by 
international standards and thus hinders the development of a shareholder culture. 
Recent adverse developments in the capital markets, particularly the collapse of the 
Neuer Markt, have also resulted in renewed scepticism about financial markets. 
Ownership concentration among listed companies remains significant (Mayer and 
Whittington 1999) thus obstructing the development of an outsider system of control and 
of a market for corporate control. The influence of foreign investment funds, the most 
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insistent claimants for shareholder values, has been significant in only a small proportion 
of cases - about ten per cent of large listed companies (Lane 2003). In addition, there has 
been no change in company law, and the system of co-determination is still intact with 
employee stakeholder retaining some degree of influence, if not control within the firm. 
The two-tier board, designed for insider control, also remains in place. 
It is also assumed that the German pattern of pay is influenced by a culture embracing 
high collectivism, which will itself influence tax regulations and other important institutional 
arrangements that in turn impinge upon the design of executive pay packages. The 
dimensions of national culture continue to be used in international business research in 
relation to associations between culture and the entrepreneurship (Begley and Tan 2001), 
wages and employee voice (Van der Wert 2001, Thomas and Au 2003), entry mode 
choice (Brouthers 2002) and the performance of joint ventures as entry modes 
(Pothyckuchi et al. 2002). Therefore, this thesis proposes to extend the use of Hofstede's 
dimensions to certain elements of corporate governance, adopting a 'co-evolutionary' 
perspective (Lewin et al. 1999, Lewin et al. 2004) whereby culture moderates interactions 
between old and new institutions - and new institutional arrangements evolve in ways 
consistent with, and reflective of, a nation's value system. This hybrid, culturallinstitutional 
perspective is consistent with Lowe (1998: 322) who emphasises the '... complex inter- 
determinism between influences of pre-modem values, modem values, formal institutional 
and formal institutional norms... ' 
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National culture may thus have more general governance implications for systems as a 
whole, beyond the piecemeal approach of Licht (2001) and Licht et al. (2003). For 
example, the stylised elements of 'market-oriented' (Anglo-American) corporate 
governance system would include: a high proportion of liquid shares in the hands of 
dispersed, outside shareholders, or of financial institutions With dispersed outside 
shareholders; hostile takeovers; accounting rules for open information disclosure b 
outside investors; single-tier boards of outside shareholder representatives and 
executives; law protecting minority shareholders and; a high proportion of equity-based 
pay for executives. On the other hand, the stylised elements of the 'network-oriented' 
(German) corporate governance system would be characterised by: a high proportion of 
shares held by family members or other stakeholders such as banks, suppliers, 
competitors, the State, employees, etc; 'friendly' mergers; corporate secrecy; dual boards 
with wider stakeholder representation; weak minority shareholder protection With 
extensive use of pyramid shareholdings and; executive pay heavily reliant on base salary. 
Each of these governance elements can be paired off and considered in the context of the 
cultural dimensions of 'Uncertainty Avoidance' and 'Ind ividualism/Col lectivism'. For 
example, where levels of 'Uncertainty Avoidance' are low, individual shareholders, 
employees and other stakeholders are relatively willing to bear risks. With a 'market- 
oriented' corporate governance system, one major uncertainty concerns the fluctuation in 
a firm's share price and so low'Uncertainty Avoidance' is consistent with this system of 
governance. These fluctuations discipline managers, and a tradition of low 'Collectivism' is 
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unlikely to throw up the collective stakeholder action needed to provide an alternative, 
relational form of governance. 
On the other hand, with high 'Uncertainty Avoidance' - stakeholders are conservative in 
risk taking, combined with high 'Collectivism' - individual shareholders of stock market 
capitalism may represent a major source of uncertainty, and thus anxiety, for relatively 
undiversified stakeholders. The sale of shares following the disclosure of information 
concerning weak corporate performance can lead to a hostile takeover, retrenchment, and 
variable levels of pay. For example, one particular group of undiversified stakeholders, 
company employees, may feel particularly threatened by weak performance (Fernandez 
and Rodrik 1991) and may voice for board representation and the construction of a 
consensus-based organisation. Senior managerial employees are a special, undiversified 
subset of total employees (Hall and Murphy 2002) who may collude with other employees 
in these arrangements. 
In these circumstances, a cultural inheritance of even moderately high 'Uncertainty 
Avoidance' and 'Collectivism' may be expected to create an environment hostile to stock 
market capitalism, and favourable to some variety of 'market based' governance. In other 
words, high levels of 'Collectivism' may encourage stakeholders to demand corporate 
structures that facilitate collective decision-making based on community and consensus 
(Dore 2000, Hall and Gingerich 2001), while individualism will stimulate minority 
shareholder protection, information disclosure to dispersed shareholders and a permissive 
attitude towards wide variations in pay for executives and other employees. 
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Thus, it is assumed that a national culture featuring low (high) levels of 'Uncertainty 
Avoidance' and low (high) levels of 'Collectivism' will be associated with the presence of 
elements of market-oriented (network-oriented) governance system. Ulcht et al. (2003) 
find supporting evidence for this in their piecemeal consideration of the rights of individual 
shareholders versus executive directors and individual creditors. Additionally, in their 
seminal paper on executive pay, Conyon and Murphy concluded that (2000: 667). '... the 
US, as a society, has historically been more tolerant of income inequality, especially of the 
inequality is driven by differences in effort, talent, or entrepreneurial risk taking'. 
The review in Chapter 3 regarding the influence of culture on corporate governance 
systems and table 3.1 show that low 'Collectivism' and low 'Uncertainty Avoidance' are 
associated with a 'market-oriented' governance system, and a 'network-based' 
governance system (represented by German and Japan) shows quite high levels of each 
of these dimensions. While cause and effect cannot be identified by illustrations or 
regressions, the associations between cultural attributes and governance system seem to 
be important for the analysis of governance changes. 
According to neo-institutional theory, shifts in power dependencies, whether brought 
about by market and/or institutional pressures, will allow corporate governance 
convergence. However, corporate governance changes can be blocked trough 
concentrated power structures that continuously reaffirm the importance, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of the current system (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). The presence of co- 
determination systems ensures that employers maintain positive relations with the works 
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councils who seek to preserve the strong traditions of social welfare. Indeed, senior 
managers in large German firms have traditionally made recommendations concerning 
important strategic decisions (e. g. executive pay) to Auf1schsrite (supervisory boards) 
where there are strong representations of employees (in turn reflecting the views of 
Betfiebsr5te, or works councils), banks, family shareholders and the nominees of related 
firms linked through cross-shareholdings (Adams 1998). Current labour market relations 
in Germany (see Jacobi, Keller and Mueller-Jentsch, 1992) are the complex outcome of 
interactions between national culture and institutional developments over a long period. 
In the language of neo-institutional theory, the Aufsichtsr5te and Betriebsr5te of large 
German firms may be effective points of passage for governance institutions like 
executive stock option schemes. The labour unions (and banks) that lie behind 
Aufsichtsr5te are themselves associated with networks of interested parties. In these 
circumstances, an organisational innovation such as the executive stock option scheme, 
designed in the USA to suit local actors, may contradict prevailing German culture, 
contingencies, and coalitions of interests, making them liable to drastic adaptations. As a 
development of the general propositions therefore, the executive stock option scheme 
seem to be a potentially illegitimate innovation for German firms. Executives and 
employees with a long tradition of Germeinschaft and moderately high levels of 
collectivism may resist an innovation that offers potential conflict between senior 
managers and other employees, and greater pay inequality. With moderately high levels 
of uncertainty avoidance, executives may resist a pay instrument that promises highly 
uncertain, share price contingent returns, and other employees may resist an innovation 
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that gives executives more incentive to perform better in terms of share price, than, say in 
job creation and preservation (Newman and Nollen 1997). 
Supervisory boards, as passage points for German executive stock option schemes 
embodying powerful employee representatives with an obvious interest in such a 
remuneration innovation, have important implications for five practical attributes of stock 
option schemes. For each attribute, employee representation in the context of national 
culture, with moderately high levels of uncertainty avoidance and collectivism, is likely to 
lead to executive stock option schemes that are 'tougher' on executives than in the USA, 
where the innovation odginated. 
This assumption of resistance to fundamental change has been extended to produce the 
research propositions. Because the adoption of executive stock option schemes by 
German companies has only recently occurred, and important data that did not previously 
exist relates to one financial year, the propositions developed will have to take a snapshot 
cross-section view rather than noting transitional changes. An obvious proposition would 
concern the relative openness of information closure but because the comparative 
situations in the USA, UK and Germany are obviously different, formal hypothesis testing 
is perhaps necessary. Information on German executive stock option schemes is so thin, 
it if often impossible to establish the most rudimentary characteristics of such schemes. 
Conversely, full disclosure is quite common in the USA and the UK, even facilitating the 
calculation of option values for individual directors at any point in time. 
95 
Chapter 4: Development ofResearch Propositions 
The first proposition involves the number of senior managers and employees covered by 
German schemes. With executives anxious to avoid the uncertainty of variable incomes, 
and with employees fearing the uncertainties created by a strong link between executive 
pay and share price, a collective sense of community between executives and employees 
is expected to produce executive stock option schemes that are more egalitarian 
compared to the USA and UK, in the sense of being offered to a higher proportion of total 
employees. 
Proposition I (PI): Executive stock option schemes in German firms may 
be expected to be more egalitarian, extending down a firm's vertical 
hierarchy to include a greater proportion of the total tabour force, than 
equivalent schemes in the USA and UIC 
Similarly, where a community of stakeholder imposes tight, collective voice control, 
managerial decisions may be uncomfortable with the wide variations in the dispersion of 
income and wealth that executive stock options imply. Collectivist employees and labour 
unions, intolerant of power-distance and with distaste for 'hard' individual orientation in 
pay structures, inequalities, and the uncertainty of inequalities (Gooderham et al. 1999) 
may also exert to influence more egalitarian schemes in the form of smaller executive 
stock option tranches as well as larger number of potential beneficiaries. Hence, despite 
the predicted more extensive coverage of schemes in terms of their wider membership 
(Proposition 1), German executive stock option schemes may still be expected to offer 
lower rewards in total. This tendency may be reinforced by high levels of uncertainty 
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avoidance and the preference of German executives and other employees to have fixed 
salaries rather than variable executive stock options based rewards. Therefore: 
Proposition 2 (P2): German executive stock option schemes may be 
predicted to involve smaller proportions of firms' total issued capital 
under option in executive stock option schemes than in comparable US 
and UK schemes. 
With the cultural preference of executives and other employees for community and 
consensus rather than conflict, it may be argued that employees are unlikely to use their 
bargaining power and threats of industrial action in a US/UK style to obstruct cost-cutting 
strategies. While employee representatives may voice their objection to retrenchments at 
supervisory board meetings, share price reductions may be seen by employees as a real 
threat at a time when links with banks and other 'employee friendly' investors are being 
weakened. Executive stock option schemes should encourage executives to give a higher 
priority to share price movements, and this could indirectly encourage cost-cutting 
strategies. Employees, banks etc have a relatively high degree of participation in strategic 
decisions in German firms (Ferner 1997, Cheffins 2003). In the context of conservative 
employees and bank representatives with a preference for uncertainty avoidance (Macey 
and Miller 1997), it may be hypothesised that employees will try to introduce performance 
conditions that distract executives from the single-minded pursuit of maximum 
shareholder value in favour of a greater number of alternative performance conditions 
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capable of deflecting executives from their executive stock option scheme motivated focus 
on short-term share price and the realisation of gains. It is therefore proposed that: 
Proposition 3 (P3): With low levels of executive power in Germany subject 
to a degree of collective control, the attachment of quantitatively more 
performance conditions in executive stock option scheme awards can be 
predicted with the USA and UK 
If performance conditions are attached to options, executives in the USA and UK may 
prefer performance conditions that are more susceptible to manipulation (Elitzur and Yaari 
1995), but supervising employees in German firms may wish to prevent managers from 
influencing a pay innovation in such an inegalitarian way that creates new uncertainties 
for employees. Consequently, following Proposition 3, the use of qualitatively more 
demanding performance indicators in Germany can also be predicted from the arguments. 
Predicting the strictness of performance conditions may prove to be more complicated. 
For example, indexing against retail prices generally represents a less challenging 
performance condition than indexing against capital market trends, industrial trends or 
trends in a bespoke peer group of firms (this progression corresponds to that in New 
Bridge Street 1996). Stricter conditions involve earnings per share (EPS) and total 
shareholder returns (TSR). Following Murphy (2000) and Wright and Kroll (2002), external 
performance indicators that are subject to some managerial discretion are considered to 
provide softer targets. Where dividends announcements and accounting manipulation can 
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affect EPS, this may be considered a softer condition compared to TSR. It is hence 
proposed: 
Proposition 4: German executive stock option schemes will employ 
qualitatively more demanding German performance indicators than 
comparable schemes in the USA and UK 
Where German firms are seen as embedded in society, representing long-term 
relationship between shareholders, stakeholders and the interest of the community as a 
whole, executive stock option schemes may be expected to be longer-term compared to 
the US and UK. Executive stock option schemes should encourage executives to longer- 
term targets, and this could encourage longer-term qualification periods. Additionally, in 
the context of conservative employees and bank representatives with a preference for 
uncertainty avoidance (Macey and Miller 1997), employees and bank representatives may 
try to introduce executive stock option schemes that distract executives from pursuing 
short-term targets, encouraged by short-term qualification period, in favour of longer-term 
qualification period. Hence, while major executive stock option schemes in the USA and 
UK are typically offered with short-term qualification period, it is predicted that German 
executive stock option schemes will contain a longer-term qualification period. Hence, it is 
proposed: 
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Proposition 5: Corporate governance in Germany will produce executive 
stock options with longer qualification periods imposed before option 
exercise than in the USA and UIC 
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter is crucial to this thesis in formulating a set of research propositions relating to 
the convergence of German executive pay. This process was achieved by firstly, 
discussing issues which give rise to the research question, noting in particular that the 
implicit aim of US-style executive stock option schemes of maximising shareholder value 
remains incompatible with the concept of the German firm as a social institution and its 
sense of Gemeinschaft created to enhance community welfare. At the moment, there 
exists little research in the literature showing that the adoption of US-style executive share 
option schemes by large German corporation does not represent convergence at some 
level. 
Attempting to analyse German executive stock option schemes for convergence at a 
deeper level, this chapter develops a set of testable propositions that recognise the reality 
of institutional stability and institutional change and not just their appearance. It was 
assumed that traditional institutional theory, With its emphasis on path dependence, 
institutions, and embeddedness, was appropriate for German corporate governance. 
Thus, propositions were developed that propose that executive share option schemes will 
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remain essentially 'German'. That is, they Will significantly differ from their Anglo-American 
equivalents in a number of important ways, consistent With prevailing long-term, relational 
corporate governance rather than prioritising shareholders to the exclusion of other 
stakeholders. The next chapter describes the research methodology that will be used in 
attempting to test these propositions. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 generated propositions which encapsulated the research question. The 
objective of this chapter is to propose a research methodology which will at least 
introduce these propositions to testing. The chapter proposes the use of multiple case- 
studies as a means to analyse the alleged convergence of the German executive pay, in 
particular through the use of descriptive multiple case-studies and the process of pattern- 
matching. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 explains the philosophical approach of 
the research. Section 5.3 highlights the ideas behind choosing case-studies. Section 5.4 
discusses the use of case-studies as a research methodology. Section 5.5 presents a 
detailed description of the research design of the thesis, focusing on the selection of 
sample and data collection. Section 5.6 discusses the methodological strategy adopted by 
the thesis, in particular the use of pattern-matching and the role of theory used in 
interpreting the findings. Section 5.7 summarises the overall discussions and notes the 
limitations of the research design. 
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5.2 Philosophical Approach 
Understanding the philosophical approach underpinning the research is important as it 
clarifies alternative designs and methods, identifying which one is more likely to work in 
practice (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991). When considering approaches for this research, the 
question arise as to whether the positivist or the interpretive (phenomenological) approach 
should be adopted. Both these approaches are briefly discussed here. 
The positivist approach, arguably often designed as a quantitative research essentially 
believes that the subject under analysis should be measured through objective methods 
rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition. This 
approach stresses the need for the formulation of hypotheses which are to be verified and 
searches for causal explanations and fundamental laws, reducing the whole into the 
simplest possible elements in order to facilitate analysis (Easterby-Smith et al. 1991, 
Remenyi et al. 1998). On the other hand, the interpretive or phenomenological approach 
understands reality as holistic, and socially constructed, rather than objectively 
undermined. The interpretive approach which arose largely in reaction to the application 
of positivism in the social science asserts that researchers should not gather facts or 
simply measure how often certain patterns occur, but rather appreciate the different 
constructions and meanings people place upon their own experiences and the reasons for 
these differences. The interpretive approach thus tries to understand and explain a 
phenomenon rather than search for external causes for fundamental laws (Easterby- 
Smith et al. 1991, Remenyi et al. 1998). 
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Notwithstanding this long-standing debate, in reality both the positivism and the 
interpretative approach are not entirely different in terms of their impact on research and 
the generalisation of their findings. Remenyi et al. (1998) for instance highlights that both 
need to be replicated before any generalisation can be made and both need a convincing 
argument that the findings are valid before they can be accepted as a valuable addition to 
the body of knowledge. The conclusion being that ultimately, it is more useful to consider 
these approaches as complementary to each other as opposed to two opposite extremes. 
Thus, Esterby-Smith et al. (1991) observe that major scientific advances are not only 
produced by logical and rational application for a scientific method but also from creative 
thinking which exceeds the boundaries of existing ideas. Furthermore, while it is true that 
in its pure interpretation, the positivist approach is epistemologically different and quite 
incompatible with the interpretive approach, it is clear that this incompatibility is blurred 
and the differences unclear when it comes to actual research (Easterby-Smith et al. 
1991). 
The thesis shares this viewpoint. Consequently, the dominant philosophical approach 
underlying this thesis is a balance between the positivist approach and the interpretive 
approach. This approach can be seen where the positivist approach of developing 
propositions on the basis that they will be tested by evidence is combined with the 
interpretive approach where the use of multiple case-studies and in particular, pattern- 
matching provide the means of interpreting the various meanings contained in the details 
of case-studies. 
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5.3 Justification for Choosing Case-Studies 
This section provides the background for choosing multiple case-studies as a research 
design. Firstly, it highlights the difficulties of obtaining and assembling data on executive 
pay, in particular in Germany. Secondly, it explains the difficulties of using conventional 
statistical methods when pefforming cross-country comparisons involving German 
executive pay. Thirdly, it describes the advantages of using case-studies as a research 
methodology in this study. Finally, it provides examples of where complementary studies 
have shed light by taking a similar approach 
Availability of Executive Pay Data 
Continued fascination with executive pay issues has resulted in a number of studies 
comparing the level and structure of executive pay internationally. While the number of 
cross-country comparisons has grown, the number of research is, however, still relatively 
small in relation to the level of interest in the area of executive pay (Murphy 2000). This is 
attributed in some part to the difficulties of obtaining and assembling the requisite data 
with most studies citing data limitations such as: executive pay measurements varying 
according to the country, legal, and accounting systems (Conyon and Schwalbach 
2000b), unavailability of micro-data such as those relating to individual companies 
(Conyon and Schwalbach 2000a), and availability of survey data which are non 
comparable (Murphy 2000). 
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The problem particularly arises when between-country comparisons involving Germany 
are undertaken. Firstly, German law only requires the disclosure of the aggregate amount 
paid to the group of top executives. Secondly, because executive share option schemes 
were only made legal in 1998, there exist no national body collecting aggregate statistics 
and no publicly available database listing executive stock options information. Faced with 
such data limitations, between-country comparisons of executive pay incorporating 
Germany have used methods which focused on narrow definitions of compensation which 
excluded stock option schemes (see Conyon and Schwalbach 1999,2000a, 2000b), 
merged different databases (see Conyon and Schwalbach 2000a) and relied on non- 
comparable survey data (see Abowd and Bognanno 1995). While these researches 
successfully used conventional statistical methods to provide important results concerning 
executive pay structures and levels across countries, between-country comparisons 
involving stock option schemes in Germany have so far remained problematic. 
Disclosure of executive pay information is generally poor in Germany. German companies 
adopting executive stock option schemes only have to announce their intention in the 
Federal Bulletin (Bundesanzeige6 without disclosing details of their schemes. Where 
there is a small percentage of stock floating and inactive trading, insiders (including 
banks, employees, and interlocking shareholders) are informed of the details of executive 
pay by virtue of their close relationship with the board of directors rather than via 
information being made public. This is consistent With the limited role of monitoring played 
by outside investors in bank-centric settings and the finding that governance transparency 
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is significantly and negatively related to the importance of bank financing to external 
equity financing (Bushman et al. 2003). 
Information on executive pay only became public recently when German corporations 
started to issue Level 11 and III ADRs on the American Stock Exchanges. Issuers of ADRs 
are required by the SEC to file proxy statements disclosing details about their stock option 
plans, although this is limited to the aggregate remuneration for the whole board of 
directors, in the financial accounts under notes to the balance sheet and profit and loss 
statement. The availability of previously undisclosed data presents a way of finally 
shedding some light into Germany's adoption of executive stock option schemes. 
However, the adoption of executive stock option scheme by German companies is at an 
early stage, and the available complete data only relates to one financial year. 
Furthermore, German culture's secretive approach towards business information vis-ý-vis 
outsiders makes data collection very much like detective work. 
For example, although German companies had filed in information with the SEC, they did 
not always provide access to their SEC filings (file 20k and 6f) on their corporate 
websites. Pieces of information could only be obtained from various files obtained from 
the US SEC websites and had to be confirmed via telephone calls made to the company 
secretaries and investor relations officers in these German corporations. 
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Difficulties of using Conventional Statistical Methods 
A consideration of executive stock option schemes as a single governance innovation 
within a German system switches the level of analysis from a system over time to firms in 
cross-sections. The main problem in adopting conventional statistical methods to carry out 
cross-section comparisons is that although 43 M-DAX 100 firms had declared at least the 
existence of executive stock option schemes by 2002 in shareholder annual general 
meeting invitations, only ten companies provided information on executive pay in their 
proxy statements for the US SEC as a result of their Level 11 or III ADR listings. A further 
eleven companies disclosed details of executive stock option schemes because they had 
voluntarily adopted US GAAP. With some firms using GAAP and ADRs, even fairly 
rudimentary executive stock option scheme information is so far available for only 
fourteen of the forty-three large German firms disclosing the existence of executive stock 
option schemes. Even with these disclosing firms, published information was difficult to 
ascertain and had to be supplemented in many instances by direct enquiries to company 
secretaries. 
A sample of forty-three quoted firms and fourteen disclosing necessary details for tests on 
the research propositions are quite inadequate for proper testing. Furthermore, the 
prevalence and characteristics of executive stock option schemes in the USA and UK 
have been shown to vary consistently by size of firm and industry (Murphy 1999). 
Applying these controls further reduces the sample size to seven, which results in 
potential findings being statistically insignificant. Clearly, a larger sample is necessary for 
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conventional statistical methods to provide statistically significant findings after applying 
controls for size, industrial classification and possibly firm performance. 
Advantages of using Case-studies 
For reasons mentioned in the above sub-section, this thesis proposes a research design 
which will be able to tentatively test the propositions and present 'theoretical useful' 
findings even where the sample size is small, rather than one which will offer statistically 
representative findings. Indeed, the consideration of case-studies as a research design is 
also important given that the adoption of executive share options by German corporations 
cannot be construed as a phenomenon readily distinguishable from its context. The 
research would benefit from using an explorative case-study method which purports to 
%udy actual awards of stock options by corporations embedded in German national 
institutions and culture. 
There is an argument that case-studies are superior to cross-unit studies insofar as they 
promise greater theoretical yield; i. e. case-studies are theoretically fecund in a way that 
cross-unit studies are not. This thesis argues that case-studies are not necessarily more 
theoretically useful, but are often more useful at the stage of theory generation as 
explained by Yin (1981) and Eisenhardt (1989) and where the sample size is too small for 
the findings to be statistically significant. 
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Indeed, the vagueness of the research subject becomes an advantage, rather than a 
disadvantage, when the object of the research is explorative, and the aim is to unearth 
and identify many plausible causes or hypotheses rather than to definitely prove or 
disprove a single causal argument. By 'casing' - defining the topic, including the 
hypotheses of primary interest, the outcome, and the set of cases that offer relevant 
information through research propositions - case-studies are able to challenge the 
conventional notion that theories are hatched fully formed (Ragin 1992,1997,2000). 
A further advantage of using case-studies is that deviant instances or cases that do not 
appear to fit the pattern or trend are not treated as outliers as they would be in statistical 
probability-based analysis. Rather, deviant or exceptional cases are taken as challenges 
for further elaboration and verification of an evolving conclusion. In a sense, the deviant 
case analysis would strengthen the general conclusion by showing that it takes 
exceptional circumstances to override the constraints of the situation (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). 
Applying this to the research, the tentative conclusions obtained from performing 
explorative case-studies will be useful to further research where the findings obtained may 
lead to the refinement/modification of the developed propositions and hence the 
development of a set of testable hypotheses. This will be crucial for when the sample size 
increases following a higher level of disclosure in Germany in future. For instance, when 
sample size increases, the development of testable hypotheses will allow regressions to 
be performed with size, industry, performance, and country dummies as independent 
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variables. Findings of significant coefficients on the German country dummy may denote 
rejection or otherwise of the hypotheses and conclusions on whether German executive 
stock option schemes represent convergence on US-style governance could be made. 
Alternatively, Wests may be performed on the means of a smaller sample consisting of 
two sets of German and US companies data which are big enough to control for size and 
industry by obtaining matching pairs similar to the study carried out by Combs and Skills 
(2003) 
Other Similar Studies 
The lack of disclosure on German businesses' strategies, including on executive pay in 
Germany, has motivated a number of interesting studies that necessarily involved no 
conventional statistical methods. Berndt (1998) investigated German firms' strategic 
response to the growing dependence on the international financial capital by examining 
three specially selected case-studies in the form of Veba AG, RWE AG, and Thyssen AG. 
Bernhardt (1999) analysed the efficiency of German stock option plans by carrying out 
detailed case-studies involving the characteristics of stock option schemes adopted by 
Daimler Benz AG, Henkel KGaA and SGL Carbon AG. Lane (2000) examined whether 
the German model of capitalism was eroding by undertaking case-studies involving six 
German companies in highly internationalised industries with the expectation that the 
case-studies will reveal the tension between intern ationalisation and embeddedness. To 
be sure, analyses of executive pay involving Germany invariably exclude long-term 
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compensation (Conyon and Scwalbach 2000, Erikkson 2000), are based on small 
samples (Allcouffe and Alcouffe 2000) or small, variable samples (Ferrarini et al. 2003). 
5.4 Case-Study as a Research Methodology 
Adopting the use of case-studies as a research methodology requires a discussion of 
case-studies design. Consequently, this section examines the use of case-studies in more 
depth. Yin (1994: 13) defines a case-study as, '... an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context and where the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. At the simplest level, case-studies are 
descriptive accounts of one or more cases. Less simply, case-studies offer a unique way 
in which processes are isolated, providing a strong basis for prevailing explanations and 
ideas to be tested, offering the strengths of experimental research within natural settings 
(Hakim 2000). 
indeed experimental isolation is the alternative to randomised assignments to treatments. 
Where randomisation purports to control an infinite number of variables and rival 
explanations without specifying what any of them are; experimental isolation specifies the 
factors to be excluded or included and identifies one or more social setting in which they 
are present or absent (Campbell and Stanley 1963, Yin 1994). Strategic case-study 
assesses the evidence for a conclusion by looking at the most favourable illustration or by 
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studying deviant case which suggest that the exception disproves the rule, requiring 
theory to be redefined or reconsidered, 
Case-studies can be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory (Yin 1994). An explanatory 
case-study is aimed at defining the questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study or 
determining the feasibility of the desired research procedures. A descriptive case-study 
presents a complete description of a phenomenon within its context. An explanatory case- 
study presents data bearing on cause-effect relationships - explaining which causes 
produced which effects. Case-study designs can also focus on a single case or multiple 
cases. A single example usually forms the basis for research on typical, deviant or critical 
cases. Multiple case designs extent to several settings to achieve replication of the same 
study in different settings to compare and contrast different cases. Hakim (2000) notes 
that confidence in the generalisability of the results in case-study design increases with 
the number of cases covered, with the greatest proportional gains being achieved when 
the number of cases is increased from one to two, three or more. It is important to note 
here that with case-studies, generalisability of the results is not extended to the population 
but rather to the theory where the logic underlying multiple cases is replication logic rather 
than any sampling logic (Yin 1981,1993,1994). 
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5.5 Research Design of this Thesis 
Yin (1981) writes that in designing case-studies, it is important to consider key design 
issues such as (1) identifying the major unit of analysis; (2) opting for a single case or 
multiple cases; (3) selecting appropriate cases and (4) choosing appropriate data 
collection strategies. Consequently, in discussing the research design of this thesis, these 
issues are dealt with in this order here. 
5.5.1 Unit of Analysis 
The definition of what the unit of analysis is of vital importance in designing case-studies. 
Dubin (1978) stresses that only when units are put together, with their correspondent 
interactions, do they facilitate the generation of theories. Different types of units can be 
considered from individuals, to organisations, small groups or events. In this thesis, where 
German national institutions and culture are expected to influence the structure of 
executive share option schemes adopted by large German corporations, German 
corporations with executive share option schemes will be the main unit of analysis. 
5.5.2 Single Case vs. Multiple Cases 
A research design which incorporates multiple case-studies will allow replication logic. 
Cross case-studies allow an incomparable in-depth study to be undertaken by analysing 
and comparing German executive stock option schemes to those in the USA and UK. 
With the research being carried out where it is naturally occurring, actual interconnected 
relationships may be traced over time, allowing a closer examination for specific 
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outcomes to be made (Yin 1994, Denscombe 1998). Furthermore, by undertaking a 
cross-site multiple case-studies approach, holistic data from German, USA and UK Wil be 
preserved, enabling the comparative research to recognise and identify the local variation 
affecting the outcomes (Marshall and Rossman 1999). 
5.5.3 Selecting Appropriate Cases for Sampling 
Selecting specific cases are important where collecting data from a complete census of 
the wider population is impractical. The criteria to selecting cases are a matter of 
discretion and judgment, convenience, access and geographic proximity (Yin 1994). For 
the purpose of this thesis, an important criterion hence was attaining a sample of 
information-rich cases (Patton 1990) constituting samples which are observable and 
theoretically useful cases by filling conceptual categories (Eisenhardt 1989). 
The research thus focuses on choosing large companies with executive stock option 
schemes on the basis of availability of information and ability of finding suitable matches. 
Because the research is concerned with the convergence of German executive pay, 
where 'convergence' is regarded as practices adopted by the Anglo-American companies 
of USA and UK, it was natural to chose larger companies from Germany, USA and UK. 
Out of this, the main starting point was the development of a database comprising the 
entire population of large German companies in the M-DAX 100 index with (a) executive 
stock option schemes, and (b) US share quotations having issued GDRs and/or ADRs, or 
(c) US GAAP accounts. 
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Table S. 1: M-DAX 100 Firms with ESO disclosure and details (FY 2002) 
Dax 100 Firms: Existence of ESO Disclosed In Detailed Detailed Rest: No 
'Bundesanzelger' Disclosure Disclosure Detailed 
through through ADRs Disclosure 
Adoption of (Level 11 or 111) of 
Existing 
US-GAAP ESO 
(43 Companies) (11 Cos) (10 Cos) (29 Cos) 
I Adidas-Salomon AG 
2 Altana AG 
3 Baader Wertpapierhandelsbank AG 
4 Babcock Borsig AG 
5 BASF AG 
6 Beate Uhse AG 
7B ilfinger+ Berger BauaktiengeselIschaft 
8 Buderus 
9 CargolifterAG 
10 CelaneseAG 
11 Continental AG 
12 Daimler Chrysler AG I 
13 Deutsche Bank AG 
14 Deutsche Telekom AG 
15 Deutz AG 
16 Dresdner Bank AG 
17 ESCADA AG 
18 FAG Kugelfischer Georg Sch5ferAG 
19 Fresenius Medical Care AG 
20 Gold Zack AG 
21 Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG 
22 Henkel KgaA 
23 HOCHTIEF AG I 
24 Jenoptik AG 
-1 1-- Aý zo r\arnpb mu 
26 Lufthansa AG 
27 Merck KgaA 
I 
I 
I 
28 Metaligeselischaft AG (MG Technologies) i 
29 Nordeutsche Affiniede AG I 
30 Phoenix AG 
31 Puma AG 
32 RWE AG 
33 SAP AG 
34 Schedng AG 
35 Schwarz Pharma AG 
36 SGL Carbon AG 
37 Siemens AG 
38 SIXT AG 1 
39 TECIS Holding AG I 
40 VCL Film + Medien AG 
41 Veba AG (E. ON) 
42 Volkswagen AG 
43 Vossloh AG 
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Out of the one hundred companies short-listed, forty-three had in financial year 2002 
announced at least the existence of executive stock option schemes in the 
Bundesanzeiger. Out of forty-three, eleven have voluntarily adopted US GAAP accounts 
while ten provided information on executive pay in their proxy statements to the US 
Exchange Commission as a result of their Level 11 or III ADRS or GDRs. Because some of 
these companies have both GAAP and ADRslGDRs, the total number of DAX 100 
companies disclosing details of executive stock option schemes is only fourteen out of 
forty-three as illustrated in Table 5.1. 
Testing the propositions by comparing these fourteen companies with the hundred biggest 
firms of the USA and UK was not appropriate given the fact that the prevalence and 
characteristics of senior executive rewards in the USA, UK and Germany have been 
found to vary significantly according to the size of the firm (Rosen 1992, Murphy 1999, 
Conyon and Schwalbach 2000b); and senior executives rewards in the USA and UK have 
been found to vary significantly to its industrial classification (Murphy 1999). For this 
reason, it was decided to match individual firms in Germany with approximately equivalent 
US and UK firms in terms of size and industry in a process that is the case-study 
equivalent of using control variables in regressions (Combs and Skill 2003). Where other 
relevant criteria were found in the literature (for example, Combs and Skills (2000) 
matched for additional variables such as R&D intensity, diversification, and foreign market 
activity), it was decided to restrict the analysis only to size of firm and industrial 
classification because the German sample was already very small and it was difficult to 
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match firms on more than these two criteria and these criteria have been found to be the 
most important influences on executive pay packages (Murphy 1999). 
Sales Sales Sales 
__German 
Cos. Industry ($ Mil) US Companies ($ Mil) UK Companies ($ Mil) 
BASF Chemicals 33,989 E. I. DuPont de Mours 28,268 No match found n. a. 
The Good Year Tire 
Continental Manufacturing 11,375.5 and Rubber 14,417 No match found n. a. 
DaimlerChrysler Automobiles 152,446 Ford Motors 170,064 No match found n. a. 
Deutsche Bank Banking 77,755 JP Morgan Chase 60,065 HSBC Holdings n. a. 
Deutsche Telekom Telecom. 33,126 World Com 39,090 Bfitish Telecom. 25,340 
E. ON Conglomerate 77,904 General Electric 129,853 No match found n. a. 
Fresenius Med. Care Medical Care 4,201 No match found n. a. No match found n. a. 
Table 5.2 Selecting case-studies German/US/UK companies 
MG Technologies Multi-Industry 7,783 Textron 11,589 Johnson Matthey 5,954 
SAP 
Commercial 
Services 4,739 AOL 4,777 Reuters Group n. a. 
Schering Drugs 4,218 No match found n. a. No match found n. a. 
Schwarz Pharma Healthcare 337 
SGLCarbon 
Siemens 
Vossloh 
Manufactudng 
Industdal Paas 
Electrical / 
Electronics 
Autornotives 
Equipment 
Endo Pharma 
Holdings 197 No match found n. a. 
1,189 Crane 1,491 T. T. Electronics 1,114 
68,387 No match found n. a. No match found n. a. 
805 Wabtec 1,028 Henlys Group 1,318 
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Obtaining a double coincidence of size in terms of sales turnover and industrial 
classification was still problematic even after restricting the analysis to only these two 
criteria and matching individual German firms with equivalent US and UK firms. For 
example, it was not possible to obtain any satisfactory matches for the German 
companies until the decision was made to: (i) consider US and UK matches with sales 
turnover that ranged from 50-200% of the German firms and (ii) consider the broad 
industrial classification used by Fortune, Forbes, Business Week, Financial Times and 
Hoover when classifying companies. Indeed, it was only following this decision that the 
two sets of only seven matched pairs of firms comprising of one set of German/US 
companies and one set of Gerrnan/UK companies based on the financial year ending 
2000 (2000/2001) were finally produced (see Table 5.2). 
Although suitable matches were found for the selected German companies, two of the 
resulting pairings appear to be imperfectly matched in terms of their business activity. 
That is, although AOL and SAP have been classified in the same industry sector 
(commercial services), SAP's main business of providing software and associated 
services is different to AOL's business of providing web-related services and internet 
hosting. Additionally, while both Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan Chase have both been 
classified as banks, JP Morgan Chase is far more an 'investment bank' compared to 
Deutsche Bank's, 'universal bank. This is perhaps inevitable given the decision of 
adopting very broad and thus crude industry classifications to obtain the German/US/UK 
matches. 
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Because case-studies use a theoretical sampling logic, the question as to whether the 
sample is big enough to be statistically representative of a total population is not a major 
concern here. Companies selected are significant in relation to the research question 
because they enable key comparisons to be made, testing and developing theoretical 
propositions given that they contain certain characteristics of criteria. Theoretical sampling 
thus does not expect sample to be a representative of the wider population contrasting 
with probability sampling which is used to generate empirically representative samples. 
5.5.4 Choosing Appropriate Data Collection Methods 
The proposed source of data collection is that of documentation, consisting of multiple 
published sources for example in the form of individual company annual reports, proxy 
statements filed with the American SEC, company annual reports, archives, financial 
reports from the press and financial analysts, books, journals and web-site pages as to 
promote the achievement of 'triangulation' (Denzin 1970). This section explains why data 
will be collected this way and discusses the issue of credibility relating to the use of 
documentary or published evidence. 
As previously mentioned, detailed data regarding awarded executive stock option 
schemes are simply not available in other forms. Annual reports and proxy statement 
however provide a novel way of gaining access to information relating to German 
executive share option schemes in particular, which is otherwise unobservable. 
Additionally, where annual reports and proxy statements represent meaningful 
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constituents of executive stock option schemes adopted by companies, they can be 
considered to be more consequential than verbal utterances particularly where executives 
hesitate to disclose information about their pay. Indeed, Hakim (2000) writes that 
administrative records provide more reliable information than interviews on topics such as 
annual earnings. 
Regarding the credibility of documentary evidence, Mason (1996), asserts that many 
qualitative researchers see the analysis of documents as a meaningful and appropriate 
method in the context of research strategy. That observations and interviews become 
data when they are transformed into text emphasises the inherent credibility of 
documentary data. Indeed, previous studies comparing cross-country executive pay 
comparisons have also mostly used data sourced from published sources. For example, 
studies using aggregate figures relied on databanks or surveys compiled by International 
consultancies such as Tower Perrin, European Independent Remuneration Network or El- 
RN and other consultancies. Surveys published by Forbes, Business Week and Wall 
Street Journal although less comprehensive have also been utilised (Murphy 2000a). On 
the other hand, where data are required on a more micro level, published reports in the 
form of company annual reports and proxy statements filed with the American SEC were 
utilised whether obtained directly or though secondary sources such as DataStream, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Corporate Register, and Compustat ExecuComp database. 
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5.6 Analytical Strategy 
There are various ways to analyse the data contained in the case-studies. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) suggest alternative analytic techniques such as using arrays to display 
data, creating displays, tabulating the frequency of events and ordering the information 
amongst others. Yin (1981,1994) recommends performing either pattern-matching, 
explanation building or carrying out a time-series analysis. He notes that often, conclusion 
drawing from case-studies is impeded because the theoretical or logical assumptions 
underlying the research are left unstated. The analysis must be able to recognise and 
address the theory which is often only implicitly constrained in the analysis for it to draw 
conclusive findings. For this reason, pattern-matching is helpful where it explicitly spells 
out a logic model or theoretical pattern as to how the result pattern is expected. This need 
becomes especially important when there is a need or desire to place the findings from a 
single evaluation into a wider comparative context or substantively critical (Yin 1993). 
Indeed, Trochim (1989) considers pattern-matching as being one of the most desirable 
techniques for analysis where the existence of theory-pattern can be said to enhance the 
internal reliability of the study. 
Pattern-matching is essentially a process in which variables are compared between what 
is theorised and observed (Yin 1993, Combs and Skill 2003). Effective pattern-matching 
requires the clear prediction of two types of idealised outcomes based on developed 
theory (Yin 1993). Failing to specify a priori the critical outcomes to be described will 
result in circular reasoning with the final outcome constituting a contaminated combination 
of what might have been expected and what is found (Yin 1993). Predicted pattern of 
events thus plays an important part where they form a series of benchmarks against 
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which actual data are compared and analysed. The research thus proposes to analyse 
data by carrying out pattern-matching using the theoretical lens of neo-institutional theory 
and translation theory as elaborated in Chapter 4. Performing the pattern-matching 
procedure requires the completion of firstly constructing a theory-pattern, secondly 
developing a case-study pattern and then performing pattern-matching. Where each of 
these steps is quite extensive, they will be dealt exclusively Chapters 6,7 and 8 
respectively. 
With the outcomes will be specified in the theory-pattern, data collection will be carried out 
to gather evidence to confirm or disconfirm the theory. At the same time, unanticipated 
findings are not precluded and revelatory or important information found in addition to the 
anticipated outcome will still be collected and analysed. The prediction of initial outcomes 
nevertheless will provide a major support in structuring the data collection and prevents a 
data collection which is never ending. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The chapter started by explaining the philosophical approach of the research. It then 
discussed the reasons for choosing explorative case-studies as the research methodology 
touching on the availability of German executive pay data, and the difficulties associated 
to performing conventional statistical methods. From there, it highlighted the advantages 
of using case-studies, and noted other studies using similar approach in the area of 
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corporate governance and corporate strategies in Germany. Following this, the proposed 
research design is presented in detail, considering matters such as the unit of analysis, 
multiple cases, choice of sampling, and data collection methods. 
It has to be mentioned however, that while the use of multiple case-studies is proposed 
here, there exist some clear limitations. For example, Yin (1994) warns that there is a risk 
of some interpretive discretion on the part of the researchers when conducting case-study 
research, which might create problems. Researchers may be overly restrictive in claiming 
a pattern to have been violated or overly lenient in deciding that a pattern has been 
matched. Acknowledging that there is no precise way of setting the criteria for 
comparisons, the thesis attempts to improve the quality of pattern-matching by developing 
semi-quantitative indicators when testing the propositions as will be seen in Chapter 6. 
More significantly, the main disadvantage of this design is that the scope and content of 
the studies are constrained by the nature of the data currently available. On the other 
hand, the availability of new information on German executive stock option schemes 
provides crucial means for which theory relating to German executive pay can be finally 
tested. By using explorative case-studies and the process of pattern-matching, the 
research Will be able use the findings obtained to further modify and improve the 
propositions. This will lead to the development of a set of testable hypotheses which will 
be crucial for when sample size increase where a higher level of disclosure as is expected 
to occur in Germany in the following months and years. For instance, with a particular 
executive stock option scheme character taken from Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 5 as the 
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dependent variable, regressions could proceed with size, industry, performance, and 
country dummies as independent variables. Significant coefficients on the German 
country dummy would denote rejection or otherwise of Hypothesis I to Hypotheses 5 and 
hence conclusions on whether German executive stock option schemes represent 
convergence on US-style governance. An alternative proposal is to compile two sets of 
data of German and US companies which are big enough to obtain matching pairs to 
control of size and industry and carry out Mests to the means of the samples similar to the 
study carried out by Combs and Skills (2003). Finally, where decisions relating to 
research design have to consider time-scale and costs factors (Hakim 2000), the 
proposed research using multiple case-studies and pattern-matching and obtaining data 
from documentary source appear equally feasible and appropriate. 
125 
Chapter 6: Constructing a Theory-Pattern 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has been important in developing the research framework for this 
thesis. By proposing the research design of multiple case-studies, and introducing the 
idea of using 'pattern-matching' as an analytical strategy. Pattern-matching essentially 
compares an empirical based pattern with a predicted one (Trochim 1989, Yin 1994) and 
if these patterns are found to have coincided, the case-study's internal validity is 
considered to be strengthened (Trochim 1989, Yin 1994). Thus, no pretensions are made 
towards full empirical testing, but the methodology can advance theory and 
understanding. Indeed, pattem-matching is regarded as one of most desirable strategies 
when theory is being examined using case-studies (Trochim 1989, Yin 1993, Cresswell 
1994, Yin 1994). 
Performing the pattern-matching procedure involves the completion of three separate 
procedures. The first procedure involves constructing a theory-pattern by creating a 
pattern of events involving predicted variables based on the specified theory, to be used 
as a benchmark against which actual data can be compared. The second procedure 
involves constructing a case-study pattern by collecting and collating information 
regarding real events from the case-studies according to the pattern set out in the first 
stage, Finally, the third procedure engages pattern-matching, by matching both sets pf 
patterns and analysing whether the events in the case-study patterns correspond with the 
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events in the theory-pattern. Because each of these steps are quite extensive, this 
chapter will solely focus on the first stage which is constructing a theory-pattern, leaving 
the remaining stages to be dealt with by subsequent chapters. 
6.2 Constructing a Thoofy-Pattem 
This thesis is concerned with examining the alleged convergence of German executive 
pay on an American template, as part of a general convergence process. It predicts that in 
the face of German national culture and institutions, a long-term absence of 'real' 
convergence, with governance convergence being largely dependent and human 
resource strategies embedded in antecedent German culture and institutions, German 
executive stock option schemes will remain essentially 'German. Rather than being 
concerned with establishing causal inferences, this investigation is concerned with 
discovering the extent to which German executive stock option schemes really 
correspond with governance convergence. 
Constructing a theory-pattern consisting of variables involves articulating variables in 
operational terms (Yin 1994). Operationalising variables is however, usually fraught with 
difficulties; denoting variables not only involves a high degree of interpretation, the 
construction variables also have to closely resemble the variables available in case- 
studies and be easily measurable, thereby promoting a more exact paftern-matching 
procedure. Where this thesis is primarily concerned with comparing the characteristics of 
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German executive stock option schemes to US and UK schemes, attempts are made to 
minimise these difficulties by constructing variables which are semi-quantitative in nature, 
based on the specific characteristics of actual schemes adopted by corporations. 
In Chapter 4, a set of five research propositions was proposed, formulated from the 
chosen theoretical framework and predicting specified outcomes for German executive 
stock options in comparison with US and UK executive stock options. Constructing the 
theory-pattern for the investigation into German executive stock option schemes, these 
propositions are used as the basis for constructing pattern by: firstly, identifying the 
predicted variables in all propositions; secondly, defining them when they need to be 
interpreted; and thirdly, operation alising them so that they form a structure for data 
collection and organisation, for case-study analysis or creating case-study pattern, as well 
as aiding the final matching procedure. This practice begins with Proposition 1. 
Proposition I (Pi): Executive share option schemes in German firms may be 
expected to be more egalitarian, cascading further down a firm's vertical hierarchy, 
to include a greater proportion of total labour force than in the USA and UK. 
From PI, the following variables are identified. 
Executive stock option schemes in German/US/UK firms 
A greater proportion of the total labour force 
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(fi) Where the following variables need to be interpreted, they are defined below- 
- Executive stock option schemes in German/US/UK firms: the single most important 
share based scheme that applied to main board directors in German/US/UK 
corporations for the financial year 2000, in terms of the firm's proportion of shares 
involved. 
- Senior executives: Senior executives 'awarded' share based rewards (as opposed to 
'granted') during the financial year 2000. Although there seems to be little difference 
between the literal meaning of 'awarded' and 'granted, the thesis treats these terms 
as distinct from one another when referring to the actual practice of awarding 
incentives. Whereas stock options are usually awarded to executives by corporations 
during the financial year, stock options are, for most parts, only granted, vested and 
exercised later, when conditions are satisfied. 
Note: where the above variables appear in all of the propositions, they will not be defined 
here again. 
(N) Operationalising 'a greater proportion of the total labour force than in the USA and UK' 
involve: 
Assessing the percentage number of labour force awarded stock options under 
German, US, and UK schemes. 
Making a cross-comparison of the percentage number of the labour force awarded 
stock options under the GermanIUS and German/UK schemes. Should the case-study 
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pattern provide evidence that German executive stock options cover a lower 
percentage number of the labour force awarded stock options compared to US or UK 
schemes, the theory predicting that German executive stock options are more 
egalitarian than US or UK schemes will be tentatively weakened. 
Proposition 2 (P2): Executive stock option schemes in German firms may be 
predicted to award lower rewards in total - involving a smaller proportion of firms' 
total issued capital than in the USA and UK. 
(i) From P2, the following variable is identified., 
- smaller proportion of firm's total 
issued capital 
(fl) Operationalising 'smaller proportion of firm's total issued capital, involVes: 
- Assessing the percentage 
figure of total share capital awarded to senior executives by 
German, US and UK executive stock option schemes. 
- Making a cross-comparison of 
the percentage figures of total shares awarded by 
German/US and German/UK executive stock option schemes. Should the case-study 
pattern provide evidence that German executive stock option schemes award a higher 
percentage of total share capital compared to US or UK schemes, the construct- 
theory predicting that German firms award lower rewards in total compared to US and 
UK will tentatively be less supported. 
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Proposition 3 (P3): With low levels of executive power in German subject to a 
degree of collective control, the attachment of quantitatively more performance 
conditions to executive stock option schemes can be predicted in comparison with 
the USA and UK. 
(i) From P3, the following variable is identified 
- Quantitatively more performance conditions 
(fi) Operationalising 'quant#atively more performance conditions'involves: 
Determining the number of performance conditions attached to German, US and UK 
executive stock option schemes. 
Making a cross-compafison of the performance conditions attached to German/US 
and German/UK executive stock option schemes. Should the case-study pattern finds 
German executive stock option schemes usually attaching a lower number of 
performance conditions to their options compared to US or UK schemes, then the 
construct-theory predicting that German executive stock option schemes are 
subjected to a tighter degree of collective control will be tentatively diluted. 
Proposition 4 (P4): German executive stock option schemes will employ 
qualitatively stricter performance conditions than comparable schemes in USA and 
UK. 
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(i) From P4, the following variable is identified. 
- Qualitatively more performance conditions 
(#) Operationafising more performance conditions involves: 
- considering the strictness of performance conditions attached to German, US and UK 
stock option schemes using the criteria below which is based on New Bridge Street's 
(1996) ranking of the stringency of performance indicators. 
From less stringent to more stringent: 
no condition (i. e. naked option) 
exercise price adjusted for rate of inflation 
stock price indexed (outperform stock price) 
stock price indexed to sector (outperform index) 
idiosyncratic peer group comparison 
market based conditions e. g. total return of a stock to an investor (TSR) 
accounting based conditions e. g. earnings per share (EPS) 
additional accounting based conditions e. g. pre-tax dividend income and income 
from dividends reinvested in underlying shares added to appropriate rate of return 
Note: EPS is regarded as stricter than TSR because calculating TSR involves making 
subjective decisions about the treatment of dividends and variations in share capital 
through rights issue. On the other hand, EPS figures are measured once a year, with 
fewer opportunities for manipulation. This criteria, while has been used extensively, is 
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admittedly more contentious than suggested. For example, relying on EPS figures 
assumes that financial accounts do actually reflect performance when in reality they are 
subjected to manipulation. In this instance, TSR may prove to be a better indicator of 
performance particularly if markets are believed to be efficient and share prices do reflect 
company's performances. 
- Making a cross-comparison between the performance conditions' ranking of the 
German/US and German/UK executive stock option schemes. Should the case-study 
pattern finds German executive stock option scheme attaching less stringent performance 
conditions to their options compared to US or UK schemes then the construct-theory 
predicting that German executive stock option schemes are subjected to tighter degree of 
collective control will be tentatively undermined. 
Proposition 5 (P5): Corporate govemance in Germany will produce executive 
stock options of longer qualification periods imposed before option cans be 
exercised, than in the USA and UK. 
(i) From P5, the following variable is identified: 
- Longer qualification period 
imposed before options can be exercised 
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(ii) Operationalising 'longer qualification period imposed before options can be exercised' 
involves: 
- Determining minimum stock holding years in German, US and UK executive stock 
option schemes. 
- Making a cross-comparison between the minimum stock holding years for German/US 
and German/UK executive stock option schemes. Should the case-study pattern finds 
that German executive stock option schemes attach shorter number of minimum stock 
holding years compare to US or UK executive stock option schemes then the theory 
predicting that corporate governance in Germany will produce longer termed executive 
stock option schemes will be tentatively weakened. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter initiated the method of pattern-matching in relation to the study of the alleged 
convergence of the German executive pay. Where the procedure of pattern-matching 
involves construction theory-patterns and case-study patterns and matching theory and 
case-study patterns, this chapter only dealt with the first stage, leaving the second and 
third stage for Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
This chapter highlighted the difficulties of constructing theory-pattern, noting that in 
practice, a high degree of interpretation is needed for theory to be unravelled into a 
pattern of events, or a series of distinct variables. In constructing the variables, the 
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approach of this thesis thus has been to minimise any potential difficulties, by formulating 
variables which are defined and based on executive stock option schemes characteristics 
and operationalise to contain some quantitative measure. Where variables have been 
unavoidably qualitative such as those relating to Proposition 4, which required a 
measurement for 'strictness of performance conditions', a subjective but established 
ranking order of performance conditions stringency was utilised. Now that the theory- 
pattern for the case-studies has been constructed, Chapter 7 will proceed by performing 
the second stage of pattern-matching: constructing case-study pattern. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 proposed the use of descriptive case-studies and pattern-matching using 
details of German, US and UK executive stock option schemes as a means to analyse the 
alleged convergence of German, US and UK executive stock option schemes as a means 
to analyse the alleged convergence of German executive pay. Chapter 6 constructed the 
theory-pattern that forms the basis for the pattern-matching process. Building on this, 
Chapter 7 firstly aims to construct the case-study pattern by: collecting relevant 
information relating to the German/US/UK executive stock option schemes; arranging the 
information in the form of a database which will aid cross-comparisons; making cross- 
comparisons of German/US and German/UK executive stock option scheme details; and 
finally presenting the outcomes of the cross-comparisons in a pattern similar to theory- 
pattern. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 instigates the data collection process. 
Section 7.2 assembles the database relating to individual German, US and UK executive 
stock option schemes under study and the database relating to paired German/US and 
German/UK executive stock option schemes. Section 7.3 cross-compares German/US 
and German/UK executive stock option schemes details. Section 7.4 presents the 
outcome to construct the case-study pattern. Section 7.5 concludes the chapter. 
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7.2 The Data Collection Process 
Chapter 5 found seven pairs of matching German/US and German/UK companies as 
case-studies. The task now is to collect relevant information regarding the selected 
companies' executive stock option schemes, which would allow the case-study pattern to 
be constructed. In the process of collecting information on companies' executive stock 
option schemes, it was discovered that some US and UK companies adopt more than one 
stock option scheme or share based reward for its senior executives. Where the research 
was conducted in early 2002, and the most recent published reports which were available 
related to the 2000/2001 period, it was thus decided that this thesis would only concern 
itself with the 'main' stock option scheme adopted by the company for the financial year 
2000, where the'main'stock option scheme was defined as the scheme which awards the 
highest proportion of shares to senior executives, or the scheme which only served the 
executive officers. Hence, only data relating to this scheme was collected in the data 
collection process. Additionally, a few companies in the UK were also found not to 
possess any form of stock option schemes, having replaced them with long-term incentive 
plans awarding only conditional shares i. e. conditional executive stock option schemes 
with zero exercise prices to senior executives. Another decision was therefore made: to 
consider the 'main' share-based reward scheme adopted by the company and compile 
data only relevant to this scheme. 
For all of these schemes hence, the same set of information was targeted: the number of 
senior executives awarded stock options / conditional shares, the percentage of this to 
total company employees, the maximum number of shares underlying the options / 
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conditional shares awarded, the percentage of this to total company share capital, the 
description and number of performance conditions and the minimum qualification period 
attached to the schemes. 
Under German law, German companies are only required to disclose total pay awarded to 
pay. Other information on executive pay, as previously mentioned is scarce and can only 
be obtained if the company has filed with the US SEC upon listing Type I or Type 11 ADRs 
or when the companies prepared their accounts in accordance to US GAAP. 
Consequently, data on German companies were obtained from piecing together 
information from company annual reports, and US SEC forms such as Form 10-F and 
Form 6-K. These documents are available because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
requires that listed companies submit ongoing and interim detailed disclosures to the 
SEC. Form 20-F Annual Report is particularly detailed, with disclosures often being over 
fifty pages in length and information closely resembling that which is required to be 
disclosed by domestic US companies. Although this report need not strictly comply with 
the US GAAP, reports made by German companies can be particularly detailed where 
they have to be reconciled with US accounting and disclosure requirements. 
Form 6-K is also an extensive report. An interim statement, it requires that German listed 
companies provide all information which was made public pursuant to the law in Germany 
and distributed to the local shareholders. An example of such information is the 
information contained in German's company agendas or managing directors' report to the 
shareholders in companies' general meetings. These reports often include details about 
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stock option programmes being adopted because of the requirement by Aktiengesetz that 
firms using contingent capital or buying back their own shares to issue stock options for 
executives have to inform shareholders. Interestingly, this information is not available in 
local report or on companies' websites. However, when the companies issue stock 
appreciation rights or stock options to its executives, and the underlying shares are 
bought by the companies from third party, Aktiengesetz do not require such information to 
be made public, on the basis that they do not impact on the ownership position of 
outstanding shareholders. 
Data relating to US companies was gathered from company annual reports as well as 
financial results filed with the SEC, in accordance with Form 10-K, and the definitive proxy 
statements or 14A as they are commonly known. Every publicly traded US Company is 
required by law to file a proxy statement with the SEC within 120 days after the end of its 
fiscal year and mist mail proxies to every shareholder before its annual shareholder 
meeting. The proxy statements contains a report of the compensation committee 
providing detailed information on salary, bonus, option grants, restricted sock awards and 
other perks for the company's chief executive and next four highest paid officers. 
For UK companies, information was accumulated from company annual repoýs. Under 
the Company Accounts (Disclosure of Directors' Emoluments) Regulations 1997; The 
Listing Rules and UK Combined Code of Principles of Good Governance and Code of 
Best Practice, the detailed reporting of directors' share options in UK are provided in most 
company accounts in the remuneration report section of the directors' report. 
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Collecting data for individual German, US and UK executive stock option schemes / share 
based reward schemes was not without problems however. An example of this is the 
discovery that the number of individuals involved in stock option schemes for certain 
German, US and UK companies were not disclosed in any of the published records made 
available. Where this was the case, telephone calls were made to the companies' investor 
relations and in some instances directly to the company secretary him/herself to confirm 
the number of executives estimated to be involved in the selected share based reward 
scheme. Out of all the companies approached, only one company: SAP AG, refused to 
provide this information. The relevant data was eventually collected and compiled to 
create individual case-study database as described on the next section. 
7.3 Constructing Case-Study Database 
Yin (1994) stresses the importance of creating a database where he writes that 
documentation within the case-study should not only comprise the case-study report but 
also a formal and presentable database. The purpose of this is to allow the critical reader 
recourse to inspect the evidence directly that led to the case-study conclusions. 
Accordingly, subsection 7.3.1 provides an overview of the specific German, US and UK 
companies, and Appendix A records important and relevant information about their main 
share based reward schemes. This information is then picked up in subsection 7.4.2 
where information collected is summarised to form a database which presents information 
along the lines of matched German/US and GermanIUK companies. 
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Deutsche Bank (Germany) 
Deutsche Bank is one of the world's leading international financial service providers. The 
Bank's activities cover a full range of corporate and investment banking, private clients 
and asset management products and services with 2,099 facilities in over 70 countries 
worldwide. Deutsche Bank prepares its accounting and valuation methods in accordance 
to the International Accounting Standard (IAS) and prior to listing ADRs on the NYSE in 
Oct 2001, issued over the counter (OTC) ADRs. As such, for financial year 2000, 
Deutsche Bank was not required to file in Form 20-F with the US SEC. During financial 
year 2000, Deutsche Bank awarded its senior executives the rights to subscribe interest- 
paying convertible bonds under its Global Equity Plan. Selected executives included 
members of the board of management, executives in affiliated companies, regional 
managers, and the heads of service areas in Deutsche Bank's main office. 
J. P. Morgan Chase (USA) 
J. P. Morgan Chase is a financial holding company formed in 2000 by the merger of JP 
Morgan & Co. with The Chase Manhattan Corporation. The Company's activities are: 
investment banking, treasury and security services, investment management and private 
banking. During financial year 2000, J. P. Morgan Chase awarded its executive offices 
stock options under its Growth Performance Incentive Program. In 2000, five executive 
officers were awarded stock options to acquire up to 4,329,817 common stocks. 
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HSBC Holdings (UK) 
HSBC Holdings is a banking and financial services organisation. The Bank's international 
network comprises approximately 7,000 offices in 81 countries and territories in Europe, 
the Asia-Pacific region, the Americas, the Middle East and Africa. HSBC provides a 
financial services such as personal, commercial, corporate, investment and private 
banking; trade services, cash management; treasury and capital market services; 
insurance; consumer and business finance; pension and investment fund management; 
trustee services; and securities and custody services. HSBC did not award any stock 
options to its executive directors and group general managers in 2000; instead, the bank 
continued its 1996 decision to award conditional shares (stock options with zero exercise 
prices) under its Restricted Share Plan 2000. In 2000, the remuneration committee 
proposed to the trustee of the plan that 264 executives be awarded in 2001 instead of 
2000. 
Deutsche Telekorn (Germany) 
Deutsche Telekom is the largest telecommunications company in Europe, and German's 
leading fixed-line phone operator, with about 57 million access lines. Deutsche Telekom's 
T-Corn unit provides network access services and its T-Mobile International division 
serves wireless phone customers. The Company's T-Online subsidiary is Europe's 
leading ESP; and the Company's T-Systems division specialises in IT services. The 
German government owns 43 per cent of Deutsche Telekom. Deutsche Telekom's 
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accounting and valuation methods are prepared in accordance with Section 317 HGB and 
the generally accepted German standards. The Company listed itself on the NYSE by 
issuing Levels 11 ADRs in 1999. During financial year 2000, Deutsche Telekorn awarded 
stock options to selected senior executives consisting of managing directors, managers 
below the board level and managers of domestic and foreign group company under its 
Stock Option Plan 2000. In 2000,350 executives at Deutsche Telekom and its 
subsidiaries were awarded stock options. 
WorldCom (USA) 
WorldCom provides communications services which include voice, data, internet and 
international services to businesses and consumers. The WorldCom Group 
communications infrastructure connects 124 cities cross North American, Europe, Latin 
America and Asia. Of course, this company created a major corporate scandal in 2002, 
mainly associated with its executive pay and performance measurement. Nevertheless, it 
was still used as a match for Deutsche Telekom, representing US practices at 2000. in 
the financial year 2000, WorldCom awarded its executive officers stock options under its 
1999 Stock Option Plan. In 2000, stock options under the plan were awarded to four 
executive officers. 
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BT (UK) 
BT provides voice and data services in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. The Company 
consists of BT Retail, BT Wholesale, BT Ignite and BT Openworld. BT Retail and BT 
Wholesale address the UK consumer, business and wholesale markets, offering 
communication products and services, voice, data, internet and multimedia products and 
services, and communications solutions; BT Ignite provides business service solution 
provider, and BT Openworld is a mass market Internet business. In 2000, BT did not 
award any share-based rewards to its executives. BT Share Option Scheme had expired 
in January 1995 and was not replaced after the last options were granted in 1994. It did 
however, announce the introduction of a new share-based scheme in 2001, called BT 
Equity Incentive Portfolio. Because of the scheme involved awarding stock based 
compensation to BT's most senior executives, it was decided for the purpose of this 
research that the use of this scheme for the German/UK cross-comparison would be 
appropriate. In 2000, awards were granted to around 2,500 senior executives. 
MG Technologies (Germany) 
MG Technologies, formerly MetallgeselIschaft is a multi-industry company-operating 
group Wth core competencies in technology, engineering and chemicals. The group 
provides plant construction, process and thermal engineering. Its chemical group makes 
and distributes explosives, plastics, advanced ceramics, specialty chemicals and 
pigments. MG Technologies starl[ed preparing its consolidated financial statements 
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according to US GAAP in 2000, but is not listed on the NYSE. In the financial year 2000, 
MG Technologies awarded its executive directors and group executives stock options 
under its Modified Stock Option Plan, originally launched in April 1998 while the Company 
was known as Metal Igesellschaft AG. In 2000,160 senior executives were awarded stock 
option rights. 
Textron (USA) 
Textron is a multi-industry company with five operating segments: aircrafts, industrial 
products, fastening systems, industdal components, and finance. In the financial year 
2000, Textron awarded its executive directors, key executives and other employees stock 
options coupled with performance share units under its 1999 Long-Term Incentive Plan. 
The stock options are granted to executives based on the executive officers' functions and 
responsibilities, past and expected future performance, potential contribution to the 
Company's profitability and growth, and prior option grants. In 2000,62 most senior 
executives received awards of stock options which were coupled with performance share 
units. 957 other senior executives received stock options without awards of performance 
units. 
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Johnson Matthey (UK) 
Johnson Matthey is a multi-industry company with operations in four district units: 
catalysts and chemicals, precious metals, colours and coatings and pharmaceutical 
materials. It is also the sole marketing agent for Anglo-American Platinum, the world's 
largest platinum producer and makes active pharmaceutical ingredients, such as codeine. 
The Company operates in 34 countries worldwide. In the financial year 2000, Johnson 
Matthey awarded shares to its executive directors and other senior executives under its 
1998 Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP). In 2000, incentive shares were awarded to 1,650 
senior executives. 
SAP (Germany) 
SAP is the leading provider of computer software used to integrate back-office functions 
such as distribution, accounting, human resources and manufacturing. Nearly 20,000 
companies use its software and SAP continues to shift its huge customer base to its web- 
based software plafforms. SAP is also expanding into related fields, including supply 
chain and customer relationship management. SAP's accounting and valuation methods 
have been conforming to US GAAP since 1999. SAP had listed itself on the NYSE by 
issuing Level 11 ADRs in August 1998. 
SAP introduced share-based reward in the form of executive stock options for the first 
time in 2000 announcing its aim to attract, retain, and motivate senior managers and top 
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performers. Previous to this, in 1999, SAP's subsidiary, SAP American Inc. 's saw many of 
its top management including the president, chief executive officer and several vice 
presidents leave the company to join US based technology companies, which were known 
to offer hefty stock options to executive employees. In the UK, the general manager and 
deputy managing director also resigned to join rival technological companies. Under 
SAP's Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP), executives can choose between receiving 
convertible bonds, stock options or 50 per cent of each. In 2000, the Company issued 
convertible bonds and stock options under the plan to its executives. However, it refused 
to reveal how many executives were awarded convertible bonds or stock options. 
America Online (USA) 
America Online (AOL) provides internet access to more than 35 million subscribers. The 
AOL proprietary network offers contents, communication tools, and online shopping, 
among other internet services. It also owns Compuserve Interactive Services, which has 
more than 2 million users and has operations in foreign countries. In 2000, AOL and Time 
Warner merged. During this time, each of the AOUs and Time Warner's executive officers 
was awarded stock options by their respective compensation committees under plans 
approved by the stockholder of either AOL or Time Warner and assumed by the Company 
as of the merger date and the terms governed by the plans and the recipient's option 
agreement. During 2000, AOL awarded stock options to its three executive officers. 
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Reuters (UK) 
Reuters culls data from some 240 exchanges, over-the-counter markets, and contributing 
subscribers, and distributes it through various products to nearly 500,000 users globally. 
Reuters also provides news to online, broadcast, and print media. In 2000, Reuters did 
not award stock options to its executive directors and group executive directors but 
instead awarded share rights under its 1993 Long-Term Incentive Share Plan. In 2000, 
nine senior executives were awarded share incentives. 
Schwarz Pharma (Germany) 
Schwarz Pharma develops and markets innovative drugs for medical needs, focusing on 
neurology, urology, and cardiovascular diseases. The Company also invests in projects 
targeting diseases such as Parkinson's, restless legs syndrome, epilepsy, neuropath pain, 
overactive bladder / incontinence, and benign prostatic hyperplasia. The Company has a 
strong international presence with affiliates in Germany, the USA, Italy, Spain, France, 
Great Britain, Poland, and China, and licensing agreements in 50 other countries. 
Schwarz Pharma's accounting and valuation methods are prepared in accordance to US 
GAAP and the Company issued OTC ADRs in 1996. In 2000, Schwarz Pharma awarded 
interest bearing fixed-rate convertible bonds to its executive directors and other senior 
executives under its Stock Option Program 2000. In 2000, options for common shares 
were awarded to 500 senior executives. 
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Endo Pharma (USA) 
Endo Pharma is a drug company specialising in products for pain management. The 
Company's best selling drugs include Percocet tablets, Percodan tablets and Lidoderm. 
The Company also makes generic equivalents of pain medications for which patent 
production has expired as well as making remedies for serious cough and congestion. In 
2000, Endo Pharma awarded stock options to its executive officers and other senior 
executives under the amended and restated 1997 Stock Option Plans. In 2000, Endo 
Pharma awarded options to approximately 60 senior executives. 
Cell Tech Group (UK) 
Cell Tech Group is a drug company, which is a product of the merger of two R&D firms, 
Cell Tech and Chiroscience, and then a union with a drug developer, marketer, and 
distributor Medeva. Cell Tech specialises in producing drugs relating to autoimmune and 
inflammatory diseases, cancer, and pain and the ability to market them. The Company's 
research and development unit develops new pharmaceuticals and its pharmaceutical 
arm manufactures, markets, and distributes the drugs. In the financial year 2000, Cell 
Tech Group awarded its executive directors and senior managers stock options under its 
Executive Share Option Scheme 1999. In 2000,508 senior executives were awarded 
options. 
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SGL Carbon (Germany) 
SGL Carbon is a global manufacturer of graphite and carbon products, and electrodes 
used to melt steel scrap. The Company's customers range from members of the 
aerospace and automobile industries to chemical and energy companies. SGL Carbon's 
accounting and valuation methods are prepared in accordance with Section 317 HGB and 
the generally accepted German standards. The Company listed itself on the NYSE by 
issuing Level 11 ADRs in February 2000. In the financial year 2000, SGL Carbon awarded 
stock options to 153 of its executive board members, selected senior executives, 
executive board members of the group companies and senior executives of group 
companies. 
Crane (USA) 
Crane Company manufactures engineered industrial products. The Company's products 
have primary application in the aerospace, hydrocarbon-processing, petrochemical, power 
generation, and automated merchandising and transportation business. In the financial 
year 2000, Crane awarded selected senior executive stock options under its Stock Option 
Plan 1998. Crane's compensation committee has the discretion to determine the terms 
and the conditions of the stock options granted. The executives may also be granted 
sreload options' under certain circumstances, after the exercise of all or a portion of 
options granted. The reload option entitles the executives to purchase a number of shares 
equal to the number of shares delivered in payment as part of the exercise piece of the 
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original option plus the shares delivered or withheld to satisfy tax liabilities associated with 
the exercise of the original option. In 2000, the Committee granted options to 199 of its 
senior executives. 
TT Electronic (UK) 
TT Electronic is a global manufacturing company making electronic components for 
automotive manufacturers. The company's electrical division manufactures generators, 
power and data transmission cables, uninterruptible power supplies, fasteners and 
connectors. In the financial year 2000, TT Electronics awarded stock options to 100 
executive officers and selected senior executives under its 1996 Executive Share 
Scheme. 
Vossloh (Germany) 
Vossloh makes transport products, from locomotives and switch systems to fasteners for 
railway tracks. The Company also makes software for traffic management and railway 
design and lightning products and operates through more than 50 subsidiaries worldwide. 
Vossloh started preparing its accounting and valuation methods in accordance to US 
GAAP in 1999 and has no ADR listing. In the financial year 2000, Vossloh awarded its 
executive board members and selected executives of its company and subsidiaries stock 
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option plans under the Company's 1998 Long-Term Incentive Programme - ESOP. 
Eligible participants purchase shares of Vossloh stock and receive bonus options, 
granting them options to acquire the Company stock at the quoted market price. In 2000, 
45 senior executives purchase stocks and receive bonus option. 
Wabtec Corporation (USA) 
Wabtec, formally Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies is a manufacturer of transport 
equipment producing parts for locomotives, freight cars, and passenger railcars. Webtec's 
transit segment supplies replacement parts and repair services to operators of passenger 
transit vehicles such as the Metropolitan Transportation Authority / New York City Transit. 
In the financial year 2000, Webtec awarded stock options to its senior executives who 
share responsibility in management, growth, or protection of the business under its 2000 
Stock incentive Plan. In 2000, five senior executives were awarded stock options. 
Henlys Group (UK) 
Henlys Group manufacturers commercial buses, school buses, transit buses, motor 
homes and touring coaches through its subsidiaries, which include Blue Bird, North 
America's largest maker of school buses. Henlys Group also has fifty per cent ownership 
in two North American bus and motor-home companies and makes buses and coaches 
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foe European market though its 30 per cent stake in TransBus International. During 
financial year 2000, Henlys awarded its senior executives incentive shares under its Long 
Term Incentive Plan. Although the Company's stock incentive plan allowed awards if 
shares to be made to any full-time executive of the Group, the remuneration committee 
only awarded the three executive directors during 2000. 
7.4 Constructing the Case-Study Pattern 
This section constructs the case-study pattern. This process involves taking each pair of 
the German/US and German/UK companies and carrying out a cross-comparison in 
accordance to the theory-pattern constructed in Chapter 6. Hence, evidence pertaining to 
each German company will be contrasted to evidence of its matched US or UK Company 
as to whether the German executive stock option scheme has a: 
1. greater proportion of the total labour force involved 
2. smaller percentage figure of total issued shares under options 
3. greater number of performance conditions attached 
4. qualitatively stricter performance conditions 
5. longer minimum qualification period 
Carrying out these comparisons is straightforward Wth the exception of number 4, with 
some sort of ranking system required to provide an objective judgment. As specified in 
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Chapter 6, for this reason the adapted work of compensation consultants New Bridge 
Street (1996) will be used. Of course using this ranking means that it is assumed that 
stock market-based performance measures are less susceptible to manipulation by 
executives than accounting measures, and that TSR is less difficult to manipulate using 
new shares issues and dividend decisions than EPS. Sub-section 7.4.1 uses the 
information collected in the database in Appendix B and performs these comparisons and 
reports the findings. 
7.4.1 German/US Companies 
(1) Number of senior executives involved: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of senior 
executives involved compared to JP Morgan Chase's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of senior 
executives involved compared to WorldCom's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has a smaller number of senior 
executives involved compared to Textron's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has an unknown number of senior executives 
involved compared to AOL's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has a smaller number of senior 
executives involved compared to Endo Pharma's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has a smaller number of senior 
executives involved compared to Crane's scheme. 
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(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of senior executives 
involved compared to Wabtec's scheme. 
(2) Percentage figure of total issued shares under options: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has approximately the same 
percentage figure of total issued shares under option compared to JP Morgan Chase's 
scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has a smaller percentage figure 
of total issued shares under option compared to WorldCom's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has a smaller percentage figure of 
total issued shares under option compared to Textron's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has a smaller percentage figure of total issued 
shares under option compared to AOL's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has the same percentage figure of 
total issued shares under options compared to Endo Pharma's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has a greater percentage figure of total 
issued shares under option compared to Crane's scheme. 
(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option scheme has a smaller percentage figure of total 
issued shares under option compared to Wabtec's scheme. 
(3) Number of performance conditions attached: 
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(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has the same number of performance 
conditions attached compared to JP Morgan Chase's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of 
performance conditions attached compared to WorldCom's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has a greater number of 
performance conditions attached compared to Textron's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of performance 
conditions attached compared to AOL's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has the same number of 
performance conditions allached compared to AOL's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of performance 
conditions compared to Endo Pharma's scheme. 
(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option has a greater number of performance conditions 
attached compared to Wabtec's scheme. 
(4) Levels of strictness of qualities performance conditions attached: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively stricter performance 
conditions compared to JP Morgan Chase's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively stricter number 
of performance conditions attached compared to WorldCom's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has qualitatively stricter 
performance conditions to Textron's scheme. 
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(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively stricter performance 
conditions attached compared to AOL's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively stricter 
performance conditions allached compared to Endo Pharma's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has the same level of strictness for 
qualitatively performance conditions compared to Crane's scheme. 
(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option has qualitatively stricter performance conditions 
attached compared to Wabtec's scheme. 
(5) Qualifying period of the schemes: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has a longer qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to JP Morgan Chase's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has a longer qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to WorldCom's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has a longer qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to Textron's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has a longer qualifying period imposed before 
options can be exercised compared to AOL's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has a longer qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to Endo Pharma's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has a longer qualifying period imposed 
before options can be exercised compared to Crane's scheme. 
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(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option has a longer qualifying period imposed before 
options can be exercised compared to Wabtec's scheme. 
7.4.2German/UK Companies 
(1) Number of senior executives involved: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of senior 
executives involved compared to HSBC's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has a smaller number of senior 
executives involved compared to BT's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has a smaller number of senior 
executives involved compared to Johnson Matthey's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has an unknown number of senior executives 
involved compared to Reuter's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has a smaller number of senior 
executives involved compared to Cell Tech's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of senior 
executives involved compared to TT Electronic's scheme. 
(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option scheme has a greater number of senior executives 
involved compared to Henlys'scheme. 
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(2) Percentage figure of total issued shares under options: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has a greater percentage figure of 
total issued shares under option compared to HSBC's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has a smaller percentage figure 
of total issued shares under option compared to BT's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has a greater percentage figure of 
total issued shares under option compared to Johnson Matthey's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has a greater percentage figure of total issued 
shares under option compared to Reuter's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has a greater percentage figure of 
total issued shares under options compared to Cell Tech's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has a greater percentage figure of total 
issued shares under option compared to TT Electronic's scheme. 
(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option scheme has a greater percentage figure of total 
issued shares under option compared to Henlys'scheme. 
(3) Number of performance conditions attached: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has the same number of performance 
conditions attached compared to HSBC's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has the same number of 
performance conditions attached compared to BT's scheme. 
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(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has a smaller number of 
performance conditions attached compared to Johnson Matthey's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has the same number of performance 
conditions attached compared to Reuter's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has a smaller number of 
performance conditions attached compared to Cell Tech's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has the same number of performance 
conditions compared to TT Electronic's scheme. 
(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option has a higher number of performance conditions 
attached compared to Henlys'scheme. 
(4) Levels of strictness of qualities performance conditions attached: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively less strict 
performance conditions compared to HSBC's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively less strict 
number of performance conditions attached compared to BT's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has qualitatively less strict 
performance conditions to Textron's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively less strict performance 
conditions attached compared to Reuter's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively less strict 
performance conditions attached compared to Cell Tech's scheme. 
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(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has qualitatively less strict 
performance conditions compared to Crane's scheme. 
(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option has qualitatively stricter performance conditions 
attached compared to Henly's scheme. 
(5) Qualifying period attached to the schemes: 
(i) Deutsche Bank's executive stock option scheme has a shorter qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to HSBC's scheme. 
(ii) Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme has a shorter qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to BT's scheme. 
(iii) MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme has the same qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to Johnson Matthey's scheme. 
(iv) SAP's executive stock option scheme has a shorter qualifying period imposed before 
options can be exercised compared to Reuter's scheme. 
(v) Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme has a longer qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to Cell Tech's scheme. 
(vi) SGL Carbon's executive stock option scheme has a shorter qualifying period 
imposed before options can be exercised compared to TT Electronic's scheme. 
(vii) Vossloh's executive stock option has the same qualifying period imposed before 
options can be exercised compared to Henlys scheme. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter completed the process of constructing case-study pattern. It began by 
gathering information relating to the sample of selected companies from various sources. 
Yin (1994) suggests that case-study report should provide the means whereby 
conclusions can be examined directly hence data collected was collated and structured 
into a database, which summarised important information relating to the individual 
companies (see Appendix A). This information was then organised to form a second 
series of database, which contained a series of matching pairs of German/US and 
German/UK companies (see Appendix B). Following this, a multi-cross comparison was 
made between the paired companies to form the case-study pattern. With theory-pattern 
being constructed in Chapter 6 and the case-study pattern completed in this chapter, the 
next chapter is now able to perform the final act of matching case-study pattern to the 
theory-pattern and subsequent to this, analyse the results. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 identified and operationalised the significant variables contained in the 
developed propositions and constructed a theory-pattern. Chapter 7 collected and valued 
information collected from the case-studies to construct a case-study pattern. This chapter 
focuses on the third and final step of pattern-matching: examining whether the variables 
contained in the theory-pattern have the same values as those in the case-study pattern. 
If the values of the variables in the theory and case-study pattern are found to be the 
same, it can be tentatively concluded that German executive pay is not converging 
towards Anglo-American pay practices and that stock option schemes have been adopted 
by larger German corporations in a typically 'German' way. Such a finding would be useful 
for future research. For instance, when sample size increase, significance tests may be 
performed on the differences between sample means, and the hypothesis can be more 
firmly tested for rejection or support. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.2 matches each one of the theory-pattern 
to the case-study patterns and reports the preliminary outcomes. Section 8.3 determines 
the conclusiveness of these findings by examining in more detail, the case-studies 
evidence in relation to each theory-pattern construct. Section 8.4 examines the 
propositions from the viewpoint of the German companies contained in the case-studies, 
to 
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identify patterns, which could lead to possible avenues for further research. Section 8.5 
concludes the chapter. 
8.2 The Pattem-matching Process 
This section performs the actual matching process by matching the values of the variables 
in the theory-pattern with those resulted from cross comparing the case-studies. In the 
preceding tables, each of the five propositions established from Chapter 6 is compared 
with the findings obtained from the case-studies from Chapter 7. Where evidence from 
each case-study is found to have matched with the proposition, a tick (4) is made in the 
column for the relevant case-study pair. Conversely, when the finding from each case- 
study is found to have differed from each proposition, a cross (X) is made. When then the 
process is completed, the total number of case-study patterns matching theory-pattern us 
counted in an unweighted thus providing a rough indication of the level of support for each 
proposition. 
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8.2.1 Pattern-matching for German/US Case-Studies 
Table 8.1: Paftem-matching German/US Companies 
I Theory-Paftern 
Proposifions 
Pl: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms 
may be expected to cover a 
greater no. of senior 
executive participation than 
equivalent schemes in the 
USA 
P2: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms 
may be expected to issue a 
smaller percentage figure of 
total issued shares under 
options than equivalent 
schemes in the USA 
PI Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms. 
may be expected to attach a 
greater number of 
performance conditions than 
equivalent schemes in the 
USA 
P4: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms 
may be expected to have 
qualitatively stricter 
performance conditions than 
equivalent schemes in the 
USA 
P5: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms 
may be expected to have 
longer minimum qualification 
period than equivalent 
schemes in the USA 
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8.2.2 Pattern -match i ng for German/UK Case-Studies 
Table 8.2: Pattem-matching German/UK Companies 
Theory-Pattern Case-Study Patte 
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Pl: Executive stock opfion C= 
schemes in German firms X M X X 
may be expected to cover a 0 
greater no. of senior 
executive participation than 
equivalent schemes in the 
USA 
P2: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms X X X X X X 
may be expected to issue a 
smaller percentage figure of 
total issued shares under 
options than equivalent 
schemes in the USA 
PI Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms X X X X X X 
may be expected to attach a 
greater number of 
performance conditions than 
equivalent schemes in the 
USA 
P4: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms X X X X X X 
may be expected to have 
qualitatively stricter 
performance conditions than 
equivalent schemes in the 
USA 
P5: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms X X X X X X X 
may be expected to have 
longer minimum qualification 
period than equivalent 
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8.2.3 The Preliminary Outcomes 
Subsequent to the pattern-matching procedure undertaken, the section summarises the 
findings for each of the pattern matched. If the case-study pattern matches those 
predicted by theory, it can be concluded that the proposition is supported by evidence 
from the case-study and should therefore be allowed to go forward as a viable 
proposition. If the case-study evidence describes other values, it can be concluded that 
the evidence from the case-study does not support the propositions. If some or all of the 
values of the case-study differ, then it can be concluded that the empirical evidence only 
weakly supports or does not support the propositions. Of course, the statistical 
significance of each of the proposition findings can only be estimated with much bigger 
samples, but an unsupported proposition should arguably be modified or abandoned. 
German/US Case-studies 
proposition I 
Three out of six German companies employed schemes, which included a higher level of 
senior executive participation compared to the US equivalent schemes. The proposition 
that German firms can be predicted to be more egalitarian with higher participatory rate by 
senior executives and employees than equivalent schemes in the USA is at best 
moderately supported. 
proposition 2 
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Five out seven German companies were found to have awarded a smaller proportion of 
shares under its executive schemes compared to US equivalent schemes. The 
proposition that German firms can be predicted to award lower rewards under their 
executive stock option schemes compared to equivalent US schemes is supported. 
Proposition 3 
Five out of seven German companies were found to have attached a greater number of 
performance conditions to their options compared to US schemes. The proposition that 
German firms can be predicted to attach qualitatively more performance conditions to 
executive stock option scheme awards compared to equivalent US scheme is supported. 
Proposition 4 
Five out of seven German companies were found to have attached a more stringent 
performance compared to US schemes. The proposition that German firms can be 
predicted to attach more stringent performance conditions to their executive stock option 
scheme awards compared to equivalent US schemes is supported. 
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Proposition 5 
Seven out of seven German executive stock option schemes were found to have longer 
minimum qualification periods compared to their US equivalents. They proposition that 
corporate governance in Germany will produce executive stock option schemes of longer 
duration, Wth longer minimum qualification periods imposed before options can be 
exercised compared to equivalent US schemes is supported. 
German/UK Case-studies 
proposition I 
Three out of six German companies employed schemes, which included a higher level of 
senior executive participation compared to equivalent schemes in the UK. The proposition 
that German firms can be predicted to be more egalitarian with higher participatory rate by 
senior executives and employees than equivalent schemes in the UK is at best 
moderately supported. 
proposition 2 
One out of seven German companies was found to have awarded a smaller proportion of 
shares under its executive schemes compared to UK companies. The proposition that 
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German firms can be predicted to award lower rewards under their executive stock option 
schemes compared to equivalent schemes in the UK is unsupported. 
Proposition 3 
One of out seven German companies was found to have attached a greater number of 
performance conditions to their options compared to UK schemes. The proposition that 
German firms can be predicted to attach qualitatively more performance conditions to 
executive stock option scheme awards compared to equivalent schemes in the UK is 
unsupported. 
proposition 4 
Two out of seven German companies were found to have attached a more stringent 
performance conditions compared to UK schemes. The proposition that German firms can 
be predicted to attach more stringent performance conditions to their executive stock 
option scheme awards compared to equivalent schemes in the UK is unsupported. 
proposition 5 
Zero out of seven German executive stock option schemes was found to have longer 
qualification period compared to their US equivalents. The proposition that corporate 
governance in German will produce executive stock option schemes of longer duration, 
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With longer minimum qualification periods imposed before options can be exercised 
compared to equivalent schemes in the UK is unsupported. 
Overall findings 
These provisional findings show that not all of the theories based on the assumption of 
path-dependency, traditional institutional theory and embeddedness can be supported by 
evidence from German, US and UK case-studies. That is, while initial findings suggest 
that evidence provided by the German/US case-studies support Proposition 2, Proposition 
3, Proposition 4, Proposition 5 and only very moderate support for Proposition 1. The next 
section examined the scores of these propositions in more detail to judge the 
conclusiveness of these results. 
8.3 Examining the Results 
This section reviews both the German/US and German/UK pattern-matching results by 
analysing closely the case-study evidence relating to each proposition to determine the 
extent of their support. Consequently, it also presents an amended set of final results for 
each of the proposition after taking into account any further evidence uncovered in its 
analysis. 
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8.3.1 Individual Proposition Scores 
German/US Case-studies 
Proposition I 
Proposition 1 stated that executive stock option schemes in Germany may be predicted to 
cover a greater proportion of the total labour than in the USA. Out of the six pairs of 
German/US case-studies (not seven, since SAP did not disclose information on the 
number of executives required), three pairs matched the proposition (see Table 8.3 
below). The three case-study pairs, which did not match the proposition, were SGL 
Carbon/Crane, Schwarz Pharma/Endo Pharma and MG Tech nologies/Textron and 
accordingly deserve further examination. 
Table 8.3: Comparisons of proportion of total labour involved (German/US) 
Percentage of Percentage of 
German Companies employees involved US Companies employees involved 
Deutsche Bank 2.740% JP Morgan Chase 0.005% 
Deutsche Telekom 1.373% WorldCom 0.006% 
MG Technologies 0.472% Textron 1.435% 
SAP Unknown AOL 0.017% 
Schwarz Pharma 0.123% Endo Pharma 0.200% 
SGL Carbon 1.905% Crane 2.116% 
Vossloh 0.930% Wabtec 0.114% 
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A closer inspection of the case-study of Schwarz Pharma/Endo Pharma and SGL 
Carbon/Crane shows that the difference between executive involvements in Schwarz 
Pharma/Endo Pharma and SGL Carbon/Crane schemes are not very significant. For 
example, Schwarz Pharma awarded stock options to 0.12 per cent of its total workforce 
while Endo Pharma awarded stock options to 0.20 per cent of its total workforce. 
Similarly, SGL Carbon awarded stock options to 1.90 per cent of its total workforce and 
Crane awarded stock options to 2.12 per cent of its total workforce. The case-study of MG 
Tech nologies/Textron on the other hand, does appear to provide no support for this 
proposition with MG Technologies' executive stock option scheme involving a smaller 
number of executives, covering only 0.47 per cent of its total workforce compared to 
Textron's 1.43 per cent. 
Proposition 2 
Proposition 2 stated that German companies can be predicted to award lower rewards in 
total, measured by the proportion of firms' total issued capital awarded to executives 
under their executive stock option schemes compared to their US equivalents. Out of the 
seven pairs of case-studied, five pairs supported this proposition (see Table 8.4 below). 
The two case-studies, which do not support this proposition, were Deutsche Bank/jP 
Morgan Chase and VosslohNVabtec, and thus deserve further examination. 
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Table B. 4 Comparisons of proportion of shares awarded and number of participants involved (German/US) 
% max. % max. 
German underlying Number of us underlying Number of 
Companies shares to participants Companies shares to Participants 
total no. of total no. of 
shares shares 
outstanding outstanding 
Deutsche 
Bank 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
0.230% 2,498 
0.033% 264 WorldCom 0.126% 4 
JP Morgan 
Chase 
0.226% 5 
MG 0.286% 180 Textron 3.159% 1,019 
Technologies 
SAP 0.122% 1,650 AOL 0.273% 3 
Schwarz 
Pharma 
2.037% 500 Endo Pharma 10.662% 60 
SGL Carbon 0.876% 154 Crane 0.468% 199 
Vossloh 2.870% 45 Wabtec 1.759% 5 
Although both Deutsche Bank and Vossloh executive stock option schemes were found to 
award higher or similar proportion of total shares when compared to their US 
counterparts, a closer inspection shows that where the number of proportion of shares 
issued and the number of senior executives awarded stock options or proportion of total 
labour force awarded options are interdependent, they awarded the proportions of total 
shares a higher number of executives in comparison to US firms. For example, Deutsche 
Bank awarded 0.23 per cent of its total shares to 2,498 or 2.74 percent of its total labour 
force compared to JP Morgan Chase's 0.23 per cent to 5 executive officers or 0.005 per 
cent of its total labour force. Similarly, Vossloh awarded 2.87 percent of its total shares to 
45 executives or 0.930 per cent of its labour force compared to Wabtec! s 1.76 per cent to 
5 executive officers of 0.114 per cent of its labour force. By definition of course, other 
things being equal, if the number of executives covered by an executive stock option 
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scheme or proportion of labour force awarded stock options was low, this would limit the 
proportion of total shares covered by the scheme. 
Proposition 3 
Proposition 3 stated that executive stock option scheme in Germany may be predicted to 
attach quantitatively more performance conditions compared with US schemes ensuring 
that executives earn their gains. This proposition was supported by five out of seven 
German firms having quantitatively more numerous performance conditions attached to 
their executive stock option schemes compared to US companies. The two-case-studies, 
which did not support this construct, were Deutsche Bank/JP Morgan Chase and Schwarz 
Pharma/Endo Pharma (Table 8.5 below) 
Table 8.5: Comparisons of number of performance conditions attached (German/US) 
No. of performance No. of performance 
German Companies Conditions US Companies Conditions 
Deutsche Bank 1 JP Morgan Chase 1 
Deutsche Telekom WorldCom 
MG Technologies 1 Textron 
SAP 1 AOL 
Schwarz Pharma 0 Endo Pharma 
-§GL Carbon 1 Crane 
Vossloh I Wabtec 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Further analysis of Deutsche Bank/JP Morgan Chase shows that although the Deutsche 
Bank executive stock option does not have more performance conditions attached, the 
scheme does involve a discount of up to two-thirds on the exchange of shares for bonds 
that depend on performance of EPS or its hurdle rate. Similarly, an analysis of the 
Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option scheme also reveals that although Schwarz 
Pharma has fewer conditions than Endo Pharma, it also provides an additional, 
unconventional condition involving a premium on the executive stock option scheme 
exercise price. Thus, it could be argued that these case-studies only contradict 
Proposition 3 because of the technical way in which performance conditions are defined. 
Proposition 4 
Proposition 4 stated that German executive stock option schemes can be predicted to use 
more demanding performance indicators measured by the use of qualitatively more 
demanding performance indicators compared with US schemes. This proposition was 
supported by five out of seven pairings with most of the German executive stock option 
schemes in the study attaching more stringent performance conditions compared to US 
schemes, which were mostly'naked'. 
Similar to the case in Proposition 3, it is the case-studies of Deutsche Bank/JP Morgan 
Chase and Schwarz Pharma/Endo Pharma, which did not offer any support to this 
proposition (Table 8.6). 
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Table 8.6: Compadsons of performance conditions attached (German/US) 
Performance 
German Companies Conditions US Companies 
Deutsche Bank Average adjusted pre- JP Morgan Chase 
tax EPS to exceed 
average pre-tax EPS of 
previous years 
Deutsche Telekom Share price to WorldCom 
outpedorm Euro Stoxx 
Index 
MG Technologies Average EPS growth to Textron 
exceed historical 
average EPS growth 
SAP Share price to AOL 
outperform Goldman 
Sachs Software Index 
_Schwarz 
Pharma None 
- 
Endo Pharma 
SGL Carbon Share price and Crane 
Vossloh 
reinvested dividends to 
exceed exercise price 
by at least 15% 
Share price to Wabtec 
outperform the M-DAX 
Performance 
Conditions 
Cumulative EPS for 
next 2 years to achieve 
targets of $8.50 and 
$9.50 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Nonetheless, as described before, both Deutsche Bank and Schwarz Pharma have 
issued additional provisions in relation to the subscription price despite having 'weaker' 
performance conditions in comparison to their US matches. The same observation made 
for Proposition 3 could thus be made here: where the German executive stock option 
schemes involve additional performance conditions compared to their US equivalents, the 
performance targets can be considered as being more demanding. 
Proposition 5 
proposition 5 states that German executive stock option schemes may be predicted to 
have longer qualification period imposed before options can be exercised, compared to 
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equivalent schemes in the USA. All of the seven case-studies supported the proposition 
(see Table 8.7 below). 
Table 8.7: Comparisons of minimum qualification period imposed (German/US) 
Minimum qualification Minimum qualification 
German Companies period US Companies period 
Deutsche Bank 2 years JP Morgan Chase 1 year 
Deutsche Telekom 2 years WorldCom 
MG Technologies 3 years Textron 
SAP 2 years AOL 
Schwarz Pharma 2 years Endo Pharma 
SGL Carbon 2 years Crane 
Vossloh 3 years Wabtec 
I year 
I year 
1 year 
None 
1 year 
Discretionary 
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German/UK Case-studies 
Proposition I 
Proposition 1 stated that executive stock option schemes in Germany may be predicted to 
cover a greater proportion of the total labour than in the UK. Out of the six pairs of 
German/UK case-studies (again not seven, since SAP did not disclose information on the 
number of executives required), only three supported this construct (see table 8.8). The 
remaining three pairs of case-studies, which did not match this proposition, were 
Deutsche Telekom/BT, MG Technologies/Johnson Matthey and Schwarz Pharma/Cell 
Tech. 
Table B. 8: Comparisons of proportion of total labour involved (German/US) 
Percentage of Percentage of 
German Companies employees involved UK Companies employees involved 
Ue--utsche Bank 2.740% HSBC 0.154% 
Deutsche Telekom 1.373% BT 2.388% 
MG Technologies 0.472% Johnson Matthey 0.148% 
AP Unknown Reuters 0.055% 
Schwarz Pharma 0,123% Cell Tech 25.037% 
-SGL Carbon 1,905% TT Electronics 0.121% 
-Vo-ssloh 0.930% Henlys 0.175% 
Examining these case-studies in greater detail, it was found that there was a significant 
difference between the proportion of labour force awarded options in these UK and 
German schemes. For example, a closer examination of the case-study of Deutsche 
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Telekom/BT showed that Deutsche Telekom only awarded 1.373 per cent of its total 
labour workforce compared to BT's 2.388 per cent. Similarly, MG Technologies only 
awarded 0.472 per cent of its total labour force compared to Johnson Matthey's 23.585 
per cent. Schwarz Pharma also awarded a much smaller percentage of its total workforce 
of 0.123 per cent compared to Cell Tech's 25.038 per cent. 
Proposition 2 
Proposition 2 stated that German companies can be predicted to award lower rewards in 
total, measured by the proportion of firms' total issued capital awarded to executives 
under their executive stock option schemes compared to their UK equivalents. Out of the 
seven case-studies, only Deutsche Telekom/BT matched the construct theory by 
awarding a lower percentage to its executives (see Table 8.9 below). 
Table 8.9: Comparisons of proportion of shares awarded and number of parficipants involved (German/UK) 
% max. % max. 
German underlying Number of UK underlying Number of 
Companies shares to participants Companies shares to participants 
total no. of total no. of 
shares shares 
outstanding outstanding 
Te-utsche Bank 0.230% 2,498 HSBC 0.022% 264 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
0.149% 2,500 0.033% 264 BT 
MG 0.286% 180 Johnson 0.148% 1,650 
Technologies Mafthey 
0.021% 9 
Schwarz 2.037% 500 Cell Tech 1.710% 508 
Pharma 
ics 0.468% 100 
Vossloh 2.870% 45 Henlys 1.759% 3 
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However, studying the other case-studies closely and considering the number of 
executives awarded the options and underlying shares, it was discovered that all German 
companies except for Deutsche Bank had issued out a higher proportion of shares under 
its executive stock option schemes. In the case of Deutsche Bank, it was seen that 
although the Bank awarded 0.230 per cent of its total shares compared to HSBC's 0.022 
per cent, it was to 2,498 executives or 2.740 per cent of its labour force compared to 
HSBC's 264 or 0.154 per cent. As previously mentioned, other things being equal, where 
HSBC's executive stock option scheme covered a lower number of executives, it would 
limit the proportion of total shares awarded to its senior executives. Nevertheless, the 
findings still indicate that Proposition 2 is weakly supported by the evidence from 
German/UK case-studies. Indeed, the exceptional case of Deutsche Telekom showing 
clear and direct support for Proposition 2 may have been the result of the conservative 
influence of high State ownership in the financial year 2000, with the State owning 43 per 
cent of total shares directly, plus another 17 per cent indirectly through the German 
Development Bank. 
proposition 3 
proposition 3 stated that executive stock option scheme in Germany may be predicted to 
attach quantitatively more performance conditions compared with UK schemes ensuring 
that executives earn their gains. This proposition was supported by the case-study of 
vossloh/Henlys when Henlys executive stock option scheme was found with no 
performance conditions attached. It is discovered that all the case-studies of Deutsche 
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Bank/HSBC, Deutsche Telekom/BT, SAP/Reuters, and SGL Carbon/TT Electronics did 
not support this construct because they all equally attached only one performance 
condition. On the other hand, the performance conditions of executive stock option 
schemes adopted by MG Technologies and Schwarz Pharma were simply outnumbered 
where Johnson Matthey employed two conditions and Cell tech provided one. 
Interestingly, Vossloh/Henlys supported this construct not because Vossloh was found 
with more than one performance condition but because Henlys did not specify any 
conditions attached to its executive stock option scheme (see Table 8.10 below). 
Table 8.10: Comparisons of the number of performance conditions attached (German/UK) 
No. of performance No. of performance 
_German 
Companies Conditions UK Companies Conditions 
Deutsche Bank 1 HSBC 
Deutsche Telekom 1 BritishTelecorn 
MG Technologies 1 Johnson Matthey 2 
SAP I Reuters 1 
Schwarz Pharma 0 Cell Tech 1 
SGL Carbon 1 TT Electronics 1 
Vossloh 1 Henlys 0 
proposition 4 
Proposition 4 stated that German executive stock option schemes can be predicted to use 
more demanding performance indicators measured by the use of qualitatively more 
demanding performance indicators compared with UK schemes. Only one of the seven 
pairings supported this proposition where all of the German companies, with the exception 
of Vossloh were found to have less stringent performance conditions attached to its 
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executive stock option schemes compared it its UK equivalent of Henlys (see Table 8.11 
below). The case-study of Vossloh/Henlys supported this proposition not because 
Vossloh was found with more than one performance condition but because Henlys did not 
specify any conditions to its executive stock option scheme. 
Table 8.11: Comparisons of performance condifions aftached (German/U* 
Performance 
German Companies Conditions UK Companies 
Average adjusted pre- HSBC 
Deutsche Bank tax EPS to exceed 
average pre-tax EPS of 
previous years 
Deutsche Telekorn Share price to British Telecom. 
outperform Euro Stoxx 
Index 
G Technologies Average EPS growth to Johnson Matthey 
exceed historical 
average EPS growth 
SAP 
Schwarz Pharma 
Share price to Reuters 
outperform Goldman 
Sachs Software Index 
None Cell Tech 
SGL Carbon Share price and TT Electronics 
reinvested dividends to 
exceed exercise price 
by at least 15% 
Vossloh Share p6ce to Henlys 
outpeorm the M-DAX 
Performance 
Conditions 
Attainment of 
predetermined TSR 
targets against the 
mean of selected 
benchmark over 3 
years. 
Attainment of TSR 
targets against rank of 
companies on FTSE 
100 Index after 3 years. 
Attainment of TSR 
targets against rank of 
companies on FTSE 
mid 250 index over 3 
years. EPS growth also 
to exceed RPI + 2% p. a. 
TSR targets over 3-5 
years compared to 
companies in FTSE 100 
index. 
Share price 
outpefforming the USE 
Mid 250 Index by a 
margin over 3 years. 
EPS to increase at a 
rate greater than 2% 
above any increase in 
the all items index of 
retail prices after 3 
years. 
None 
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Proposition 5 
Proposition 5 states that German executive stock option schemes may be predicted to 
have longer qualification period imposed before options can be exercised, compared to 
equivalent schemes in the UK. None of the case-studies matched this construct (see 
Table 8.12 below). 
Table 8.12: Comparisons of minimum qualification period imposed (German/UK) 
Minimum Minimum 
German Companies qualification period UK Companies qualification period 
Deutsche Bank 3 years HSBC 5 years 
Deutsche Telekorn 2 years British Telecom. 3 years 
MG Technologies 3 years Johnson Matthey 3 years 
SAP 2 years Reuters 3 years 
Schwarz Pharma 2 years Cell Tech 3 years 
SGL Carbon 2 years TT Electronics 3 years 
Vossloh 3 years Henlys 3 years 
Deutsche Bank's minimum qualification period was 2 years earlier than HSBC, s. 
Deutsche Telekom, SAP, Schwarz Pharma and SGL Carbon specified a minimum 
qualification period one year shorter than its UK equivalent and MG Technologies and 
Vossloh shared the same number of years. 
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8.3.2 The Findings Summarised 
This section summarises the findings after taking into consideration the additional 
observations acquired from the previous section. Again, it has to be noted here that the 
findings are still tentative at this stage, and the statistical significance of findings can only 
be estimated with further research. Additionally, as Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explained, 
because the study was performed when the adoption of executive stock option schemes 
by German companies was at an early stage, and the data obtained only related to one 
financial year, the results are only a snapshot. 
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Table 8.13: Final Results - Pattem-matching German/US Companies 
Theory-Paftem 
Propositi ns 
PI: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to cover a greater 
no. of senior executive 
participation than equivalent 
schemes in the USA 
P2: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to issue a smaller 
percentage figure of total issued 
shares under options than 
equivalent schemes in the USA 
PI Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to attach a greater 
number of pefformance 
conditions than equivalent 
schemes in the USA 
P4: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to have 
qualitatively stricter 
performance conditions than 
equivalent schemes in the USA 
Case-Study Paftem 
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P5: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to have longer 
minimum qualification period 
than equivalent schemes in the 
USA 
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Table B. 14: Final Results - Pattern-matching GermanAJK Companies 
Theory-Paftem 
Propositions 
Pl: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to cover a greater 
no. of senior executive 
participation than equivalent 
schemes in the USA 
P2: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to issue a smaller 
percentage figure of total issued 
shares under options than 
equivalent schemes in the USA 
P3: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to attach a greater 
number of pedormance 
conditions than equivalent 
schemes in the USA 
P4: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to have 
qualitatively stdcter 
performance conditions than 
equivalent schemes in the USA 
P5: Executive stock option 
schemes in German firms may 
be expected to have longer 
minimum qualification period 
than equivalent schemes in the 
USA 
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Taken as a whole, these provisional pattern-matching results demonstrate that there is 
little evidence of across-the-board German convergence on US-style executive stock 
option schemes. When compared to US executive stock option schemes, German 
comparators appear to have retained German characteristics in the sense of being less 
generous and maintaining more quantitatively and qualitatively performance conditions as 
well as appearing to be more concerned with long-termism by decreeing longer qualifying 
period. Additionally, there is also some support for German executive stock option 
schemes extending further down the managerial ladder, to include a greater proportion of 
the total labour force than in the USA. 
As was noted in Chapter 2, UK corporate governance is usually bracketed with US-sye 
market capitalism, identified as an Anglo-American corporate governance model. Hence, 
it is interesting to note that in terms of detailed characteristics, UK executive stock option 
schemes do not generally occupy an intermediate position between the USA and 
Germany. Indeed, UK executive stock option schemes in the paired case-studies seem to 
be empathically more 'German' than actual German schemes in their quantity and quality 
of performance conditions, the proportion of shares under options and the longer time 
horizons. 
Future tests on these five propositions are vital. When sample size increases and more 
information is forthcoming, statistical significance tests may be conducted on the 
differences between sample means, providing an opportunity to tests these constructs to 
obtain more concrete analytical generalisations. Anticipating the need for future tests, the 
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next section examines the construct from the perspective of individual German 
companies, in order to identify additional patterns occurring within the area of German 
executive pay, which might be invaluable for future research. 
8.4 Examining German Companies in Case-Studies 
This section examines the evidence provided by each German company in the 
German/US case-study pairs to identify additional patterns occurring within the area of 
German executive pay, which might be invaluable to future avenues for research. 
Deutsche Bank/JP Morgan Chase 
Deutsche Bank's main executive stock option scheme in 2000, the Global Equity Plan 
when compared with JP Morgan Chase's Stock Incentive Plan was found to have 
supported only two out of six propositions. Section 8.3.1 highlighted however that a close 
examination of the Deutsche Bank/JP Morgan Case showed that it however indirectly 
supported three other propositions. For example, although Deutsche Bank's Global Equity 
Plan did not issue a smaller proportion of total share capital when compared to JP Morgan 
Chase's Stock Incentive Plan, the Plan did not award a smaller proportion of total share 
capital per executive. Additionally, where Deutsche Bank executive stock option scheme 
came attached with less stringent performance conditions compared to executive stock 
option scheme in JP Morgan Chase, it conversely imposed a discount of up to two-thirds 
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on the exchange of shares for bonds depending on share price performance. Based on 
these findings, it can thus be concluded that evidence provided by Deutsche Bank/JP 
Morgan Chase pertaining to financial year 2000, do provide some support for the proposal 
that its executive stock option scheme has remained 'German'. 
Even so, in 2001, Deutsche Bank replaced its Global Equity Plan with a plan named DB 
Global Partnership. Under DB Global Partnership, instead of receiving convertible bonds, 
executives are awarded options. More importantly, the stock option plan differed from the 
convertible bond plan by making the purchase of options conditional upon Deutsche 
Bank's share price being at least 120 per cent its issue price. Additionally, the minimum 
qualification period for the exercise of the options were shortened from three years to two 
years after the date they were awarded. There was however, an exception to this. Where 
share price rises are considered to be substantial and not temporary: option rights may be 
exercised prematurely but only after the expiry of two years from the respective data on 
which they were awarded and the Deutsche Bank share price amounts to at least 130 per 
cent of the basis price before the exercise of the option right on 35 successive trading 
days. Finally, a smaller number of executives (approximately 387 executives) were 
allowed to participate in this scheme. 
justifying the amendment made to the performance condition, Deutsche Bank stated in its 
report that, 'alternative performance condition' was not viable omfing to the conversion of 
Group reporting to US GAAP as implementing an alternative performance condition would 
lead to significant staff expense in the Consolidated Income Statement under the US 
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GAAP: 'Where most of Deutsche Bank's competitors on the capital markets use such 
performance conditions and if the performance conditions of Deutsche Bank's 
programmes were to continue unchanged, the Group would have to accept competitive 
disadvantages on the equity markets, with negative effects on the share price' (item 11 or 
12: Report of the Board of Managing Director to the General Meeting, 2001). 
Nevertheless, Deutsche Bank also highlighted that the new plan included a longer 
minimum qualifying period because it wanted to give the entitled beneficiaries, 'a longer 
term incentive to raise company value in the interest of the shareholders' (Item 11 and 12: 
Report of the Board of Managing Directors to the General Meeting, 2001). 
Hence, although the case-study of Deutsche Bank/JP Morgan Chase in 2000 provided 
evidence that German incentive pay has essentially remained German, developments 
occurring after 20OOmsuch as Deutsche Bank's conversion to US GAAP from IAS and its 
listing of shares on the NYSE on October 2002 indicate that Deutsche Bank's incentive 
pay structure has been amended to incorporate some of the characteristics consistent 
With US executive stock option schemes. 
Deutsche Telekorn I World Com 
Deutsche Telekom's Stock Option Plan 2000, when compared with WorldCom's 1999 
Stock Option Plan provided support for all five constructs, tentatively approving the 
proposition that Deutsche Telekom's executive stock option scheme essentially remained 
'German'. However, like Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Telekom also announced in 2001, that 
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it was replacing the Stock Option Plan 2000 with a modified plan called the 2001 Stock 
Option Plan. Essentially, the 2001 Stock Option Plan differed from its predecessor by 
replacing the clause that made the options exercisable conditional upon Deutsche 
Telekom's share prices outperforming the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 Index with an 
absolute performance target of an increase in the price of 20 per cent over the reference 
price of the T-share. The 2001 Stock Option Plan was also more broadly based and more 
internationally oriented. Compared to Stock Option Plan 2000 which only awarded stock 
options to 300 selected executives, the new plan awarded options to 3,000 executives 
ranging from the executive board members of the company and group to the executive 
members of other second and lower-tier group companies and other specialists of 
Deutsche Telekom and of national and international second and lower-tier group 
companies which do not offer their own stock option plan. 
Under US GAAP, executive stock option schemes with index based or performance-linked 
targets are considered variable and are required to be reported as personnel expenses in 
the consolidated income statement resulting in a reduction in profit. Conversely, where 
executive stock option schemes considered to be fixed or certain of being exercised and 
the hurdles linked to the attainment of fixed share price targets, they are not required to 
be reported as personnel expenses. By choosing to adopt a stock option plan with share 
price targets, Deutsche Telekom thus explained that it would be able to report its incentive 
plan as fixed and thus able to report operation results, which are in line with other US or 
global competitors reporting under US GAAP. Hence, the new performance condition 
removed the disadvantage faced by the Company now that stock options can be reported 
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in accordance with US GAAP without affecting net income (items 7 and 8 of the Report of 
the Board of Managing Directors to the General Meeting, 2000). 
Although the case-study of Deutsche Telekom I World Com in 2000 provided evidence to 
support the view that German incentive pay has essentially remained German, these 
developments indicate that the incentive pay structure of Deutsche Telekom is to an 
extent, responding to external institutional pressures such as those provided by US 
GAAP. 
MG Technologies /Textron 
MG Technologies' stock option scheme in 2000, the Modified Stock Option Plan 1998 
when compared with Textron's 1999 Long Term Incentive Plan was found to have 
supported only four out of five propositions. That is, MG Technologies' executive stock 
option scheme was found not to cover a greater number of executives compared to 
Textron's executive stock option scheme. However, MG Technologies could be 
considered atypical German firm in that figures from its 2000 financial year report show 
that 21 per cent of its shares were US-owned and UK financial institutions owned a further 
20 per cent. In 2001 and 2002, MG technologies' group executives were awarded options 
under the same programme without any changes. 
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SAPIAOL 
SAP's executive stock option scheme in 2000, the 2000 LTI Plan when compared with 
AOL's Stock Option Award was found to have supported four out of four propositions, 
supporting the proposition that SAP's executive stock option scheme although appear to 
represent convergence in the form of US-sVe executive pay, is still 'German' in 
character. Nevertheless, at the 2002 Annual General Meeting of shareholders, SAP's 
shareholders approved the replacement of the 2000 LTI Plan with the Stock Option Plans 
2002. Describing the 2000 LTI Plan as complex compared to other plans implemented by 
German companies in the DAX 30 as well as US companies, SAP introduced SOP 2002 
as a significantly simplified structure where if offered only straightforward stock options 
and replaced the use of index-based performance targets with fixed share price targets. 
However, where each stock option entitles the subscription of one SAP share, the 
payment of exercise price will compose of a base price and a premium of 10 per cent. 
SAP explained in its report to shareholders that by eliminating index-based targets, SAP's 
executive stock option schemes will become more competitive with its US competitors 
and other German companies that prepare their balance sheets in accordance with US 
GAAP. Adopting a stock option, which is considered a fixed plan under the US GAAP, will 
not negatively impact the operation results of SAP, its earnings per share and cash flows 
thus resulting in SAP becoming more competitive. 
The case-study of SAPIAOL in 2000 provided strong tentative evidence to support the 
view that German incentive pay has essentially remained German. However, the recent 
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amendments made to SAP's executive stock option scheme indicate that the incentive 
pay structure of SAP is to an extent influenced by external institutional pressures in the 
form of US GAAP. NoWthstanding this, SAP's new plan in requiring that the payment of 
the exercise price of the stock options include a premium of 10 per cent in addition to the 
base price has resulted in exercising options more demanding. 
Schwarz Pharma I Endo Pharmaceuticals 
Schwarz Pharma's main stock option scheme in 2000, the Stock Option Program 2000, 
when compared with Endo Pharmaceuticals' LLC 1997 Stock Option Plans was found to 
have supported only three out of five propositions. This was due to Schwarz Pharma's 
stock option programme specifying only share price targets as its performance conditions. 
Because of this, the evidence from the case-study of Schwarz Pharma / Endo 
Pharmaceuticals provided only moderate support for the proposition that its executive 
stock option scheme did not converge to US-style executive stock option scheme. On the 
other hand, Section 8.3.1 highlighted that because Schwarz Pharma had issued additional 
Provisions relating to stock options subscription price, in addition to its share price targets, 
its scheme could be said to provide additional performance conditions compared to Endo 
Pharma. Where these findings are reached, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 could be 
indirectly supported thus providing that Schwarz Pharma's executive stock option is still 
fundamentally 'German'. 
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Nonetheless, in 2003, Schwarz Pharma announced that it was replacing its 2000 Stock 
Option Program with Executive Stock Option 2003. Contrary to Deutsche Bank, Deutsche 
Telekom and SAP however, the plan did not amend its performance conditions but 
instead differed from the previous one by choosing to issue straightforward options 
instead of issuing convertible bonds and extending the minimum qualification period from 
2-3 years to 4 years. 
SGL Carbon / Crane 
SGL Carbon's stock option plan in 2000, the Stock Option Plan 2000 when compared with 
Crane's Stock Option Plan 1998 was found to have supported four of the five propositions 
where it did not support Proposition 1. Section 8.3.1 however revealed that a closer 
inspection of the case-study of SGL Carbon/Crane shows that the differences between 
executive involvements in SGL Carbon and Crane schemes are not very significant both 
in terms of actual number of executives involved and proportion of senior executives 
awarded options out of total workforce. It could thus be said that SGL Carbon's executive 
stock option scheme is still fundamentally German. SGL Carbon did not amend its 
executive stock option schemes in 2001 and 2002. 
Vossloh / Wabtec 
Vossloh's stock option plan in 2000, the Long Term Incentive Plan 1998 when compared 
with Wabtec's 2000 Stock Incentive Plan supported four out of five propositions. Vossloh's 
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executive stock option scheme did not provide support for Proposition 2 where it awarded 
options to a higher number of senior executives compared to Wabtec. Section 8.3.1 
examined this finding and found that where the number of proportion of shares issued and 
the number of senior executives awarded stock options are interdependent, Vossloh has 
awarded the proportion of total shares to a higher number of executives compared to 
Wabtec. Taking this into consideration thus, it can be concluded that Vossloh's executive 
stock option scheme, although appear to represent convergence in the form of US-style 
executive pay remains essentially 'German'. Vossloh continued with the same stock 
option plan for 2001 and 2002. 
The examination of the seven German companies contained in the case-studies has 
revealed that in four of the companies (Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Telekom, SAP and 
Schwarz Pharma) executive stock option schemes, which were used to compare with US 
and UK executive stock option schemes, have undergone important changes in the 
subsequent years. With the exception of Schwarz Pharma, the main changes 
incorporated in the scheme have been related to performance conditions. Deutsche Bank, 
Deutsche Telekom, and SAP have all justified the need to amend their performance 
conditions in order to become more competitive with its competitors who prepare their 
balance sheets in accordance with US GAAP. Hence, although the results obtained from 
the case-studies of GermanIUS executive stock option schemes have tentatively 
suggested that German incentive pay has remained German, developments occurring 
after 2000 indicate that incentive pay structure of larger German corporations is to some 
extent responding to external institutional pressures such as those provided by US GAAP. 
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8.5 Conclusions 
This chapter performed the final step of pattern-matching, examining whether the 
variables contained in the theory-pattern have the same values as those in the case-study 
patterns. The pattern-matching results using evidence obtained from German/US case- 
studies showed that generally there is little evidence of German convergence on US-style 
executive stock option schemes. When compared with equivalent schemes in the USA, 
German executive stock option schemes have essentially remained 'German, in the 
sense of being less generous in terms of attaching quantitatively and qualitatively more 
performance conditions and awarding lower number of underlying shares. German 
executive stock option schemes have also been seen to generally extend further down the 
managerial ladder compared to executive stock option schemes in the USA. On the other 
hand, German executive stock option schemes when compared to equivalent schemes in 
the UK appear to be less 'executive friendly' with UK executive stock option schemes 
awarding a smaller proportion of total shares, specifying tighter performance conditions 
and longer equivalent minimum qualification period. 
Nevertheless, further studies on individual German companies contained in the case- 
studies have revealed that the behaviour of German firms does seem to become more 
'American' following the company's accounting conversion to US GAAP and/or listing or 
expected listing of the company's shares on the NYSE. This is especially illustrated by the 
cases of Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bank, and SAP, which although provided strong 
matches to constructs, have recently adopted more simply structured executive stock 
option schemes with performance conditions, which are not linked, to competitors' 
performances, similar to those attached to executive stock option schemes in the USA. 
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Finally, an important point made by this chapter is that although it attempted to derive 
some generalisations by conducting pattern-matching, it must be noted that at this stage, 
it is difficult to claim any absolute analytical generalisation. For the most part, findings 
remain tentative until some statistical significance tests can be conducted and of course, 
this may only be possible when sample size increases and more information becomes 
forthcoming. Nevertheless, these research results are important in that they provide a 
useful basis for when further detail research is possible by demonstrating how 
subsequent, formal tests may be performed. 
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Chapter I stated that the main aim and challenge of this research was to compare 
German executive stock option schemes with equivalent schemes in the USA and UK to 
establish whether they represent an example of convergence for German executive pay in 
particular, and therefore for corporate governance in general. The objective of this final 
chapter is to review the findings of the research undertaken and to assess its contribution 
for the development of a better understanding of German executive pay, stock option 
schemes as well as corporate governance and convergence. 
This concluding chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.1 reviews key findings. Section 
9.2 considers the possible contribution that the research may make the academic debate 
and any implications it might have for policy, and for remuneration practices in firms. 
Section 9.3 considers the limitations of the research and highlights suggestions for future 
work. 
9.1 Discussions of Key Findings 
Where this research has obtained a number of key findings, they are each discussed in 
this section, under the different sub-sections below. 
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9.1.1 Lack of Adoption of US-Style Levels of Information Disclosure 
While larger German companies have adopted seemingly US-style stock option schemes, 
there has not been a parallel adoption of US-sye levels of information disclosure. By the 
start of 2002, forty-three German quoted firms had announced the existence of executive 
stock option schemes, however, only fourteen disclosed detailed information about them. 
Out of these fourteen companies, ten companies were required to disclose information by 
the American Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when they chose to issue Level 11 and III 
ADRs and GDRs on the American markets. Additionally, out of the same total fourteen 
companies, eleven companies had voluntarily chosen to adopt US GAAP accounting 
methods, hence providing more information than what is contained in their German HGB 
accounts. Table 5.1 provided details of companies disclosing information via detailed 
disclosure through ADRs and US GAAP. 
it is interesting to note that out of the total fourteen companies disclosing information, nine 
were found to have disclosed information both through ADRs and US GAAP. While 
reports submitted to the American SEC need not strictly comply with the US GAAP, but 
have to be, reconciled with US accounting and disclosure requirements and often 
extensive, information prepared for American SEC submissions often contain similar 
information as those disclosed under US GAAP. Hence, it could be stated that out of the 
fourteen companies providing information on their executive stock option schemes, only 
three (Continental, MG Technologies and Vossloh) did so without being required to do so 
by American law. 
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Although the number of German companies disclosing information through preparing their 
accounts using US GAAP and issues of ADRs and GDRs are set to increase, and 
information disclosure on stock option schemes is increasing, it is still worth noting that 
certain information remains unobtainable. For example, during the research process, it 
was discovered that where German companies issued stock appreciation rights and stock 
options to its executives, and the underlying shares are bought by the companies from 
third parties, German companies (which do not file in reports with US SEC) are not 
required by Aktiengestz to make information public relating to the schemes. 
Furthermore, while German companies are required to disclose compensation details 
relating to top executives as a group, the identification of individuals, and their individual 
compensation packages, does not have to be disclosed. Where the reports submitted to 
the American SEC only have to be reconciled with US accounting and disclosure 
requirements, German companies issuing ADRs and GDRs, unlike US companies, are 
able to avoid disclosing information on the company's five highest paid officers. 
Furthermore, it was discovered during the data collection process that it is not probable 
for a public German company listed on the NYSE to decline to provide what appears to be 
quite innocuous information. In the case of the German company SAP, the firm refused to 
give this researcher information on even the total number of employees covered by their 
executive stock option schemes. The decision to withhold information relating to executive 
stock option schemes from the researchers and shareholders appears to be both 
surprising and strange, seeing as stock option schemes are a US-style executive pay 
device that is supposed to promote shareholders' interests by incentivising managers. it is 
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also paradoxical that in a country where various stakeholders voice their deep concern for 
fairness in business, the disclosure of information on executive stock option schemes as 
an important component of executive pay is very thin. 
Thus, the clearest and most obvious observation on German stock option schemes is that 
if they constitute one example of convergence on US-style corporate governance, they 
have certainly not been accompanied by US-style information disclosure. The habits of 
relational governance, including the restriction of information to insider stakeholders, are 
hard to break in this context, and executive compensation disclosure could be considered 
a precedent-establishing case for German corporate governance reform in general. 
9.1.2 UK Executive Stock Option Schemes Differ from US Schemes 
performing the process of pattern-matching on the German/UK companies, the research 
revealed a second, unexpected finding that in terms of detailed characteristics, UK share- 
based schemes, whether in the form of executive stock option schemes or conditional 
share awards while often classified as being equivalent to US-style schemes, do not 
appear to be similar to US schemes at all. In fact, case-study evidence showed that UK 
firms when compared to German and US schemes awarded lower underlying shares in 
total; attached quantitatively more and qualitatively stricter performance conditions; and 
specified longer qualifying periods. 
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The UK represents an 'Anglo-American' model of corporate governance and under this 
model, firms are perceived to give priority to maximising shareholders' returns or wealth, 
yet UK schemes appeared to be empathically more German (in the sense of being 
egalitarian and tougher) on examination, than German schemes themselves. Clearly, this 
anomalous finding raises important questions. If the findings are caused by the fact that 
institutions in the UK have resisted the blind adoption of US-style governance innovation 
and adapted the schemes to fit in with the local governance environment, then perhaps 
the description of the 'Anglo-American' model for UK corporate governance needs to be 
reassessed for being too broad and over stating UK's institutional similarities with the 
USA. On the other hand, if the this outcome is the result of UK's experience with 
executives' abuses of reward schemes of recently privatised utility companies which lead 
to increased public scrutiny leading to the adoption of more stringent conditions or 
adoption of long term incentive plans with conditions such as market improvement 
measured against comparator, or limited stock options value. This outcome may have 
some theoretical and policy implications as discussed below. 
Certainly, the disclosure requirements with regard to executive stock option schemes in 
the UK, is far more stringent than those of US companies. Conyon and Sadler (2001) 
discuss how Greenbury (1995) requires full disclosure for a Black-Scholes style option 
valuation for both current and past option grants paid to the company's directors. This in 
contrast to US disclosure requirements which require full information for only the current 
option grant, and the intrinsic value of all unexercised options, which means that only 
options that are in the money vAll have a value placed upon them. 
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9.1.3 German Schemes Displayed Predicted Characteristics 
Findings from German and US companies were more predictable. Pattern-matching 
revealed that German executive stock option schemes displayed characteristics, which 
were predicted my proposition and hence differed from their US equivalents in a number 
of important ways. Where all five of the propositions were found to be supported by 
evidence, the research tentatively concluded that the adoption of US-style executive stock 
option schemes by German corporations have been influenced by prevailing German 
institutions and interest groups. Additionally, these findings appear to implicitly favour 
traditional institutional theory and its prediction of institutional inertia, and the adoption of 
US executive stock option schemes by German corporations, in its details, does not 
appear to represent the convergence of German executive pay, and hence German 
corporate governance on the US pattern. 
9.2 Research Contribution 
E)isclosure of business information is generally poor in Germany. While insiders are kept 
well informed by virtue of their close relationship with the board of directors, outsiders face 
difficulties in obtaining information which are not required to be disclosed by law. With 
regards to executive pay disclosure, until recently, German firms adopting executive stock 
option schemes only had to announce their intention in the Federal Bulletin 
(Bundesanzeigeý without providing any details of the schemes. Information on executive 
pay has however improved. German corporations listing themselves on the American 
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Stock Exchanges are now required by the SEC in the USA to file proxy statements 
disclosing details about their stock option plans. 
The availability of previously undisclosed data presents an invaluable opportunity to 
analyse Germany's adoption of executive stock option schemes. By utilising the new 
available data, this thesis was able to obtain findings which would arguably yield 
potentially more detail than those inferred from survey data (see Conyon and Schwalbach 
. 1999, Kaplan 1997), thereby extending the scope of knowledge on German executive 
pay. This section considers the possible contribution these findings may make to the 
academic debate and any implications it might have for theory, policy, and remuneration 
practices. 
9.2.1 Theory 
The literature on corporate governance and convergence contains important 
disagreements and there exists no study so far which has been able to provide evidence 
that there is an unambiguous direct link between corporate governance and economic 
performance, thereby supporting the argument for convergence, in particular the 
efficiency theory. The balance of opinion and evidence, however, appears to be tilted 
towards counter-convergence arguments where there are fundamental institutional 
reasons, as well as legal and political explanations, why convergence in corporate 
governance systems, especially on the Anglo-American pattern, is not likely. Indeed, the 
literature has documented that important features of the traditional German corporate 
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governance system have persisted (Lane 2003, Lane 1999, Pauly and Reich 1997, D6rre 
1996, Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995. 
Nonetheless, evidence shows that legal reforms are taking place and hostile takeovers 
and executive stock option schemes are being introduced in Germany thereby raising 
important convergence questions. Clearly, there is a need for research to be carried out 
on the actual processes of convergence where there is a possibility of convergence 
occurring (Branson 2001, Khanna et al. 2002). This thesis thus considers the adoption of 
executive stock option schemes by German firms against the background of 'functional 
convergence' and the recent developments in neo-institutional theory which purport to 
understand change by focusing on induced rather than coercively imposed changes. By 
combining both these elements, the research attempted to provide a more detailed, more 
complete, and ultimately more accurate picture of the adoption of a US-style innovation by 
large German companies. 
Emphasising the role of institutions, the research attempted to reintroduce institutional 
theory, culture, and embeddedness and at the same time, the possibility of changes. 
through inducement from neo-institutional theory into the research framework. While a 
focus on external forces such as market pressures or network positions has contributed to 
the understanding of the innovation of US-style executive stock option schemes in 
Germany, the research highlighted that the shift from one governance model to another 
rriay ultimately depend on the institutional, cultural and political influences affecting the 
actors making the decisions in organisations. These arguments recognise that changes 
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happen in a largely path dependent way (Bebchuk and Roe 1998,2000) and the eventual 
outcome may not be a major transformation but more of a dialectical process (Berndt 
1998). 
This conclusion may have important implications for all governance performance studies 
that fail to go behind surface appearances. For example, evident cases of innovation 
adoption in relation to business strategies such as executive stock option schemes, 
takeovers, and other human resource management strategies should first be analysed in 
, -depth 
before their equivalence across countries and/or national cultures is assumed. 
Furthermore, that the traditional binary approach of adoption/non-adoption should not be 
used in this study as it would not be able differentiate between 'superficial' and 'deep' 
innovation adoption. Also consistent with translation theory, the state of German executive 
stock option schemes could additionally be considered as having undergone 'translation' 
under the influence of different interest groups and among complementary governance 
institutions. Such translation is addressed in suggestions for future research, below. 
Within the executive pay literature, there exists the intriguing theoretical conflict between 
agency theory and power-based theories on the study of executive compensation. 
According to the optimal contracting approach, executive compensation can be studied as 
an instrument for combating the agency problems between managers and dispersed 
shareholders (Mirrlees 1974,1976, Holmstrom 1979, Grossman and Han 1983). On the 
other hand, managerial power approach regards compensation arrangements as partly a 
result of agency weaknesses themselves. According to managerial power approach, 
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executives with some influence over their own pay packages as a result of governance 
weaknesses are subject to an 'outrage constraint' among commentators and shareholders 
(Bebchuk et al. 2002). Hence, to camouflage or facilitate the extraction of rents, inefficient 
pay structures that distort incentives and thus further reduce shareholder value may be 
employed. 
The UK is a 'shareholder economy' and under this form of capitalism, firms are perceived 
to give priority to maximising shareholders' returns or wealth. In terms of aggregate CEO 
rewards, it is well known that UK assumes an intermediate position between Germany 
and the USA. Yet, the findings from this research reveals that, in terms of the detailed 
characteristics of executive stock option schemes, UK schemes do not appear to be 
similar to US schemes at all and in fact appeared to be empathically more egalitarian than 
German schemes themselves. 
Executive stock option schemes are only one element in packages of executive rewards, 
and something has given the UK an intermediate position between Germany and the USA 
in terms of aggregate executive pay. Executive stock option schemes in the UK have 
been the subject of a period of exceptionally scrutiny from self-monitoring regulators, the 
press, financial institutions, and other shareholders. The findings thus suggest that there 
arises a possibility that perhaps managerial power theory is relevant to the UK scheme of 
executive compensation. UK executives, because of the 'outrage constraint', may have 
switched their focus away from options to other elements of pay packages that have 
escaped close public scrutiny, e. g. bonus plans and long-term incentive plans that do not 
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involved options. In the USA, and to some extent Germany, an agency theory may be 
more appropriate, though weak governance may have allowed executives to impose weak 
conditions on options awards. 
9.2.2 Government Policy 
Apart from having implications on theory, the research findings may also be significant in 
that they reaffirm areas of difficulty that policy-makes face when attempting to harmonise 
or reform corporate governance systems. Thus is further discussed mfith specific 
examples below. 
European Union Reforms 
The European Union has for quote a while been trying to harmonise governance in 
various ways, through efforts to standardise accounting conventions and recognise 
employee participation rights in work councils, and to establish a takeover code. With 
regards to takeover-bid regulations, efforts have to far been problematic and no 
agreement has been reached in the European Commission. 
In fact, the European Union received a surprise in 2000, when the German government, 
which had been supporting the broad lines of the European Commission Draft Thirteenth 
Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids put forward in 1996, was suddenly 
seen to change its course dramatically. First, the German government announced it was 
210 
Chapler 9: Conclusion 
opposing the draft, and then it voted the draft down in the European Parliament in 2991 
and subsequently passed a law granting managers the right to fend off a hostile approach 
without consulting shareholders. The European Commission has insisted that regulating 
takeover bid regulations is a key element in achieving an integrated capital market in the 
Union by 2005. 
The purported importance of regulating takeover bids however can be seen as requiring 
expedience in governance reform. Where the research results support the proposition that 
institutions, culture and political influence governance implementations, they offer a 
plausible explanation as to why the European Union takeover code has taken so long and 
may never see the light of the day. 
The 1998 OECD Principles and Asian Countries 
Post-crisis reform is underway through out Asia. In response to the perceived inadequacy 
of Asian governance models - mainly relational governance though families and networks 
- resulting in corporate misconduct contributing to the Asian financial crisis, the 1998 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance were introduced as a replacement for corporate governance systems in Asia, 
by offering internationally recognised standards of good governance. The standards set 
out specific guidelines that act as benchmark against which compliance can be measured 
and it was proposed that they enabled domestic institutions to be developed quicker than 
would otherwise be possible through self-design. 
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The problem with the use of these standards however is that many of the concepts 
included in the best practice standards are founded on Anglo-American ideals and the 
question arises as to whether the existing systems in Asia were inherently suitable. The 
findings of this research suggest that corporate governance systems are unlikely to 
develop according to their own national institutions, culture and political influences. To this 
end, the adoption of internationally recognised standards of good governance, which has 
been posited as an appropriate method of reforming perceived problems, may me 
alternatively viewed as futile attempts of transplanting governance systems. 
SEC 14a - 11 Rules to Increase Shareholder Voke in the USA 
Corporate governance in the USA is said to be undergoing reform due to the widely 
publicised cases of corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom that have 
compromised investor confidence and weakened financial markets. The Sarbanes - 
Oxley Act was introduced in 2002 as a ten-point plan to promote corporate responsibility, 
increased public disclosure, improve the quality and transparency of financial reporting 
and auditing, and strengthen the penalties for securities law and other violations. In 
October 2003, building on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC proposed rule 14a-1 1 that 
would require companies, under certain circumstances to include shareholders' nominees 
for directors in the company proxy materials. The SEC Commissioner, Harvey 
Goldschmidt observed, '... we are in the process of shifting the balance of power between 
corporate managements and shareholders' (Witschey Jr. 2003). 
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Yet, the rules, when examined closely, appear to be restrictive and would all but rule out 
investors' ability to get on corporate boards. The president of the board of the California 
Public Employees' Retirement System writing to the SEC on behalf of itself and eight 
other separate state representatives thus expressed that 'this rule created the illusion of 
access and the appearance of reform without offering actual access or real reform' 
(Hamm 2003). In any case, mutual funds are not owners, they are investors, and 
investors vote with their feet selling companies they do not like as it is their job to invest 
the beneficiaries' money in the most profitable investment (Drucker 1976). Furthermore, 
the compensation of many fund managers is based on how they perform in comparison 
with their peers and the benchmarks involved are based on quarterly results. 
The research finding in this thesis offers that the mere introduction of new legal rules is 
unlikely to result in sweeping changes in corporate governance practices. It is unlikely that 
institutional investors will start using their voice to control managers when the US 
governance system encourages fund managers to trade based on short-term 
performance and ignore longer-term interests. 
Gertnan Regulation vs. UK Self Regulations 
Finally, the research findings that the UK may have produced option schemes that are 
more egalitarian than German schemes, in terms of the quantity and quality of 
performance conditions and the proportion of total shares under option, may be significant 
for German policy makers in illustrating that self-regulation in the UK appears to have 
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produced a stricter regime for executive stock option schemes than stakeholder 
governance and regulation by the State in Germany. This reform was achieved despite 
prevailing institutions and a national culture of individualism and low tolerance of power 
distance (see Chapter 3). 
While law-based provisions are 'binding by construction' Le. because of their legal status, 
standards are voluntary by construction, but can also be binding in practice. Complying 
with standards can thus be strictly required to be active in a specific market due to peer 
pressure or market pressure (Padoa-Schioppa 2002). Indeed, in political science, 
standards and public regulations are viewed as alternatives, and the availability and 
strength of the different options are used to explain the choice of one over the other. 
Accordingly, standards have emerged as the primary means of governance where the 
balance of power has tilted on the side of the industry. 
in the UK, self-regulation has been important in promoting transparency and investor 
protection and corporate governance has been influenced by three major committees 
investigating the issue of corporate governance and issued reports: The Cadbury 
Committee, which was established in 1991 in response to a number of large corporate 
failures (e. g. Polly Peck, BCCI, the Maxwell companies) issued recommendations for a 
voluntary 'Code of Best Practice' leading to and accountability of the role of the boards; 
The Greenbury Committee, which was set up in 1995 in response to the public perception 
that top managers of privatised utilities were receiving excessive pay increases, focused 
on the issue of determination of executive pay; and The Hampel Committee, the 
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successor to the Cadbury Committee proposed a 'super-code' combining and updating 
the Cadbury and Greenbury codes. These Committees comprised CEOs (with Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel themselves CEOs of large companies) and leaders of profession. 
The tradition of self-regulation, while wide ranging in UK and USA, is uncommon in 
Germany. In Germany, legal protection of outside shareholders appears to be 
underdeveloped in Germany compared to the UK (La Porta et al. 1996). However, several 
private initiatives have been taken to develop best-practice principles aiming at German 
corporate governance code, on the back of the demands of institutional investors and 
widespread critique of the traditional German corporate governance system. These 
commissions include: The Commissions of General Principles of Corporate Governance 
which primarily emphasises legal aspects and provide recommendations based on OECD 
corporate governance principles; The Berlin Initiative for a German Code of Corporate 
Governance which takes a broader view on corporate governance as the legal and factual 
rules for managing and controlling a company; and an official government commission 
proposing a German Corporate Governance Code covering shareholder value, dual 
corporate constitution, transparent corporate management and the independence for 
auditors and supervisory board. Although the German Corporate Governance Code is 
voluntary in nature, the code is supported by a separate law that forces German 
companies to say whether they abide by it or not. Where these German codes represent a 
process-oriented approach, which does not impose a uniform framework for every 
institution, they have the major benefit of being readily adaptable to dynamic 
developments taking place in Germany. 
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9.2.3 Remuneration Practices 
Clearly, no form of governance, certainly not US-style stock market capitalism, is 
appropriate in all contingencies. Different governance systems enable firms and countries 
to excel at different kind activities and different governance mechanisms can perform 
equally well in different contingent environments. The findings support the view that 
institutions, path dependency and culture are important contingencies, and it seems 
unlikely that firms or governments may be able to pick and mix the optimum governance 
package, e. g. through governments' regulatory reforms. Hence, while the possibility of 
genuine institutional change appears real, business strategies should first be analysed in 
depth before their equivalence across national cultures is assumed. This deeper analysis 
should be applied to strategies such as executive stock option schemes and other forms 
of equity-based pay or human resource strategies, and apparently hostile takeovers of 
other companies. 
Indeed, in the case of Germany, because stock option schemes only superficially 
resemble US-style schemes having been influenced by German institutions and culture, 
these stock options may not serve to act as they do in the US. That, instead of attempting 
to provide real incentives for individual managers, they may exist merely to appease 
international investors, since the announcements of executive stock option schemes has 
in general a positive influence on share price (Westphal and Zajac 1998). The important 
implication of this is that international investors attracted to invest in German companies 
implementing executive stock option schemes may consequently find themselves 
investing in companies which might not only fail to align senior managers' interests to 
shareholders in terms of maximising shareholder values, but are also burdened with 
216 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
additional agency costs where shareholder value is redistributed in favour of managers. 
For the same reason, this research may itself help to make international investors more 
aware of the differences between German option schemes at a surface and deeper level. 
9.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This section considers the limitations of this research and makes a number of suggestions 
for future research. 
9.3.1 Limitations 
The present study has certain quite obvious limitations that need to be taken into account 
when considering the overall study and its contribution. Firstly, the study was performed 
when the adoption of executive stock option scheme by German companies was at an 
early stage and the data obtained only related to one financial year. Although it was 
considered important to analyse German executive stock option schemes when 
information was made available, enabling initial studies to be conducted in German 
executive stock option schemes, it could also be argued that research examining these 
schemes at a later stage would have revealed more. The adoption of a foreign innovation 
at a deeper level takes time and research, which analysed data for more than one point in 
time or involved data of several years which would arguable be able to reveal whether 
differences between German, US and UK executive stock option schemes are 
maintaining themselves, or lessening, over time. Indeed, Chapter 8 revealed that 
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subsequent studies on German corporations contained in the case-studies such as 
Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Telekom, and SAP have been observed to have replaced their 
2000 executive share option schemes with plans attaching different performance 
conditions such as absolute share price increase. 
Secondly, the scope and content of this study were constrained by the low level of 
disclosure of German executive compensation package. While fourteen German 
companies do disclose some information relating to their stock option schemes, 
information regarding the number of stock options awarded to individual senior executives 
and identification of senior executives remained elusive. As previously highlighted, the 
researcher did not succeed in obtaining information even regarding the mere number of 
participating executives in one of the German case-study (SAP). On the other hand, 
where information disclosure relating to the stock option awards in Germany has 
improved, the availability of new information provides crucial means by which theory 
relating to German pay can be finally tested. 
Thirdly, although the research attempted to derive some generalisations by conducting 
pattern-matching, there is a risk of value judgements and interpretive discretion on the 
part of the researcher, which might have created problems. Research may be overly 
restrictive in claiming a pattern to have been violated or conversely, may be too lenient. 
Recognising that there is not precise way of setting the criteria for comparisons, the 
research thus attempted to improve the quality of pattern-matching by developing semi- 
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quantitative measures while constructing theories and analysing case-study evidence as 
elaborated in Chapter 6. 
Finally, it is also difficult to claim at this stage any absolute analytical generalisation from 
the pattern-matching method. The results from pattern-matching, while rich in individual 
case-study evidence, are not statistically significant and are in need of subsequent 
significance tests. Of course, the number of German companies disclosing information on 
their executive stock option schemes was found to be only fourteen in this study, and 
statistical testing may only be possible when sample size increases and more information 
is forthcoming. For this reason, this research can only be seen as a kind of pilot study in 
the analysis of German executive pay in the form of stock option schemes. 
9.3.2 Future Research 
The conclusions, as well as limitations of this study, suggest some interesting possible 
avenues for future research. Firstly, it is proposed that when sample size builds up, 
longitudinal research be carried out emýoying statistical significance tests to obtain more 
concrete analytical generalisations for German executive pay and for any possible 
convergence. Sample size is expected to increase because a higher level of disclosure is 
expected to occur in Germany in the following months and years for the following reasons: 
Firstly, more German companies are expected to list their shares on the stock exchange 
and issue Type 11 and III ADRs as well as adopt US GAAP. Secondly, the International 
Accounting System (IAS) board proposed in 2002 that firms using IAS have to disclose 
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similar information on compensation as US GAAP starting financial year 2004 and this is 
further expected to influence the accounting system in Germany (HGB). Thirdly, the 
voluntary corporate governance code recommends that German companies disclose 
executive pay details such as executive stock option schemes, conditions and individual 
director pay on their websites. Indeed, in 2002, several of the DAX 30 companies, such as 
Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Infineon, Metro, Schering and Thyssen Krupp started 
disclosing executive pay details on their company websites. 
It is thus suggested that in the future, two long-term research projects be carried out. 
Firstly, it is proposed that databases of large numbers of companies in Germany and the 
USA be assembled (say n>100 for each country). With a particular executive stock option 
scheme character taken from Proposition I to Proposition 5 as the dependent variable, 
regressions could proceed with size, industry, performance, and country dummies as 
independent variables. Significant coefficients on the German country dummy would 
denote rejection or otherwise of Hypothesis 1 to Hypotheses 5 and hence conclusions on 
whether German executive stock option schemes represent convergence on US-style 
governance. An alternative proposal is to compile two smaller sets of data of German and 
US companies which are nevertheless big enough to obtain matching pairs to control for 
size and industry and carry out Mests to the means of the samples similar to the study 
carried out by Combs and Skills (2003). 
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An important consideration when conducting this test is to improve the variables that 
measure the characteristics of the remunerations schemes. The findings obtained from 
this case-study demonstrated that German firms cannot be categorised according to 
whether they have executive stock option schemes or not (with the traditional binary 
approach of adoption/non-adoption or zero/dummies) as they do not differentiate between 
'superficial' and 'deep' adoption; i. e. they will not be able to reveal the real extent to which 
the innovation has been employed. To this end, the matched case-study comparison 
serves as a useful initial methodology to measure the deeper nature of option schemes. 
For example, it suggests that future research may need to take into account the severity 
of performance conditions not only in terms of the form of the performance condition (TSR 
v EPS, etc) but also the demanding nature of the target in terms of the firm's recent 
achievements. The idiosyncratic German use of convertible bonds, associated with 
various discounts and premiums, should also be embraced as variations on more 
universally accepted performance conditions. Finally, recent changes in the option 
schemes and company circumstances (e. g. state ownership increased ownership by US 
institutions) must also be factored into the analysis, rather than taking a blanket, cross- 
section view. 
Secondly, besides providing support for counter-convergence theories, the findings 
obtained from the analysis also indicate support for the suggestion by Buck, Shahrim and 
Winters (2004) that the adoption of executive stock option schemes by German 
companies could be analysed in future as an 'organisational innovation'. According to 
translation theory, all innovations are viewed as outcomes of negotiation processes 
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between organisations and people. This is because innovation has to go by 'passing 
points' in a network and be transformed or translated to suit the legitimate interest groups 
(Latour 1996) in a way that reflects their own role, context, and intentions. Although 
permanent struggle is expected, the adoption and translation of an innovation may 
conceal its embeddedness in antecedent culture, institutions, and knowledge structures 
through shrew camouflage (Roffenburg 1996). 
Thirdly, it is proposed that where this thesis has been concerned with large firms, future 
research should be extended to the study of small firms. Much research has been 
conducted examining the differences between large and small firms. Small firms, including 
start-ups (typically smallý have been found to have a liability of newness (Stinchcombe 
1965, Baum 1996, Hannan and Freeman 1984) and a liability of smallness (Hannan and 
Freeman 1984, Aldrich and Auster 1986, Baum 1996). Corollary to these views, large 
established firms have been found to have a liability of obsolescence suggesting that 
established firms' failure rates increased with ages, as they become inertial and their 
original fit with the environment erodes (Baum 1989). Relating this to concern of fit to 
innovation, Dougherty (1996) finds that established organisations have problems in 
innovating effectively. 
Thus, within the innovation-diffusion literature, Dougherty and Hardy (1995) emphasises 
the role of new entrants and small firms at the periphery of an industry as change agents 
and early adopters. This would imply that studies of German executive stock option 
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scheme should be extended to small firms on the Neuer Mark (and its recent 
replacements) for evidence of the radical adoption of US-style execufive pay packages. 
Finally, it could also be interesting to extend this study to more countries, such as family- 
based capitalism in South East Asia. Theoretically, the concept of a family-based 
corporate governance system can be contrasted with the predominantly bank-based 
system of Germany and the market-based systems of US and UK. While both bank-based 
and market-based systems are closely associated with the dominant modes of corporate 
finance by banks and equity markets, the family-based system is known to be first 
financed largely by internal funds and then later to obtain funds from borrowing and 
raising capital by issuing stocks (Khan 1999). Even with large doses of external finance, 
family groups still control the governance aspects resulting in an asymmetry of information 
between the outside financiers and the inside owner-managers. Where executive stock 
option schemes seem to have been adopted by larger corporations in South East Asia, 
future research based on the advancement provided by this research could be undertaken 
to ascertain the characteristics of the executive stock option schemes adopted and 
whether South-East Asian countries, like UK and German corporations have resisted the 
blind adoption of a US-sye governance innovation. 
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Appendix A 
The following is the database containing important and relevant information about the 
individual German, US and UK companies' main share based reward schemes as 
described by Chapter 7 in Section 7.3. 
Deutsche Bank (Germany) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: Global Equity Plan 1998: Interest paying 
convertible bonds 
Number of participants: 2,498 
Level of paftipants involved: 
Board of management, senior executives of 
Deutsche Bank and affiliated companies, regional 
managers and head of services in main office. 
Approximate number of total employees: 91,168 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 2.74% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 
options under the scheme during the year 
6,968,200 
Total number of shares: 3,029,604,034 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 0.230 per cent 
to total share capital 
Peaormance condition(s) stated: 
Average adjusted pre-tax earnings per share for 3 
years preceding the exercise period to exceed 
average adjusted pre-tax earnings per share for 3 
years preceding the issuance of the bonds. 
Minimum qualification period 3 years. 
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JP Morgan Chase (USA) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: Growth Incentive Program - Stock Options 
Number of participants: 
Level of participants involved: Executive Officers 
Approximate number of total employees: 100,000 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 
0.005% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 
options under the scheme during the year 
4,392,817 
Total number of shares: 1,940,109,081 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 
0.226% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: 
Cumulative EPS targets of $8.50 and $9.0 are 
achieved for the next one-year and two years. 
Minimum qualification period 3 years. 
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HSBC Holdings (UK) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 2000 Restricted Share Plan - Conditional Share Award 
Number of participants: 264 
Level of paftipants involved: 
Executive directors, group general managers, and 
other senior executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 171,049 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.1543 % 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 
options under the scheme during the year 
2,085,000 
Total number of shares: 9,268,200,364 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 0.023% 
to total share capital 
Pefformance condition(s) stated: 
Attainment of a predetermined TSR target, against 
the mean of a selected benchmark after a3 years 
performance period 
Minimum qualification period 3 years. 
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Deutsche Telekom (Germany) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: Stock Option Plan 2000 
Number of participants: 350 
Level of paMcipants involved: 
Managing directors, managers below board level 
and managers of domestic and foreign group 
company 
Approximate number of total employees: 25,495 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 1.373 % 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 
options under the scheme during the year 
1,023,923 
Total number of shares: 3,029,604,034 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 0.038% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: 
Shares (adjusted for dividends, pre-emptive rights, 
and other special rights) to outpefform the Euro 
Stoxx 50 Total Return Index 
Minimum qualification period 2 years. 
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WorldCom (USA) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
1999 Stock Option Plan 
4 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers 
Approximate number of total employees: 66,667 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.006% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 
3,640,000 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 2,867,664,559 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 
0.1269% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: None 
Minimum qualification period 1 year 
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BT (UK) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Level of paftipants involved: 
Incentive Share Scheme - Conditional Share 
Award 
2,500 
Executive directors, group general managers, and 
other senior executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 104,700 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 2.3878% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 9.7 million 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 6,507,104,882 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 0.149% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: 
TSR has to be at the upper quartile of the top 25 
company ranked on the FTSE 100 index at the end 
of the three years for all shares to vest. The 
proportion of shares to vest reduces on a straight 
line basis according to its TSR position with only 
25% vesting at the 50th position 
Minimum qualification period 3 years 
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MG Technologies (Germany) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Modified Stock Option Plan 1998 
180 
Level of participants involved: Executive directors and other group executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 38,145 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.4719% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 1,410,000 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 492,245,451 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 
0.2864% 
to total share capital 
Pefformance condition(s) stated: 
Average EPS in the 3 fiscal years preceding to 
stock options exercise to exceed the average EPS 
in the 3 fiscal years prior to issuance of the options 
Minimum qualification period 3 years 
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Textron (USA) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of parficipants: 
Level of paýicipants involved: 
1999 Long Term Incentive Plan - Stock Options 
1019 
Executive directors, key executives and other 
employees 
Approximate number of total employees: 71,000 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 1.4352% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 4,618,000 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 146,150,000 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 3.1598% 
to total share capital 
Peýormance condition(s) stated: None 
Minimum qualification period 1 year 
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Johnson Mafthey (UK) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Long Term Incentive Plan 1998 - Conditional Share Award 
1650 
Le el of participants involved: Executive directors and other senior executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 6,996 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 23.5849% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 328,962 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 221,082,018 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 0.148% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: 
TSR performance position compared to the FTSE 
mid-250 index over a 3-year performance period 
with pro-rata allocations being made. No shares 
will be released at below 50th percentile 
performance. EPS also to increase to at least 
equal to the annual increase in UK RPI +2% per 
annurn over the period 
Minimum qualification period 3 years 
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SAP (Germany) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Level of padicipants involved: 
Long Term Incentive 2000 Plan: Convertible bonds 
and stock options 
Unknown 
Executive directors, senior managers and top 
performers 
Approximate number of total employees: 28,210 
Percentage number of senior executives selected Unknown 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 3,145,000 (preference shares) 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 131.7 million (preference shares) 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 2.388% 
to total share capital 
Peýormance condition(s) stated: 
Preference shares to outperform the Goldman 
Sachs Software Index (GSTI) immediately for 
period preceding the grant date 
Minimum qualification period 2 years 
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AOL (USA) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
AOL Stock Option Award 
3 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers 
Approximate number of total employees: 18,000 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 
for the scheme 
0.0167% 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 
6,500,000 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 2,378.6 million 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 
0.273% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: None 
Minimum qualification period 1 year 
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Reuters (UK) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
1993 Long Term Incenfive Share Plan - Restricted 
Share Award 
9 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers and group executive directors 
Approximate number of total employees: 16,265 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.0533% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 303,324 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 1,429,100 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 0.021% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: 
Company's TSR ranking position in the FTSE 100 
index based on total return to shareholders over a 
3-5 year period 
Minimum qualification period 5 years 
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Schwarz Pharma (Germany) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Stock Option Program 2000: Interest bearing fixed 
rate convertible debentures 
500 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers and other senior executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 407,166 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.1228 per cent for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 448,000 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 21,993,000 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 2.037% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: None 
Minimum qualification period 2 years 
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Endo Pharma (USA) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
1997 Stock Option Plans 
60 
Level of participants involved: Executive directors, and selected senior executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 30,000 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.200% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 8,471,259 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 79,454,000 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 10.662% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: None 
Minimum qualification period None 
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Cell Tech (UK) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Executive Share Option Scheme 1999 
508 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers and senior managers 
Approximate number of total employees: 2,029 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 25.037 per cent 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 4,682,078 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 273,842,647 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 1.710% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: 
Share price to outperform the USE Mid 250 index 
by a margin over at least a3 year period 
Minimum qualification period 3 years 
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SGL Carbon (Germany) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Level of paaicipants involved: 
Stock Option Plan 
154 
Executive officers, senior executives, executive 
officers of the group and senior executives of group 
companies 
Approximate number of total employees: 8,084 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 1.905% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 187,500 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 21,404,000 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 0.876% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: 
Share price and reinvested dividend to exceed 
exercise price by at least 15 % 
Minimum qualification period 1 year 
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Crane (USA) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Stock Option Plan 1998 
199 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers and other senior executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 9,405 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 2.116% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 1,014,220 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 60,198,426 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 1.685% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: None 
Minimum qualification period 1 year 
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TT Electronics (UK) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Executive Share Option Scheme 1996 
100 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers and other senior executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 8,295 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.1206% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 725,545 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 154,798,103 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 0.468% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: 
Group's EPS to increase at a rate greater than 2% 
above any increase in the all items index of retail 
prices after 3 years 
Minimum qualification period 3 years 
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Vossloh (Germany) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Level of patcipants involved: 
Long Term Incentive Program 1998: Stock 
purchase to receive bonus options 
45 
Executive board members and other senior 
executives 
Approximate number of total employees: 4,839 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.9300% 
for the scheme ' 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 413,306 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 14,400,000 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 2.870% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: Share price to outperform the M-DAX Index 
Minimum qualification period 3 years 
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Wabtec (USA) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
2000 Stock Incentive Plan: Stock Options 
5 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers 
Approximate number of total employees: 4,386 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.1140% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 
755,000 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 42,922,780 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 1.759% 
to total share capital 
Peýormance condition(s) stated: None 
Minimum qualification period None 
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Henlys (UK) 
FYE 31 December 2000 
Main executive stock option scheme: 
Number of participants: 
Long Term Incentive Plan - Shares 
3 
Level of participants involved: Executive officers 
Approximate number of total employees: 2,864 
Percentage number of senior executives selected 0.1746% 
for the scheme 
Maximum number of shares underlying awarded 
224,168 
options under the scheme during the year 
Total number of shares: 76,144,063 
Percentage of shares underlying awarded options 
0.294% 
to total share capital 
Performance condition(s) stated: None 
Minimum qualification period 3 years 
Append&A 
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The following is the database containing important and relevant information about the 
individual German, US and UK companies' main share based reward schemes as 
described in Section 7.3 and used by Section 7.3.2 
German I US Companies 
Deutsche Bank / JP Morgan Chase 
Deutsche Bank JP Morgan Chase 
(German) (US) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 2.740% 0.005% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 0.230% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 1 
4. Performance condifions 
0.226% 
1 
Average adjusted pre- Cumulative EPS for 
tax EPS to exceed next two years to 
average pre tax EPS of achieve targets of 
previous 3 years $8.50 and $9.50 
5. Minimum qualification period 3 years 2 years 
Deutsche Telekom I WorldCom 
Deutsche Telekom WorldCorn 
(German) (US) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 1.373% 0.006% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 
0.033% 0.126% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 1 
4. Performance conditions 
0 
Share price to 
outperform the Euro None 
Stoxx 50 
5. Minimum qualification period 2 years 1 year 
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MG TechnologiesiTextron 
MG Tech Textron 
(German) (US) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 0.472% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 0.2864% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 1 
4. Performance conditions 
1.435% 
3.159% 
0 
Average EPS growth 
against historical None 
average EPS growth 
5. Minimum qualification period 3 years 1 year 
SAP I AOL 
SAP AOL 
(German) (US) 
1. Percentage of employees involved Unknown 0.017% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 
0.122% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 1 
4. Performance conditions 
Stock price to 
outpOorm the 
Goldman Sachs 
Software Index 
0.273% 
0 
None 
5. Minimum qualification period 2 years 1 year 
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Schwarz Pharma I Endo Pharma 
Schwarz Pharma Endo Pharma 
(German) (US) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 0.123% 0.200% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 
2.037% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 0 
4. Performance condiUons None 
10.662% 
0 
None 
5. Minimum qualification period 2 years None 
SGL Carbon / Crane 
SGL Carbon Crane 
(German) (US) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 1.905% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 
0.876% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 
4. Performance condifions 
Share price and 
reinvested dividend to 
exceed exercise price 
by at least 15% 
2.116% 
0.468% 
0 
None 
5. Minimum qualification period 2 years 1 year 
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Vossloh I Wabtec 
Vossloh Wabtec 
(German) (US) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 0.930% 0.114% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 2.870% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 
4. Performance conditions 
1.759% 
0 
Share price to 
None 
outperform the M-DAX 
5. Minimum qualification period 3 years Discretionary 
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German/UK Companies 
Deutsche Bank I HSBC Holdings Holdings 
Deutsche Bank HSBC 
(German) (UK) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 2.740% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 0.230% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions I 
4. Pefformance condifions 
Average adjusted pre- 
tax EPS to exceed 
average pre tax EPS of 
previous 3 years 
5. Minimum qualification period 3 years 
Deutsche Telekom I BT 
0.154% 
0.022% 
1 
Attainment of 
predetermined TSR 
targets, against the 
mean of a selected 
benchmark after a3 
years performance 
period 
years 
Deutsche Telekom BT 
(German) (UK) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 1.373% 0.006% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 
0.033% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 
4. Pefformance condifions 
0.149% 
1 
TSR to be within top 
Share price to 25-52 companies 
outperform the Euro ranked on the FTSE 
Stoxx 50 100 index at the end 
of three years 
5. Minimum qualification pedod 2 years 3 years 
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MG Technologies I Johnson Mafthey 
MG Tech Johnson Mafthey 
(German) (UK) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 0.472% 23.585% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 0.2864% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 
4. Performance conditons 
0.148% 
2 
TSR performance 
position compared to 
Average EPS growth FTSE mid 250 index 
against historical over 3 years. EPSS 
average EPS growth growth also to 
exceed UK RPI + 2% 
per annurn 
5. Minimum qualification period 3 years 
SAP / Reuters 
1. Percentage of employees involved 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares to 
total number of shares outstanding 
years 
SAP Reuters 
(German) (UK) 
Unknown 0.055% 
0.122% 0.0212% 
3. Number of performance conditions 1 
4. Pefformance conditions 
1 
Total return to 
Stock price to outperform shareholders over 3-5 
the Goldman Sachs years compared to 
Software Index companies in USE 
100 index 
5. Minimum qualification period 2 years years 
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Schwarz Pharma I Cell Tech 
Schwarz Pharma Endo Pharma 
(German) (US) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 0.123% 25.037% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 2.037% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 0 
SGL Carbon TT Electronics 
(German) (UK) 
Share price 
outperforming the 
4. Performance conditions None FTSE Mid 250 Index 
by a margin over a3 
yearperiod 
5. Minimum qualification period 2 years 3 years 
SGL Carbon I TT Electronics 
1. Percentage of employees involved 1.905% 0.121% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 
0.876% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
Number of performance conditions 
4. Peaormance condifions 
1.7098% 
1 
0.469% 
1 
EPS to increase at a 
Share price and rate greater than 2% 
reinvested dividend to above any increase 
exceed exercise price in the all terms index 
by at least 15% of retail prices after 3 
years 
Minimum qualification period 2 years 3 years 
279 
Appendix B 
Vossloh I Henlys 
Vossloh Henlys 
(German) (UK) 
1. Percentage of employees involved 0.930% 0.175% 
2. Percentage of maximum underlying shares 
2.870% 
to total number of shares outstanding 
3. Number of performance conditions 
4. Performance conditions 
0.294% 
0 
Share price to None 
outperform the M-DAX 
5. Minimum qualification period 3 years 3 years 
280 
